Bentham's law -- The possibility and probability of noncoercive law -- In search of the puzzled man -- Do people obey the law? -- Are officials above the law? -- Coercing obedience -- Of carrots and sticks -- Coercion's arsenal -- Awash in a sea of norms -- The differentiation of law

This book examines the success of Frederick Schauer’s efforts to reclaim force as a core element of a general concept of law by approaching the issue from different legal traditions and distinct perspectives. In discussing Schauer’s main arguments, it contributes to answering the question whether force, sanctions and coercion should (or should not) be regarded as necessary elements of the concept of law, and whether legal philosophy should be concerned at all (or exclusively) with necessary or essential properties. While it was long assumed that legal norms are essentially defined by their force, it was H.L.A. Hart who raised doubts about whether law and coercion are necessarily connected, referring to the empowering, or more generally enabling, character exhibited by some legal norms. Prominent scholars following and refining Hart’s argument built an influential case for excluding force as a necessary element of the concept of law. Most recently, however, Frederick Schauer has made a strong case to reaffirm the force of law, shedding new light on this essential question. This book collects important commentaries, never before published, by prominent legal philosophers evaluating Schauer’s substantive arguments and his claims about jurisprudential methodology.

Many legal theorists maintain that laws are effective because we internalize them, obeying even when not compelled to do so. In a comprehensive reassessment of the role of force in law, Frederick Schauer disagrees, demonstrating that coercion, more than internalized thinking and behaving, distinguishes law from society’s other rules. Reinvigorating ideas from Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, and drawing on empirical research as well as philosophical analysis, Schauer presents an account of legal compliance based on sanction and compulsion, showing that law’s effectiveness depends fundamentally on its coercive potential. Law, in short, is about telling people what to do and threatening them with bad consequences if they fail to comply. Although people may sometimes obey the law out of deference to legal authority rather than fear of sanctions, Schauer challenges the assumption that legal coercion is marginal in society. Force is more pervasive than the state’s efforts to control a minority of disobedient citizens. When people believe that what they should do differs from what the law commands, compliance is less common than assumed, and the necessity of coercion becomes apparent. Challenging prevailing modes of jurisprudential inquiry, Schauer makes clear that the question of legal force has sociological, psychological, political, and economic dimensions that transcend purely conceptual concerns. Grappling with the legal system’s dependence on force helps us understand what law is, how it operates, and how it helps organize society.

This primer on legal reasoning is aimed at law students and upper-level undergraduates. But it is also an original exposition of basic legal concepts that scholars and lawyers will find stimulating. It covers such topics as rules, precedent, authority, analogical reasoning, the common law, statutory interpretation, legal realism, judicial opinions, legal facts, and burden of proof.

Law Without Force is a landmark in political and social philosophy. It proposes nothing less than a completely new basis for international law. As relevant today as when it was first published nearly sixty years ago, it commands the attention of all concerned with what the future may bring to the law of nations. The great scope of Niemeyer's undertaking draws respect even from those who disagree with his challenging analysis of the historical past and his suggestions for the future of international law. In his new introduction, Michael Henry observes that Law Without Force provides us with a foundation of Niemeyer's thinking. Published in 1941, when Hitler was swallowing up Europe, this volume shows how a first-rate mind grappled with a legal, historical, social, and ultimately metaphysical problem. It provides in detail the reasoning behind Niemeyer's rejection of a foreign policy based on morality and his distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian governments; and it provides us with the first stage of his lengthy and prodigious effort to understand "this terrible century." It is a book that no serious student of Niemeyer can afford to ignore. At the very heart of the author's vigorous discussion may be found his rejection of a moral basis for international law and his suggestion that a functional basis should be substituted for it. The book incisively reviews the relation between traditional international law and the changing structure of international politics concluding that the traditional system of law has operated as an agency of disharmony and conflict. After an investigation of the traditional legal system, the author then asks, "What type of law fits the social structure of this modern world?" The answers are presented in the last part of the book, as Neimeyer offers his case for a functional system of law, divorced from moral exhortations or appeals to shattered authority. Philosophy, sociology, and legal theory are brilliantly interwoven in this volume, which will engage serious readers interested in political and social theory.