James M. Buchanan, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986, was a pioneer of public choice and constitutional political economy, as well as contributing to many fields of study, including philosophy, political science, and public finance. Each chapter in this volume seeks to explore, critique, and emphasize the continuing relevance of the vast contributions of Buchanan to our understanding of political economy and social philosophy. The diversity in topics and approaches will make the volume of interest to readers in a variety of fields, and accessible to scholars from a variety of backgrounds providing the opportunity to further a cross-disciplinary exploration and discussion on market process theory.

“A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan’s many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory.”– Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA"The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book."– Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USA This book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan’s receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarly community. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan’s scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy.This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan’s scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan’s scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.

James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy: A Rational Reconstruction examines the contemporary meaning and significance of James M. Buchanan’s body of work. The book uses Buchanan’s past contributions to explore the present and future relevance of his scholarly contributions and insights. It seeks mainly to explain what insight for their work contemporary scholars might acquire by becoming familiar with some of Buchanan’s formulations. Buchanan was one of the most creative and prolific scholars of political economy during the post-war period. Not only was his body of work so immense that it could not be contained within 20 volumes of Collected Works, but also Buchanan’s scholarship made such strong contact with law, ethics, and political science that he could easily have served as a poster-child for the programs in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics which have been gaining momentum in recent years. Buchanan spoke for a style of economics that made wide and firm contact with the full range of the humane studies. This book emphasizes those features of Buchanan’s thought that seem relevant for contemporary scholarship within the broadly liberal tradition of political economy.

This definitive book examines and engages with the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, along with the Bloomington School of Political Economy more generally. The contributors emphasize the continuing relevance of the Ostroms’ work on collective action, self-governance, and institutional diversity for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities. This book’s wide array of topics and approaches will be a valuable resource to readers in a variety of fields, including: political science, economics, philosophy, sociology, public administration, environmental studies, and political economy.

"Buchanan's Tensions: Reexamining the Political Economy and Philosophy of James M. Buchanan," a collection of eight original scholarly essays, presents a critical assessment of Buchanan's research and ideas.

Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

A political economist whose numerous and influential writings explore the no-man's-land that separates the social science disciplines. The founder of the constitutional economics paradigm, Buchanan was awarded the 1986 Nobel Prize in economic science for his contributions to a theory of constitutional political economy as well as his leadership of the public choice movement. In this volume, David Reisman seeks to explain and analyze the important insights of this difficult but stimulating multidisciplinary figure. Buchanan's recommendation of constitutional precommitment will appeal to all economists who share his conviction that politicians and bureaucrats, where not preconstrained by rules that they cannot alter at will, tend rapidly to become not servants but the masters of the electorate. His determination to define and defend the middle ground, neither anarchy nor Leviathan, will have a wider appeal still.