The Evolution of Central Banks employs a wide range of historical evidence and reassesses current monetary analysis to argue that the development of non-profit-maximizing and noncompetitive central banks to supervise and regulate the commercial banking system fulfils a necessary and natural function. Goodhart surveys the case for free banking, examines the key role of the clearing house in the evolution of the central bank, and investigates bank expansion and fluctuation in the context of the clearing house mechanism. He concludes that it is the noncompetitive aspect of the central bank that is crucial to the performance of its role. Goodhart addresses the questions of deposit insurance and takes up the "club theory" approach to the central bank. Included in the historical study of their origins are 8 European central banks, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Board of the United States.

This book is the first complete survey of the evolution of monetary institutions and practices in Western countries from the Middle Ages to today. It radically rethinks previous attempts at a history of monetary institutions by avoiding institutional approach and shifting the focus away from the Anglo-American experience. Previous histories have been hamstrung by the linear, teleological assessment of the evolution of central banks. Free from such assumptions, Ugolini’s work offers bankers and policymakers valuable and profound insights into their institutions. Using a functional approach, Ugolini charts an historical trajectory longer and broader than any other attempted on the subject. Moving away from the Anglo-American perspective, the book allows for a richer (and less biased) analysis of long-term trends. The book is ideal for researchers looking to better understand the evolution of the institutions that underlie the global economy.

This 2005 treatment compares the central banks of Britain and the United States.

This volume collects the proceedings from a conference on the evolution and practice of central banking sponsored by the Central Bank Institute of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The articles and discussants' comments in this volume largely focus on two questions: the need for central banks, and how to maintain price stability once they are established. The questions addressed include whether large banks (or coalitions of small banks) can substitute for government regulation and due central bank liquidity provision; whether the future will have fewer central banks or more; the possibility of private means to deliver a uniform currency; if competition across sovereign currencies can ensure global price stability; the role of learning (and unlearning) the lessons of the past inflationary episodes in understanding central bank behavior; and an analysis of the European Central Bank.

Offers a comprehensive analysis of the historical experiences of monetary policymaking of the world's largest central banks. Written in celebration of the 350th anniversary of the central bank of Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank. Includes chapters on other banks around the world written by leading economic scholars.

Central banks have emerged as the key players in national and international policy making. This book explores their evolution since World War II in 20 industrial countries. The study considers the mix of economic, political and institutional forces that have affected central bank behaviour and its relationship with government. The analysis reconciles vastly different views about the role of central banks in the making of economic policies. One finding is that monetary policy is an evolutionary process.

A leading economist and former central banker discusses the evolution of central bank communication from secretiveness to transparency and accountability. Central bank communication has evolved from secretiveness to transparency and accountability—from a reluctance to give out any information at all to the belief in communication as a panacea for effective policy. In this book, Otmar Issing, himself a former central banker, discusses the journey toward transparency in central bank communication. Issing traces the development of transparency, examining the Bank of England as an example of extreme reticence and European Central Bank's President Mario Draghi as a practitioner of effective communication. He argues that the ultimate goal of central bank communication is to make monetary policy more effective, and describes the practice and theory of communication as an evolutionary process. For a long time, the Federal Reserve never made its monetary policy decisions public; the European Central Bank, on the other hand, had to adopt a modern communication strategy from the outset. Issing discusses the importance of guiding expectations in central bank communication, and points to financial markets as the most important recipients of this communication. He discusses the obligations of accountability and transparency, although he notes that total transparency is a “mirage.” Issing argues that the central message to the public must always be that the stability of a nation's currency is the bank's priority.