Curzio had one of the most fertile and original minds ever to be deployed on questions relating, first, to the interactions between Central Banks, private sector financial intermediaries and the government, and second to the working of the international monetary system in general, and to the role of the IMF specifically within that. His approach has been to apply a theory of history , which provides a beautifully written and illuminating book, much easier and nicer to read and more rounded than the limited mathematical models that have so monopolised academia in recent decades. From the foreword by Charles A.E. Goodhart Curzio Giannini s history of the evolution of central banks illustrates how the most relevant institutional developments have taken place at times of widespread confidence crises and in response to deflationary pressures. The eminent and highly-renowned author provides an analytical perspective to study the evolution of central banking as an endogenous response to crisis and to the ever increasing needs of economic growth. The key argument of the analysis is that crucial innovations in the payment technology (from the invention of coinage to the development of electronic money) could not have taken place without an institution i.e. the central bank - that could preserve confidence in the instruments used as money. According to Curzio Giannini s neo-institutionalist methodological approach, social institutions are, in fact, essential in the coordination of individual decisions as they minimize transaction costs, overcome information asymmetries and deal with incomplete contracts. This enlightening and revealing historical theory perspective on central banking will prove a thought-provoking read for academic and institutional economists, economic historians, and economic policymakers involved in the task of crafting a new institutional arrangement for central banking in the globalized economy.

Both studies of political power and Europeanization studies have tended to neglect central banks. As the age of the euro reaches its 10th anniversary, it is timely to reflect on what it means for central banks, which have been at the forefront of the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union in the European Union. Central banks have been caught up in a major historic political project. What does it mean for them? What does the age of the euro tell us about the power of central banks, their Europeanization and whether they are coming to resemble each other more closely? This book brings together a range of recognized academic specialists to examine the main political aspects of this question. How, and in what ways, has the euro Europeanized central banks (members and non-members of the Euro Area)? What have been its effects on the power of central banks and their use of power? Has the euro generated convergence or divergence in central banking? The book offers the first, in-depth and systematic political analysis of central banks in the first decade of the euro. It places the euro in its global and European contexts, including the US Fed and the Australasian central banks, patterns of differentiated integration in European central banking, and the European Central Bank. It offers a set of case studies of its effects on a representative sample of EU central banks (euro 'insiders' and 'outsiders') and looks at four main thematic areas (monetary policy, financial market supervision, accountability and transparency, and research). The book contributes to Europeanization studies, comparative political economy, and studies of Economic and Monetary Union. It will be of major interest to students of the European Union and European integration, comparative European politics, and area and 'country' studies. More generally, it will interest all those interested in central banking and their pivotal and problematic position between politics and markets.

This book discusses the role of central banks and draws lessons from examining their evolution over the past two centuries.

In recent decades, Tokyo, London, and New York have been the sites of credit bubbles of historically unprecedented magnitude. Central bankers have enjoyed almost unparalleled power and autonomy. They have cooperated to construct and preserve towering structures of debt, reshaping relations of power and ownership around the world. In Central Banks and Gold, Simon James Bytheway and Mark Metzler explore how this financialized form of globalism took shape a century ago, when Tokyo joined London and New York as a major financial center.As revealed here for the first time, close cooperation between central banks began along an unexpected axis, between London and Tokyo, around the year 1900, with the Bank of England's secret use of large Bank of Japan funds to intervene in the London markets. Central-bank cooperation became multilateral during World War I—the moment when Japan first emerged as a creditor country. In 1919 and 1920, as Japan, Great Britain, and the United States adopted deflation policies, the results of cooperation were realized in the world's first globally coordinated program of monetary policy. It was also in 1920 that Wall Street bankers moved to establish closer ties with Tokyo. Bytheway and Metzler tell the story of how the first age of central-bank power and pride ended in the disaster of the Great Depression, when a rush for gold brought the system crashing down. In all of this, we see also the quiet but surprisingly central place of Japan. We see it again today, in the way that Japan has unwillingly led the world into a new age of post-bubble economics.

Alan S. Blinder offers the dual perspective of a leading academic macroeconomist who served a stint as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board—one who practiced what he had long preached and then returned to academia to write about it. He tells central bankers how they might better incorporate academic knowledge and thinking into the conduct of monetary policy, and he tells scholars how they might reorient their research to be more attuned to reality and thus more useful to central bankers. Based on the 1996 Lionel Robbins Lectures, this readable book deals succinctly, in a nontechnical manner, with a wide variety of issues in monetary policy. The book also includes the author's suggested solution to an age-old problem in monetary theory: what it means for monetary policy to be "neutral."

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

This book addresses the welfare gains and costs of accumulating foreign exchange reserves and the implications for the functioning of the global financial system. The tremendous growth of central bank reserves has led to an increased focus on raising returns in addition to the traditional preference central banks have for maintaining liquid portfolios. Issues such as asset and currency diversification, the impact of new accounting rules and the profit distribution agreements with the government are analysed, adding new insights to the current debate on the optimal size of central bank reserves. This book brings together a wide range of experts from central banks, investment banks and the academic community.