Climate change, nuclear proliferation, and the threat of a global pandemic have the potential to impact each of our lives. Preventing these threats poses a serious global challenge, but ignoring them could have disastrous consequences. How do we engineer institutions to change incentives so that these global public goods are provided? Scott Barrett provides a thought provoking and accessible introduction to the issues surrounding the provision of global public goods. Using a variety of examples to illustrate past successes and failures, he shows how international cooperation, institutional design, and the clever use of incentives can work together to ensure the effective delivery of global public goods.

In Cooperation among Nations, Joseph M. Grieco offers a provocative answer to a fundamental question in world politics: How does the anarchical nature of the international system inhibit the willingness of states to work together even when they share common interests? Grieco examines the capacity of two leading contemporary theories--modem political realism and the newest liberal institutionalism--to explain national responses to the non-tariff barrier codes negotiated during the Tokyo Round of international trade talks. According to his interpretation of realist theory, Grieco characterizes states as "defensive positionalists." As such, they often fail to cooperate because they fear that a joint endeavor, while producing positive gains for all participants, might also generate disparities in gains among the partners involved. Grieco demonstrates that this realist concept of defensive state positionalism gives rise to a better understanding of the systemic constraints on international collaboration and of the impact of anarchy on states than is offered by neoliberal institutionalism. Drawing on previously unreported archival materials, Grieco rigorously applies the two theories to an empirical analysis of the cooperative efforts of the United States and the European Community during the 1980s to regulate and reduce non-tariff trade barriers through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.

"Justin B. Richland continues his study of the relationship between American law and government and Native American law and tribal governance in his new manuscript Cooperation without Submission: Indigenous Jurisdictions in Native Nation-US Engagements. Richland looks at the way Native Americans and government officials talk about their relationship and seek to resolve conflicts over the extent of Native American authority in tribal lands when it conflicts with federal law and policy. The American federal government is supposed to engage in meaningful consultations with the tribes about issues that affect the tribes under long standing Federal law which accorded the federal government the responsibility of a trustee to the tribes. It requires the government to act in the best interest of the tribes and to interpret agreements with tribes in a way that respects their rights and interests. At least partly based on a patronizing view of Native Americans, the law has also sought to protect the interests of the tribes from those who might take advantage of them. In Cooperation without Submission, Richland looks closely at the language employed by both sides in consultations between tribes and government agencies focusing on the Hopi tribe but also discussing other cases. Richland shows how tribes conduct these meetings using language that demonstrates their commitment to nation-to -nation interdependency, while federal agents appear to approach these consultations with the assumption that federal l aw is supreme and ultimately authoritative"--

Within the realist school of international relations, a prevailing view holds that the anarchic structure of the international system invariably forces the great powers to seek security at one another's expense, dooming even peaceful nations to an unrelenting struggle for power and dominance. Rational Theory of International Politics offers a more nuanced alternative to this view, one that provides answers to the most fundamental and pressing questions of international relations. Why do states sometimes compete and wage war while at other times they cooperate and pursue peace? Does competition reflect pressures generated by the anarchic international system or rather states' own expansionist goals? Are the United States and China on a collision course to war, or is continued coexistence possible? Is peace in the Middle East even feasible? Charles Glaser puts forward a major new theory of international politics that identifies three kinds of variables that influence a state's strategy: the state's motives, specifically whether it is motivated by security concerns or "greed"; material variables, which determine its military capabilities; and information variables, most importantly what the state knows about its adversary's motives. Rational Theory of International Politics demonstrates that variation in motives can be key to the choice of strategy; that the international environment sometimes favors cooperation over competition; and that information variables can be as important as material variables in determining the strategy a state should choose.

cancer n. any malignant tumor . . . Metastasis may occur via the bloodstream or the lymphatic channels or across body cavities . . . setting up secondary tumors . . . Each individual primary tumor has its own pattern . . . There are probably many causative factors . . . Treatment. . . depends on the type of tumor, the site of the primary tumor and the extent of the spread. (Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary 1996, 97) Let us begin by stating the obvious. Acts of organized violence are not necessarily of human nature, but they are endogenous events arising within the an intrinsic part evolution of complex systems of social interaction. To be sure, all wars have features in common - people are killed and property is destroyed - but in their origin wars are likely to be at least as different as the social structures from which they arise. Consequently, it is unlikely that there can be a simple theory of the causes of war or the maintenance of peace. The fact that wars are historical events need not discourage us. On the contrary, we should focus our understanding of the dimensions of each conflict, or classes of conflict, on the conjuncture of causes at hand. It follows that the study of conflict must be an interdisciplinary one. It is or a penchant for eclecticism that leads to that conclusion, but the not humility multi-dimensionality of war itself.