The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty has been described as the 'golden thread' running through the web of English criminal law and a "fundamental postulate" of Irish criminal law which enjoys constitutional protection. Reflecting on the bail laws in the O'Callaghan case, Walsh J. described the presumption as a 'very real thing and not simply a procedural rule taking effect only at the trial'. The purpose of this book is to consider whether the reality matches the rhetoric surrounding this central precept of our criminal law and to consider its efficacy in the light of recent or proposed legislative innovations. Considerable space is devoted to the anti-crime package introduced by the government in the period of heightened concern about crime which followed the murder of journalist Veronica Guerin. Described by the Bar Council as "the most radical single package of alterations to Irish criminal law and procedure ever put together, " the effect of the package was an amendment of the bail laws and the introduction of preventative detention; a curtailment of the right to silence for those charged with serious drugs offences and the introduction of a novel civil forfeiture process to facilitate the seizure of the proceeds of crime, a development which arguably circumvents the presumption. Given these developments, the question posed in the book is whether we can lay claim to a presumption that is more than merely theoretical or illusory.

The presumption of innocence is widely accepted as a fundamental principle of criminal justice. This work is an attempt to secure consensus, and to present some constructive solutions to the various theoretical and practical problems which exist in respect of the presumption of innocence.

Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary is designed to help law students to understand the fundamental rules, principles and policy considerations that govern the criminal law in Ireland.

The presumption of innocence is universally recognized as a fundamental human right and a core principle in the administration of criminal justice. Nonetheless, statutes creating criminal offences regularly depart from the presumption of innocence by requiring defendants to prove specific matters in order to avoid conviction. Legislatures and courts seek to justify this departure by asserting that the reversal of the burden of proof is necessary to meet the community interest in prosecuting serious crime and maintaining workable criminal sanctions. This book investigates the supposed justifications for limitation of the presumption of innocence. It does so through a comprehensive analysis of the history, rationale and scope of the presumption of innocence. It is argued that the values underlying the presumption of innocence are of such fundamental importance to individual liberty that they cannot be sacrificed on the altar of community interest. In particular, it is argued that a test of 'proportionality', which seeks to weigh individual rights against the community interest, is inappropriate in the context of the presumption of innocence and that courts ought instead to focus on whether an impugned measure threatens the values which the presumption is designed to protect. The book undertakes a complete and systematic review of the United Kingdom and Strasbourg authority on the presumption of innocence. It also draws upon extensive references to comparative material, both judicial and academic, from the United States, Canada and South Africa.

The notion that an individual accused of a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty is one of the cornerstones of the American criminal justice system. However, the presumption of innocence creates a number of practical and theoretical issues, particularly regarding pre-trial and post-trial processes. In Taming the Presumption of Innocence, Richard L. Lippke argues that the presumption of innocence should be contained to the criminal trial. Beyond the realm of the trial, legal professionals, investigators, and the general public should carry out their respective roles in the criminal justice process without making any presumptions about guilt or innocence whatsoever. Rather than eschewing the significance of the presumption of innocence, the book defends its role within its proper context, the criminal trial. According to Lippke, other aspects of the criminal justice system such as investigation, lawmaking, and treatment of ex-offenders should be conducted in such a way that reflects the fallibility and unpredictability of the system without involving the issue of presumed guilt or innocence. Lippke dispels the idea that the presumption of innocence can be used to remedy some of the current issues in the practice of criminal justice, and instead proposes engaging in deeper, more substantive reforms of the American criminal justice system. The first monograph dedicated exclusively to the presumption of innocence, Taming the Presumption of Innocence will be an ideal text for students and scholars of criminology, criminal justice, and legal theory.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the presumption of innocence from both a practical and theoretical point of view. Throughout the book a framework for the presumption of innocence is developed. The book approaches the right to presumption of innocence from an international human rights perspective using specific examples drawn from international criminal law. The result is a framework for understanding the right that is grounded in human rights law. This framework can then be applied across different national and international systems. When applied, it can help determine when the presumption of innocence is being infringed upon, eroded, violated, and ensure that the presumption of innocence is protected. The book is an essential resource for students, academics and practitioners working in the areas of human rights, criminal law, international criminal law, and evidence. The themes also have a more general application to national jurisdictions and legal theory.