This account begins with the devastation of Pearl Harbor and ends with the victory over Japan in 1945.

Victory at Sea brings together in one encyclopedic volume all the facts, figures, and details of the Pacific theater of World War II, containing much information that is unfamiliar or new. Here, acclaimed military historians James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi examine both the massive campaigns launched by all the combatants, including the famous battles for places like Midway, Guadalcanal, and Okinawa, and some of the lesser-known confrontations that were sometimes more strategically important. They also discuss the innovative and unique aspects of a modern war at sea, such as carrier-to-carrier battles and islandhopping campaigns, and tackle the myths, conspiracies, and cover-ups surrounding the dramatic events of the Pacific campaign. An authoritative reference of historic scope and vision, Victory at Sea captures the brilliance and desperation, military strategies and stories of personal valor, to give the most comprehensive overview yet of the war in the Pacific.

Chronicles the events that unfolded after Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

A look at the events leading up to Japan’s surrender in World War II, from the New York Times–bestselling author of Engineers of Victory. By the spring of 1943, Japan had a tight grip on the countries and territories of East Asia and the Western Pacific. But the Allies had won decisive victories at Midway and Guadalcanal, and they were coming for the rest of Japan’s conquests. Now the empire of Japan would be on the defensive. Featuring a new introduction by the author, this book picks up where Pacific Onslaught left off, providing a detailed, step-by-step account of the Allies’ unstoppable rally across territories annexed by the Japanese in a brutal two-pronged attack across New Guinea and the Philippines, and the islands of the central Pacific. Here you’ll find detailed contemporary accounts and strategy, from the epic battles of the Gilberts and Marshalls to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Japan’s final surrender on the decks of the USS Missouri.

When the 1st Marine Division began its invasion of Peleliu in September 1944, the operation in the South Pacific was to take but four days. In fact, capturing this small coral island in the Palaus with its strategic airstrip took two months and involved some of the bloodiest fighting of the Second World War in the Pacific. Rather than the easy conquest they were led to expect, the Marines who landed on Peleliu faced a war of attrition from the island's Japanese defenders, who had dug tunnels and fortified the island's rugged terrain. When the Marines' advance stalled after a week of heavy casualties, the "Wildcats" of the 81st Infantry Division were called in, at first as support. Eventually, the 1st Marines Division was evacuated and the 81st Infantry secured the island. Now Bobby C. Blair and John Peter DeCioccio tell the story of this campaign through the eyes of the 81st Infantry to offer a revised assessment. Previous accounts of the battle have focused on the 1st Marines, all but ignoring the 81st Infantry Division's contributions. Victory at Peleliu demonstrates that without the army's help the marines could not have succeeded on Peleliu. Blair and DeCioccio have mined the 81st Division's unit records and interviewed scores of veteran participants. The new data they offer challenge the orthodox view that the 81st Infantry merely mopped up an already broken enemy. Allowing their interviewees to tell much of the story, the authors also give a human face to a brutal battle. Although American efforts in the Palau Islands proved largely unnecessary to ultimately defeating the Japanese, the lessons learned on Peleliu were crucial in subsequent fighting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The 81st Infantry's contributions are now part of that larger story.

Japanese Carriers and Victory in the Pacific focuses on the pre-war debate between building a new generation of super-battleships or adopting aircraft carriers as the capital ships of the future. An Asian power in particular sees carriers as a way of challenging the USA and the colonial empires initially losing the contest yet coming out all right in the Cold War aftermath. Martin Stansfeld examines the much-overlooked genesis of Japan's so-called shadow fleet that was a secret attempt to bring about parity with the US in carriers--albeit only with slower speed conversions of liners and auxiliaries but along with the super battleships cluttered launch facilities when these could have been devoted to keel-up fast fleet carrier Production. This first analytical look at what major launch facilities were available in Japan shows that the Imperial Japanese Navy could have doubled its fast carrier fleet thereby able to give sufficient air cover for an invasion of Hawaii rather than just the raid on Pearl Harbor, but only providing nobody noticed they were building all these carriers. This is shown to have been entirely possible given the IJN's extraordinary success at covering up their super battleship and shadow fleet production. This secret fast carrier fleet program is given the name "phantom fleet" by Stansfeld who proceeds to demonstrate how the strategy of the Pacific War would have been transformed. Weaving through the chapters is an exotic cast of characters led most notably by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the conceiver of Pearl Harbor and a figure of mythic status to Japanese today and famous around the world thanks to the movies. Stansfeld dwells on the ironies of war, notably how, without the "day that will live in infamy", America might never have become the worldwide super-power it is today.

"To win in the Pacific during World War II, the U.S. Navy had to transform itself technically, tactically, and strategically. It had to create a fleet capable of the unprecedented feat of fighting and winning far from home, without existing bases, in the face of an enemy with numerous bases fighting in his own waters. Much of the credit for the transformation should go to the war gaming conducted at the U.S. Naval War College. Conversely, as we face further demands for transformation, the inter-war experience at the War College offers valuable guidance as to what works, and why, and how."