This study is a critique of Quine's views on three interrelated topics that figure prominently in his work and on which he has developed very distinctive opinions. Dr. Dilman provides detailed criticism of these views and contrasts them with Wittgenstein's understanding of the same topics. Throughout this systematic analysis, the author questions basic assumptions on which the Quinean edifice rests. The book argues that Quine's notion of ontology is riddled with inconsistencies and singles out examples for discussion. It argues that Quine's rejection of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths is unwarranted, and that the notion of analyticity, in terms of which he conducts this discussion, is a red herring. And it argues that the notion of experience and subordinate notion of the senses, which Quine uses to discuss the confirmation of propositions and to expound his brand of empiricism, are crude.

From the contents: Naturalistic epistemology, murder and suicide? But what about the promises! (Ton Derksen). - Naturalism and rationality (Christopher Hookway). - Quine's hypothetical theory of language learning: a comparison of different conceptualschemes of their logic (Mia Gosselin). - Quine and innate similarity spaces (Jaap van Brakel). - Quine and Davidson on the structure of empirical knowledge (Dirk Koppelberg). - Empathy and charity (Eva Picardi). - Quine: indeterminacy, 'robust realism', and truth (Sandra Laugier). - Quine and Putnam on conceptual relativity and reference: theft or honest toil? (Roger Vergauwen).

During the past few decades, a radical shift has occurred in how philosophers conceive of the relation between science and philosophy. A great number of analytic philosophers have adopted what is commonly called a "naturalistic" approach, arguing that their inquiries ought to be in some sense continuous with science. Where early analytic philosophers often relied on a sharp distinction between science and philosophy--the former an empirical discipline concerned with fact, the latter an a priori discipline concerned with meaning--philosophers today largely follow Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) in his seminal rejection of this distinction. Sander Verhaegh here offers a comprehensive study of Quine's groundbreaking naturalism. Building on Quine's published corpus as well as a wealth of unpublished letters, notes, lectures, papers, proposals, and annotations from the Quine archives, Verhaegh aims to reconstruct both the nature and the development of his naturalism. As such, Working from Within aims to contribute to the rapidly developing historiography of analytic philosophy, and to provide a better, historically informed, understanding of what is philosophically at stake in the contemporary naturalistic turn. Transcriptions of five unpublished papers, letters, and notes are included in the appendix.

W.V. Quine, a champion of philosophical naturalism and pioneer of mathematical logic, was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Contemporary thought in ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic and language owes much to his influence, yet recent work in these areas has become increasingly dismissive of his views. This is often because of mistaken or overly simplified conceptions of his philosophy which overlook the development of his views over time, in particular the growing importance of a kind of structuralism to his system as it evolved. This volume provides a fuller, richer picture of Quine's views and their development. With contributions from leading philosophers in a range of subfields including philosophical logic, philosophy of language, history of philosophy, mathematics, philosophy of time, and set theory, it is the first to investigate Quine's views on structure and how it permeates and shapes his attitude to a range of philosophical questions.