Identifies and evaluates the psychological choices implicit in the rules of evidence Evidence law is meant to facilitate trials that are fair, accurate, and efficient, and that encourage and protect important societal values and relationships. In pursuit of these often-conflicting goals, common law judges and modern drafting committees have had to perform as amateur applied psychologists. Their task has required them to employ what they think they know about the ability and motivations of witnesses to perceive, store, and retrieve information; about the effects of the litigation process on testimony and other evidence; and about our capacity to comprehend and evaluate evidence. These are the same phenomena that cognitive and social psychologists systematically study. The rules of evidence have evolved to restrain lawyers from using the most robust weapons of influence, and to direct judges to exclude certain categories of information, limit it, or instruct juries on how to think about it. Evidence law regulates the form of questions lawyers may ask, filters expert testimony, requires witnesses to take oaths, and aims to give lawyers and factfinders the tools they need to assess witnesses’ reliability. But without a thorough grounding in psychology, is the “common sense” of the rulemakers as they create these rules always, or even usually, correct? And when it is not, how can the rules be fixed? Addressed to those in both law and psychology, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law draws on the best current psychological research-based knowledge to identify and evaluate the choices implicit in the rules of evidence, and to suggest alternatives that psychology reveals as better for accomplishing the law’s goals.

Evidence law is meant to facilitate trials that are fair, accurate, and efficient, and that encourage and protect important societal values and relationships. In pursuit of these often-conflicting goals, common law judges and modern drafting committees have had to perform as amateur applied psychologists. Their task has required them to employ what they think they know about the ability and motivations of witnesses to perceive, store, and retrieve information; about the effects of the litigation process on testimony and other evidence; and about our capacity to comprehend and evaluate evidence. These are the same phenomena that cognitive and social psychologists systematically study. The rules of evidence have evolved to restrain lawyers from using the most robust weapons of influence, and to direct judges to exclude certain categories of information, limit it, or instruct juries on how to think about it. Evidence law regulates the form of questions lawyers may ask, filters expert testimony, requires witnesses to take oaths, and aims to give lawyers and factfinders the tools they need to assess witnesses’ reliability. But without a thorough grounding in psychology, is the “common sense” of the rulemakers as they create these rules always, or even usually, correct? And when it is not, how can the rules be fixed? Addressed to those in both law and psychology, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law draws on the best current psychological research-based knowledge to identify and evaluate the choices implicit in the rules of evidence, and to suggest alternatives that psychology reveals as better for accomplishing the law’s goals.

Philosophy has a strong presence in evidence law and the nature of evidence is a highly debated topic in both general and social epistemology; legal theorists working in the evidence law area draw on different underlying philosophical theories of knowledge, inference and probability. Core evidentiary concepts and principles, such as the presumption of innocence, standards of proof, and others, reply on moral and political philosophy for their understanding and interpretation. Written by leading scholars across the globe, this volume brings together philosophical debates on the nature and function of evidence, proof, and law of evidence. It presents a cross-disciplinary overview of central issues in the theory and methodology of legal evidence and covers a wide range of contemporary debates on topics such as truth, proof, economics, gender, and race. The volume covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation. Divided in to five parts, Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory and inference to the best explanation.

During the past two decades, the frequency and range of expert testimony by psychologists have increased dramatically. Courts now routinely hear expert testimony from clinical, cognitive, developmental, and social psychologists. Expert Psychological Testimony for the Courts provides a comprehensive, research-based analysis of the content, ethics, and impact of expert testimony. This book features leading scholars who have contributed to the scientific foundation for expert testimony and who have also served as expert witnesses. The opening chapter explores issues surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony, and the closing chapter explores the ethics and limits of psychological testimony. Each of the intervening chapters focuses on a different area of expert testimony: forensic identification, police interrogations and false confessions, eyewitness identification, sexual harassment, mitigation in capital cases, the insanity defense, battered women, future dangerousness, and child custody. These chapters describe the typical content of expert testimony in a particular area, evaluate the scientific foundation for testimony, examine how jurors respond to expert testimony, and suggest ways in which legal standards or procedures might be modified in light of psychological research. This groundbreaking book should be on the shelf of every social scientist interested in the legal system and every trial attorney who is likely to retain a psychologist as an expert witness. It can also serve as a text for advanced courses in psychology, legal studies, criminal justice, law, and sociology.

The intersection between law and neuroscience has been a focus of intense research for the past decade, as an unprecedented amount of attention has been triggered by the increased use of neuroscientific evidence in courts. While the majority of this attention is currently devoted to criminal law, including capital cases, the wide-ranging proposals for how neuroscience may inform issues of law and public policy extend to virtually every substantive area in law. Bringing together the latest work from leading scholars in the field, this volume examines the philosophical issues that inform this emerging and vibrant subfield of law. From discussions featuring the philosophy of the mind to neuroscience-based lie detection, each chapter addresses foundational questions that arise in the application of neuroscientific technology in the legal sphere.

In this groundbreaking book that is built on decades of work on the front lines of the criminal justice system, expert psychologist Craig Haney encourages meaningful and lasting reform by changing the public narrative about who commits crime and why. Based on his comprehensive review and analysis of the research, Haney offers a carefully framed and psychologically based blueprint for making the criminal justice system fairer, with strategies to reduce crime through proactive prevention instead of reactive punishment. Haney meticulously reviews evidence documenting the ways in which a person's social history, institutional experiences, and present circumstances powerfully shape their life, with a special focus on the role of social, economic, and racial injustice in crime causation. Haney debunks the "crime master narrative"--the widespread myth that criminality is a product of free and autonomous "bad" choices--an increasingly anachronistic view that cannot bear the weight of contemporary psychological data and theory. This is a must-read for understanding what truly influences criminal behavior, and the strategies for prevention and rehabilitation that follow.