This book traces the development of urban operations from World War II to the present to examine the evolution of doctrine, training, organization, and equipment. Four specific operations/battles are examined, including Stalingrad in World War II on the eastern front, Belfast in Northern Ireland from 1968 to the present, Beirut in Lebanon in 1982, and an illustrative future model in Seoul in Korea in 2012. The historical examples are compared to the U.S. scenario in Seoul, Korea, in 2012 to determine similarities and differences. Future lessons learned are extrapolated from these similarities and differences. The study concludes that the U.S. Army has weaknesses in doctrine, training, organization, and equipment in war and military operations other than war at the tactical and operational levels. This study recommends an updated, integrated doctrine, a training facility and training plans at the unit level, a more flexible organization, and procurement of new equipment.

This study traces the development of urban operations from World War II to the present to examine the evolution of doctrine, training, organization, and equipment. Four specific operations/battles are examined, including Stalingrad in World War II on the eastern front, Belfast in Northern Ireland from 1968 to the present, Beirut in Lebanon in 1982, and an illustrative future model in Seoul in Korea in 2012. The historical examples are compared to the U.S. scenario in Seoul, Korea, in 2012 to determine similarities and differences. Future lessons learned are extrapolated from these similarities and differences. The study concludes that the U.S. Army has weaknesses in doctrine, training, organization, and equipment in war and military operations other than war at the tactical and operational levels. This study recommends an updated, integrated doctrine, a training facility and training plans at the unit level, a more flexible organization, and procurement of new equipment.

This thesis traces the development of urban operations from World War II to the present to examine the evolution of doctrine, training, organization, and equipment. Four specific operations/battles are examined, including Stalingrad in World War II on the eastern front, Belfast in Northern Ireland from 1968 to the present, Beirut in Lebanon in 1982, and an illustrative future model in Seoul in Korea in 2012. The historical examples are compared to the U.S. scenario in Seoul, Korea, in 2012 to determine similarities and differences. Future lessons learned are extrapolated from these similarities and differences. The study concludes that the U.S. Army has weaknesses in doctrine, training, organization, and equipment in war and military operations other than war at the tactical and operational levels. This study recommends an updated, integrated doctrine, a training facility and training plans at the unit level, a more flexible organization, and procurement of new equipment.

"The Army and Marine Corps both consider Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) to be a central part of future training and together have a joint MOUT Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) underway. Training facilities for military and law enforcement agencies include firing ranges, mock towns or villages, and shoot houses. Makeshift facilities for dry fire drills include engineer tape staked out on the ground and rooms in any building available. Training in Close Quarter Combat (CQC) is offered in Army and Marine Corps training courses. Training time was mostly allocated to live fire and live simulation. Team dry fire drills were often extensively practiced before team live fire, but considered as a part of the safety training required as a part of live firing. Before team live fire training, Army units usually conduct individual marksmanship training. In many cases, standards were set for individual qualification before soldiers could participate in team live fire. Live simulation was both with the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) and Simunition. Law enforcement agencies (including Military Police) and Marines were more likely to use Simunition. Those using Simunition who also had experience with MILES preferred Simunition for live simulation training."--DITC.

The urgent requirement for US Army preparedness in conducting urban operations (UO) is very real. As global urbanization continues to increase, the contemporary threat environment makes operations in cities impossible to avoid. The past decade has demonstrated through the American experiences in Mogadishu and Russian experiences in Grozny, less capable forces will attempt to use urban terrain asymmetrically to even the balance of power against technologically superior military forces. While we have always had a serious requirement to conduct urban operations, the very nature of the cold war, which was successful by its deterrence, prevented us from ever having to face the reality of fighting such urban engagements. In the post-cold war era, the U.S. Army is forced to face the realities of fighting in the urban environment. It is not enough to speak of preparing for “future urban operations”; the future is here today and the Army must be prepared to engage in urban operations even as it moves towards the objective force. Being prepared means having solid doctrine, realistic training programs and facilities, and appropriate equipment to ensure success on the urban battlefield when the time comes to fight there.

Special Forces forward operational bases (FOB) are essential for mission and contingency planning as well as for the preparation, infiltration and exfiltration of Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA). Therefore, the defense of this command and control headquarters is critical for preserving combat power and synchronizing military actions in a theater of operations. Because the enemy has the capability of projecting forces with the objective of disrupting US military operations, FOBs have become likely targets. According to SF doctrine, FOBs should be located in secure areas with MP or host-nation personnel providing the bulk of the security force. Although this situation is preferable, it is by no means assured. FOBs should be able to provide their own security in the event other forces are not available or when rapid deployment restricts the flow of conventional forces into a theater of operations. After-action review results from the Joint Readiness Training Center demonstrate that many SF battalions are not prepared to execute base defense tasks without the assistance of other forces. Many SF commanders do not consider base defense a mission essential task and the result is a lack of training by many of their personnel. This study analyzes joint and SF doctrine, observations from the field, and the effects of the contemporary operating environment to identify weaknesses in the readiness of SF battalions.