An international team examines the often neglected contexts of European unity, in which the hopes for integration and the difficulties involved are viewed from the political, economic and cultural limits of their success. The missed opportunities for integration in Eastern Europe are viewed in light of power politics, and American policy towards shaping Europe is discussed along with the pro- and anti-American stances adopted by Britain and Germany. The two most important considerations during the integration period, economic and strategic, are explored from British, Italian and Scandinavian perspectives, with Eastern Europe providing the base for an analysis of Comecon. Tensions between international (global) and pan-Euroepan forces provide the focus for a look at the historical origins of issues which are emerging as the political map of Europe is once again transformed.

Peter Calvocoressi's engrossing volume explores controversial questions about the ending of World War II and its long-term consequences. He discusses fundamental and highly charged issues including both the Nuremberg Trials and the bombing of Dresden; and the statesmanship of Winston Churchill; and examines major processes like the postwar renewal of France and the origins of the European Community. The result links the Europes of World War II, the Cold War and the post-Cold War world into a complex chain, and throws a searching light on them all. Issues discussed include: * was World War II a war against fascism, or a war against Germany? * did the total defeat of Germany unnecessary prolong the conflict and facilitate the division of Europe? * was the Cold War, and that division, an inevitable sequel? * what happened to fascism and where does it stand today?

" How the United States helped restore a Europe battered by World War II and created the foundation for the postwar international order Seventy years ago, in the wake of World War II, the United States did something almost unprecedented in world history: It launched and paid for an economic aid plan to restore a continent reeling from war. The European Recovery Plan—better known as the Marshall Plan, after chief advocate Secretary of State George C. Marshall—was in part an act of charity but primarily an act of self-interest, intended to prevent postwar Western Europe from succumbing to communism. By speeding the recovery of Europe and establishing the basis for NATO and diplomatic alliances that endure to this day, it became one of the most successful U.S. government programs ever. The Brookings Institution played an important role in the adoption of the Marshall Plan. At the request of Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Brookings scholars analyzed the plan, including the specifics of how it could be implemented. Their report gave Vandenberg the information he needed to shepherd the plan through a Republican-dominated Congress in a presidential election year. In his foreword to this book, Brookings president Strobe Talbott reviews the global context in which the Truman administration pushed the Marshall Plan through Congress, as well as Brookings' role in that process. The book includes Marshall's landmark speech at Harvard University in June 1947 laying out the rationale for the European aid program, the full text of the report from Brookings analyzing the plan, and the lecture Marshall gave upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953. The book concludes with an essay by Bruce Jones and Will Moreland that demonstrates how the Marshall Plan helped shape the entire postwar era and how today's leaders can learn from the plan's challenges and successes. "

A major new history of the eight days in February 1945 when FDR, Churchill, and Stalin decided the fate of the world Imagine you could eavesdrop on a dinner party with three of the most fascinating historical figures of all time. In this landmark book, a gifted Harvard historian puts you in the room with Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt as they meet at a climactic turning point in the war to hash out the terms of the peace. The ink wasn't dry when the recriminations began. The conservatives who hated Roosevelt's New Deal accused him of selling out. Was he too sick? Did he give too much in exchange for Stalin's promise to join the war against Japan? Could he have done better in Eastern Europe? Both Left and Right would blame Yalta for beginning the Cold War. Plokhy's conclusions, based on unprecedented archival research, are surprising. He goes against conventional wisdom-cemented during the Cold War- and argues that an ailing Roosevelt did better than we think. Much has been made of FDR's handling of the Depression; here we see him as wartime chief. Yalta is authoritative, original, vividly- written narrative history, and is sure to appeal to fans of Margaret MacMillan's bestseller Paris 1919.

This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "Between Religion and Ethnicity: Twentieth-Century Jewish Émigrés and the Shaping of Postwar Culture" that was published in Religions