The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), unleashed by the integration of information technologies into weapons systems, military units, and operations is a phenomenon whose impacts have been felt well beyond the Gulf in 1991 or the Balkans in 1999. Technological developments lie at the center of these changes; however, the RMA is about more than technology. It includes the consequences of technological changes for defense and security. This study provides an assessment of the RMA that goes beyond a mere description of new defense-related technologies to deal with deeper, more fundamental issues. Through the contributions of American, Canadian, Chinese, and French experts, this book surveys the RMA from various perspectives and evaluates it from the standpoints of military history and military science. The authors conclude that, while the RMA represents a significant challenge for defense establishments, it may fall short of being truly revolutionary. Whether one looks at power projection or information warfare, it appears that emerging technologies will translate into significant improvements in capabilities, but not necessarily a revolution in warfare. From a comparative perspective, the United States remains well ahead in thinking of and implementing changes that stem from the RMA, although other nations may make selective use of the RMA to promote regional security goals.

The remit of this study is to encourage further studies that make an honest and successful effort to achieve synergy between social science and history when analysing the impact of revolutions in military affairs (RMAs).

This book explores the idea of arevolution in military affairs (RMA), which underpins the transformational agenda of the US military, and examines its implications for smaller states.The strategic studies literature on the RMA tends to be American-centric and directed towards the strategic problems of the US military. This volume seeks to fill t

The current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is taking place against the background of a larger historical watershed involving the end of the Cold War and the advent of what Alvin and Heidi Toffler have termed "the Information Age." In this essay, Dr. Earl Tilford argues that RMAs are driven by more than breakthrough technologies, and that while the technological component is important, a true revolution in the way military institutions organize, equip and train for war, and in the way war is itself conducted, depends on the confluence of political, social, and technological factors. After an overview of the dynamics of the RMA, Dr. Tilford makes the case that interservice rivalry and a reintroduction of the managerial ethos, this time under the guise of total quality management (TQM), may be the consequences of this revolution. In the final analysis, warfare is quintessentially a human endeavor. Technology and technologically sophisticated weapons are only means to an end. The U.S. Army, along with the other services, is embracing the RMA as it downsizes and restructures itself into Force XXI. Warfare, even on the digitized battlefield, is likely to remain unpredictable, bloody, and horrific. Military professionals cannot afford to be anything other than well prepared for whatever challenges lie ahead, be it war with an Information Age peer competitor, a force of guerrillas out of the Agrarian Age, or a band of terrorists using the latest in high-tech weaponry. While Dr. Tilford is optimistic about the prospects for Force XXI, what follows is not an unqualified endorsement of the RMA or of the Army's transition to an Information Age force. By examining issues and problems that were attendant to previous RMAs, Dr. Tilford raises questions that ought to be asked by the Army as it moves toward Force XXI. Warfare is, the author reminds us, the most complex of human undertakings and the victors, even in the Information Age, will be those who, as in the past, are masters of the art-as well as the science-of war.

The revolution in military affairs (RMA) is an American concept that frames a debate about the restructuring of American military forces in the period of globalization of the American economy. A core task for U.S. allies is to seek to understand the American debate & to identify opportunities for & the risks to themselves in variant patterns of development of the American military in the years ahead. Chapters: the American strategic challenge; the American approach to the RMA: a baseline; the RMA & regional allies: the Asian case; Europe & the RMA; France & Germany & the RMA; & reflections on the U.S.-European military technology gap.Ó

A characteristic of the American way of war is our fascination with technology and the search for that technological "silver bullet" that will deliver victory quickly and with a minimum of loss of life. The current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is driven by rapid technological advance fostered by the advent of the microprocessor and by decreased defense spending. It operates against the background of a historical watershed brought about by the end of the Cold War. The RMA has been embraced by all the United States' military services; especially the Air Force and the Army. As the Army downsizes it is seeking to change itself into Force XXI; a strategic force, trained and ready, to fight and win the nation's wars in the 21st century. That we are in the midst of a true revolution in military affairs is evident. What it may mean for the Army and the nation is not so evident. This monograph outlines where the Army is going as it seeks to define change rather than be defined by change. It also looks to the past to ask what have been the results of change during past RMAs? Accelerated interservice rivalries and over-reliance on management systems marked the last RMA, one driven by the advent of atomic weapons at the end of World War II and the relatively stable and sparse defense budgets of the 1950s. The author argues that the consequence of interservice rivalry and the institutionalization of the managerial ethos was defeat in Vietnam. Finally, the author warns against becoming so entranced with the sophisticated technologies of the RMA that we lose both our grounding in strategic thinking and our basic warrior skills. To do so could be potentially disastrous when two peer competitor forces meet on the 21st century battlefield and, quite possibly, cancel each other out electronically. Then, it will be the side which is able to fight at the lower "gut level" of warfare that will prevail.

Over the past decade, a significant number of defense analysts, government officials, and military officers have argued that the growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and information technology will drastically alter the character and conduct of future wars, yielding a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The idea that the emergence of new technology, combined with innovative operational concepts and organizations, would transform the conduct of war, first appeared in Soviet military writings in the late 1970s. It was, however, the seeming ease with which the U.S.-led coalition defeated Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War that led many observers in the United States and elsewhere to conclude that significant changes in the character of warfare were underway. Since the mid-1990s, exploiting the emerging RMA has been an explicit goal of the Defense Department. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated Joint Vision 2010 with great fanfare in 1996 as the "conceptual template" for how the armed forces would "leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in warfighting." Each of the services has devoted considerable attention to developing new technology as well as the concepts and organizations needed to employ it most effectively.