Biography of Marie von Clausewitz (born as Marie von Brühl, 1779-1836). After the death of her husband, Carl von Clausewitz, in 1891, Marie edited and published her husband's books, amongst them 'On war'. The author's examination of based on archives and letters written between Marie and her husband.

Carl von Clausewitz's On War, his chef d'oeuvre of strategic and military theory, was first published in 1832, after his death. The book remains a touchstone, dissected and debated by scholars, students, and military personnel around the world who consider it the founding document of the field. Yet to Clausewitz himself, far more important than achieving recognition for his written works was glory on the field of battle. He dreamed of winning renown not with his pen, but with his sword, and wielded both with the same determination and zeal. In this new biographical study of Clausewitz, Donald Stoker moves skillfully between his career as a soldier and his work as a theoretician. Conventional wisdom holds that Clausewitz was "merely a staff officer" who didn't see much combat, but Stoker shows this to be far from true. As a soldier during the era of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars - perhaps the most intense period of continuous large-scale warfare in history - Clausewitz gained an enormous amount of battle experience. By reconstructing his role in various compaigns, from Jena-Auerstedt to Waterloo, this work offers new insights into Clausewitz as both a soldier in an a witness to the momentous fighting of his time. Taking readers through the heat of these battles, Stoker provides historical overview and strategic analysis, showing the connection between events and Clausewitz's own words, taken both from his works and the abundant letters written to his wife, Marie, and friends throughout his life. Clausewitz's contributions to military theory have solidified his reputation, which seems continually to rise, and Stoker assesses each of his significant works and their contribution to his legacy. Grounding Clausewitz's theoretical analyses on the field of battle, Stoker traces the road to On War, and provides an absorbing reassessment of both the warrior and the theorist. -- from dust jacket.

Originally published in 1976, Clausewitz and the State presents a comprehensive analysis of one of the significant thinkers of modern Europe. Peter Paret combines social and military history and psychological interpretation with a study of Clausewitz's military theories and of his unduly neglected historical and political writing. This timely new edition includes a preface which allows Paret to recount the past thirty years of discussion on Clausewitz and respond to critics. A companion volume to Clausewitz's On War, this book is indispensable to anyone interested in Clausewitz and his theories, and their proper historical context.

Two classic works of military strategy that shaped the way we think about warfare: The Art of War by Sun Tzu and On War by Karl von Clausewitz, together in one volume “Civilization might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world wars . . . if the influence of Clausewitz’s On War had been blended with and balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.”—B. H. Liddel Hart For two thousand years, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War has been the indispensable volume of warcraft. Although his work is the first known analysis of war and warfare, Sun Tzu struck upon a thoroughly modern concept: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Karl von Clausewitz, the canny military theorist who famously declared that war is a continuation of politics by other means, also claims paternity of the notion “total war.” On War is the magnum opus of the era of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Now these two great minds come together in a single volume that also features an introduction by esteemed military writer Ralph Peters and the Modern Library War Series introduction by Caleb Carr, New York Times bestselling author of The Alienist. (The cover and text refer to The Art of War as The Art of Warfare, an alternate translation of the title.)

This book at last makes available in English a penetrating exchange between two of history's most famous soldiers concerning the dramatic events of the Waterloo campaign of 1815. The Duke of Wellington is one of the greatest military commanders in British history; General Carl von Clausewitz is widely regarded as the greatest military thinker in the history of Western civilization. Both men had vast experience in the Napoleonic Wars, and both were prominent participants in the campaign. Wellington commanded the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian army; the much younger Clausewitz was chief-of-staff to Prussia's 3rd Corps. Wellington went on to become prime minister of Great Britain and commander-in-chief-for-life of the British Army. Clausewitz went on to author VOM KRIEGE (ON WAR), a seminal and still hotly debated treatise on the theory and philosophy of war. He also became the founder of modern, "scientific" military history, via the work of his disciple, military historian Hans Delbrück. Oddly, Clausewitz's study of the campaign of 1815 was never published in English, and Wellington's once-famous response to it has been strangely but studiously ignored by British military historians since 1914. Hence this book. It contains Wellington's initial battle report; Clausewitz's post-battle letters to his wife Marie; correspondence within Wellington's circle concerning Clausewitz's work; Clausewitz's strategic analysis of the entire campaign (not just the Battle of Waterloo); Wellington's memorandum in response; and enlightening essays by prominent experts on Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Battle of Waterloo. Major General [U.S. Army] David T. Zabecki, Ph.D., writes in the April 2011 edition of The Journal of Military History: "Long overdue, we now have two English translations of [Clausewitz's] The Campaign of 1815 [i.e., Peter Hofschröer's translation of Clausewitz's study and Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow's edition of the full Clausewitz-Wellington exchange]. Either of these volumes would be a welcome addition to the bookshelf of any serious student of military affairs, but On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815 is clearly the richer of the two." Napoleonic expert Bruno Colson wrote [in War in History 19(3)] that Pedlow "convincingly resurrects Wellington's ideas and actions, and gives a final and excellent reply to the arguments of Peter Hofschröer, while remaining balanced, recognizing the latter's merits and quoting him courteously. Waterloo 'was neither a British victory nor a Prussian victory; it was an Allied victory, ' says Pedlow (p. 282). For Waterloo enthusiasts, this essay alone justifies buying the book." Noted Clausewitz scholar Jon Sumida (U.Md) writes that "On Waterloo is essential reading for those seeking an understanding of Clausewitz's distinctive approach to historical case study as the basis of practical knowledge of armed conflict. Clausewitz's history of the campaign of 1815 incorporates methods of critical analysis explained in Book II of On War, which were addressed primarily to the observation and assessment of past cases of strategic and operational decision-making by commanders-in chief. The Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow edition provides a highly readable translation of a work previously accessible only in German that illustrates Clausewitz's approach to the replication and evaluation of the experience of high command." The Editors: Christopher Bassford is Professor of Strategy at the National War College, in Washington, DC. Daniel Moran is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, CA. Gregory W. Pedlow is Chief of the Historical Office at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium.

Oil, diamonds, timber, food aid - just some of the suggestions put forward as explanations for African wars in the past decade. Another set of suggestions focuses on ethnic and clan considerations. These economic and ethnic or clan explanations contend that wars are specifically not fought by states for political interests with mainly conventional military means, as originally suggested by Carl von Clausewitz in the 19th century. This study shows how alternative social organizations to the state can be viewed as political actors using war as a political instrument.