Provides empirical evidence that power-sharing measures used to end civil wars can help facilitate a transition to minimalist democracy.

Nearly all the peace accords signed in the last two decades have included power-sharing in one form or another. The notion of both majority and minority segments co-operating for the purposes of political stability has informed both international policy prescriptions for post-conflict zones and home-grown power-sharing pacts across the globe. This book examines the effect of power-sharing forms of governance in bringing about political stability amid deep divisions. It is the first major comparison of two power-sharing designs – consociationalism and centripetalism - and it assesses a number of cases central to the debate, including Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi and Northern Ireland. Drawing on information from a variety of sources, such as political party manifestoes and websites, media coverage, think tank reports, and election results, the author reaches significant conclusions about power-sharing as an invaluable conflict-management device. This text will be of key interest to students and scholars of ethnic conflict management, power-sharing, ethnic politics, democracy and democratization, comparative constitutional design, comparative politics, intervention and peace-building.

Power-sharing is an important political strategy for managing protracted conflicts and it can also facilitate the democratic accommodation of difference. Despite these benefits, it has been much criticised, with claims that it is unable to produce peace and stability, is ineffective and inefficient, and obstructs other peacebuilding values, including gender equality. This edited collection aims to enhance our understanding of the utility of power-sharing in deeply divided places by subjecting power-sharing theory and practice to empirical and normative analysis and critique. Its overarching questions are: Do power-sharing arrangements enhance stability, peace and cooperation in divided societies? Do they do so in ways that promote effective governance? Do they do so in ways that promote justice, fairness and democracy? Utilising a broad range of global empirical case studies, it provides a space for dialogue between leading and emerging scholars on the normative questions surrounding power-sharing. Distinctively, it asks proponents of power-sharing to think critically about its weaknesses. This text will be of interest to students, scholars and practitioners of power-sharing, ethnic politics, democracy and democratization, peacebuilding, comparative constitutional design, and more broadly Comparative Politics, International Relations and Constitutional and Comparative Law.

Proposals for power-sharing constitutions remain controversial, as highlighted by current debates in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sudan. This book updates and refines the theory of consociationalism, taking account of the flood of contemporary innovations in power-sharing institutions that have occurred worldwide. The book classifies and compares four types of political institutions: the electoral system, parliamentary or presidential executives, unitary or federal states, and the structure and independence of the mass media. The study tests the potential advantages and disadvantages of each of these institutions for democratic governance. Cross-national time-series data concerning trends in democracy are analyzed for all countries worldwide since the early 1970s. Chapters are enriched by comparing detailed case studies. The mixed-method research design illuminates the underlying causal mechanisms by examining historical developments and processes of institutional change within particular nations and regions. The conclusion draws together the results and the practical lessons for policymakers.

There are numerous studies on the role of power-sharing agreements in the maintenance of peace in postconflict states. Less explored, however, is the impact of power sharing on the quality of the peace. Do power-sharing institutions in fact transform the balance of power among actors in the aftermath of civil wars? And if so, how? As they address these issues, seeking to establish a new research agenda, the authors provide a rich new analytical approach to understanding how power sharing actually works.

Fifty years ago, academics and policymakers throughout the world agreed that it was impossible for certain sets of historically antagonistic groups to coexist peacefully on a long-term basis. This book examines the system of consociation, which was identified by Arend Lijphart and ended that pessimistic consensus. Lijphart’s specific observations concerning the impact of consociation are assessed quantitatively and qualitatively, facilitated through careful operationalization of his descriptions of consociation’s four components: grand coalition, minority veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy. Insights derived from a dataset representing the experiences of eighty-eight countries are examined further through case study analysis of the seven societies most often discussed in relation to consociation: Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Switzerland. The components of consociation are found to promote lasting peace in divided societies most successfully when combined with additional incentives for the encouragement of cross-cutting cleavages and shared loyalties.

Can power sharing prevent violent ethnic conflict? And if so, how can the international community best promote that outcome? In this concise volume, Timothy Sisk defines power sharing as practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups. He identifies the principal approaches to power sharing, including autonomy, federations, and proportional electoral systems. In addition, Sisk highlights the problems with various power-sharing approaches and practices that have been raised by scholars and practitioners alike, and the instances where power-sharing experiments have succeeded and where they have failed. Finally, he offers some guidance to policymakers as they ponder power-sharing arrangements.