Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that all of the fundamental questions concerning the nature of intrinsic value are treated in depth and from a variety of viewpoints. These questions include how to understand the concept of intrinsic value, what sorts of things can have intrinsic value, and how to compute intrinsic value. The editors have added an introduction that ties these questions together and places the contributions in context, and they have also provided an extensive bibliography. The result is a comprehensive, balanced, and detailed picture of current thinking about intrinsic value, one that provides an indispensable backdrop against which future writings on the topic may be assessed.

Are bacteriophage T4 and the long-nosed elephant fish valuable in their own right? Agar defends an affirmative answer to this question by arguing that anything living is intrinsically valuable. The result is a challenge to prevailing definitions of value and a call for a scientifically-informed appreciation of nature.

At the heart of ethics lies the concept of intrinsic value. It is at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, and acts rightly or wrongly. This book investigates the nature of intrinsic value: what sort of thing has it, and how it is measured or quantified.

An innovative and concise exploration of the foundations of ethics.

The aim of the book is to present side-by-side representative and cutting-edge samples of work in mathematical psychology and the analytic philosophy with prominent use of mathematical formalisms.

This book explores the overlooked but vital theoretical relationships between R. M. Hare, Alan Gewirth, and Jürgen Habermas. The author claims their accounts of value, while failing to address classic virtue-theoretical critiques, bear the seeds of a resolution to the ultimate question “What is most valuable?” These dialectical approaches, as claimed, justify a reinterpretation of value and value judgment according to the Carnapian conception of an empirical-linguistic framework or grammar. Through a further synthesis with the work of Philippa Foot and Thomas Magnell, the author shows that “value” would be literally meaningless without four fundamental phenomena which constitute such a framework: Logical Judgment, Conceptual Synthesis, Conceptual Abstraction, and Freedom. As part of the 'grammar of goodness,' the excellence of these phenomena, in a highly concrete way, constitute the essence of the greatest good, as this book explains.