This is on a highly topical issue and addresses a key policy issue for Europe—namely, reinforcing EMU institutional architecture along with the Banking Union. Some proposals have emerged in Europe, and it will be important to put out staff views on this issue. In that context, publication as an SDN is appropriate, given the high profile nature and relevance of the topic—much like the Banking Union paper done a few months ago.

This book explores the role of national fiscal policies in a selected group of Euro-area countries under the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, the authors characterize the response of output to fiscal consolidations and expansions in the small Euro-area open economies affected by high public and private debt. It is shown that the macroeconomic outcome of fiscal shocks is strongly related to debt levels. The Euro-area countries included in the investigation are Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, over the sample period 1999–2016, i.e., the EMU period. The main econometric tools used in this research are structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models, including panel VAR models. The available literature relating to the subject is also fully reviewed. A further closely investigated topic is the potential spillover effects of German fiscal policies on the selected small Euro-area economies. Moreover, in the perspective of the evolution of the Euro Area towards a full Monetary and Fiscal Union, the authors study the effects of area-wide government spending shocks on aggregate output and other macroeconomic variables during the EMU period. The closing chapter of the book considers evidence on the consequences of austerity policies for European labour markets during recent years.

The euro crisis made Europe’s stateless currency falter. This book retraces and interprets the ways in which the crisis impacted the unique institutional set-up of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It argues that the crisis propelled the European continent towards the institutionalization of an unprecedented form of centralized authority: Europe’s New Fiscal Union. Diving into the central functions of fiscal surveillance, financial assistance, lending of last resort and banking resolution, the book reveals how a covert and convoluted mutualisation process occurred in the shadow of the euro crisis management. Based on 62 interviews conducted by the author with senior policy-makers in Brussels, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Rome, the book claims that Europe’s New Fiscal Union is largely unsettled and still unstable. It therefore engages with the challenges arising from the patchwork of newly adopted rules, instruments and bodies, suggesting crucial reform steps to make EMU sustainable.

Does the European Union need closer fiscal integration, and in particular a stronger fiscal centre, to become more resilient to economic shocks? This book looks at the experience of 13 federal states to help inform the heated debate on this issue. It analyses in detail their practices in devolving responsibilities from the subnational to the central level, compares them to those of the European Union, and draws lessons for a possible future fiscal union in Europe. More specifically, this book tries to answer three sets of questions: What is the role of centralized fiscal policies in federations, and hence the size, features and functions of the central budget? What institutional arrangements are used to coordinate fiscal policy between the federal and subnational levels? What are the links between federal and subnational debt, and how have subnational financing crises been handled, when they occurred? These policy questions are critical in many federations, and central to the current discussions about future paths for the European Union. This book brings to the table new, practical insights through a systematic and comprehensive comparison of the EU fiscal framework with that of federal states. It also departs from the decentralization perspective that has been prominent in the literature by focusing on the role of the centre (which responsibilities are centralized at the federal level and how they are handled, rather than which functions belong to the local level). Such an approach is particularly relevant for the European Union, where a fiscal union would imply granting new powers to the centre.

This is on a highly topical issue and addresses a key policy issue for Europe—namely, reinforcing EMU institutional architecture along with the Banking Union. Some proposals have emerged in Europe, and it will be important to put out staff views on this issue. In that context, publication as an SDN is appropriate, given the high profile nature and relevance of the topic—much like the Banking Union paper done a few months ago.

The momentum for structural reforms is waning in the euro area at a time when even faster progress is needed to boost productivity and growth, achieve real economic convergence, and improve the resilience of the monetary union. What can the European Union (EU) institutions do to bridge this divide? This paper argues for greater simplicity, transparency and accountability in the EU governance framework for structural reforms. Our three interrelated proposals—“outcome-based” benchmarking; better use of existing EU processes to strengthen oversight and reduce discretion; and improved financial incentives—could help advance reforms. Ex post monitoring by an independent EU-level “structural council” and ex ante policy innovation by national productivity councils could strengthen accountability and ownership. Deeper governance reforms should be considered in the medium-term with a view toward a greater EU role in promoting convergence.