Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.

The many forces that led to the economic crisis of 2008 were in fact identified, analyzed and warned against for many years before the crisis by economist Jane D�Arista, among others. Now, writing in the tradition of D�Arista's extensive work, the

“This publication could not be more timely. Little more than a decade after the global financial crisis of 2008, governments are once again loosening the reins over financial markets. The authors of this volume explain why that is a mistake and could invite yet another major crisis.” —Benjamin Cohen, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA “Leading political scientists from several generations here offer historical depth, as well as sensible suggestions about what reforms are needed now.” —John Kirton, University of Toronto, Canada, and Co-founder of the G7 Research Group “A valuable antidote to complacency for policy-makers, scholars and students.” —Timothy J. Sinclair, University of Warwick, UK This book examines the long-term, previously underappreciated breakdowns in financial regulation that fed into the 2008 global financial crash. While most related literature focuses on short-term factors such as the housing bubble, low interest rates, the breakdown of credit rating services and the emergence of new financial instruments, the authors of this volume contend that the larger trends in finance which continue today are most relevant to understanding the crash. Their analysis focuses on regulatory capture, moral hazard and the reflexive challenges of regulatory intervention in order to demonstrate that financial regulation suffers from long-standing, unaddressed and fundamental weaknesses.

From the vantage point of the key powers in global finance including the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China, this highly accessible book brings together leading scholars to examine current changes in international financial regulation. They assess whether the flurry of ambitious initiatives to improve and strengthen international financial regulation signals an important turning point in the regulation of global finance. The text: Examines the kinds of international reforms have been implemented to date and patterns of international regulatory change. Provides an analysis of change across a number of financial sectors, including the regulation of hedge funds, derivatives, credit rating agencies, accounting, and banks. Offers an explanation of contemporary regulatory developments with reference to inter-state power dynamics, domestic politics, transgovernmental networks, and/or transnational non-state forces. Providing the first systematic analysis of the international regulatory response to the current global financial crisis, this ground-breaking volume is vital reading for students and scholars of international political economy, international relations, global governance, finance and economics.

This book analyses the interactions between financial regulation and crises with reference to the experience of the United States in the period after the global financial crisis up to the COVID-19 emergency. The US case has been framed in a more general context, making extensive reference to the theoretical literature that has examined in depth the interactions between financial laws and crises throughout the centuries (and across countries). In the last few years, a new regulatory system for large banks has arisen in the US, reversing some elements of the Dodd-Frank Act and introducing deviations from the prudential rules agreed by the G20 after the financial crisis of 2007-09. This approach is confirmed by some of the measures adopted in response to COVID-19. These signs of a softened approach to banking regulation (and supervision) are also spreading beyond the United States and they can be inferred from a variety of circumstances and institutional contexts This is a sign that the pendulum on financial regulation is swinging back again. The cumulative effect of these trends could force the globally harmonized approach to regulation to be broken down, also in the light of the situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. A trend towards easing or suspending prudential rules now could expose the international banking system to growing risks in the years to come. In the current exceptional circumstances as well, the international standards must not be breached, as they provide the resilience needed to sustain lending to the economy, and to keep banks safe. It is important to stress that the banking systems that seem to be in a better position to withstand the present shock - having higher average levels and quality of prudential requirements - are those more advanced in the consistent implementation of the G20 international standards. With the memory of the global financial crisis fading and the long post-crisis economic expansion coming to an end, the pressures to dilute the G20 rules could grow stronger. The importance of maintaining a consistent approach to needs to be emphasized. About the author: Maurizio Trapanese is Director in the DG Economics, Statistics and Research of the Bank of Italy. His responsibilities include research on the international prudential regulation, the cyclicality of financial laws, and the EU framework for crisis management. Previously, he worked in the DG Supervision, where he was involved in the international negotiations on prudential rules. He has participated to international committees at the Eurosystem, EU, and global level, directly contributing to the finalization of the post-financial crisis standards and the EU single rulebook in banking.

We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.

The Financial Crisis was a cross-sector crisis that fundamentally affected modern society. Regulation, as a concept, was both blamed for allowing the crisis to happen, but also tasked with developing and implementing solutions in the wake of the crash. In this book, a number of specialists from a range of fields have contributed their insights into the effect of the Financial Crisis upon the regulatory frameworks affecting their fields, how regulators have responded to the Crisis, and then what this may mean for the future of regulation within those industries. These analyses are joined by a picture of past financial crises – which reveals interesting patterns – and then analyses of architectural regulatory models that were fundamentally affected by the Crisis. The book aims to allow sector specialists the freedom to share their insights so that, potentially, a broader picture can be identified. Providing an interesting and thought-provoking account of this societally impactful era, this book will help the reader develop a more informed understanding of the potential future of financial regulation. The book will be of value to researchers, students, advanced level students, regulators, and policymakers.