The first textbook to present a comprehensive and detailed economic analysis of electricity markets, analyzing the tensions between microeconomics and political economy. The power industry is essential in our fight against climate change. This book is the first to examine in detail the microeconomics underlying power markets, stemming from peak-load pricing, by which prices are low when the installed generation capacity exceeds demand but can rise a hundred times higher when demand is equal to installed capacity. The outcome of peak-load pricing is often difficult to accept politically, and the book explores the tensions between microeconomics and political economy. Understanding peak-load pricing and its implications is essential for designing robust policies and making sound investment decisions. Thomas-Olivier Léautier presents the model in its simplest form, and introduces additional features as different issues are presented. The book covers all segments of electricity markets: electricity generation, under perfect and imperfect competition; retail competition and demand response; transmission pricing, transmission congestion management, and transmission constraints; and the current policy issues arising from the entry of renewables into the market and capacity mechanisms. Combining anecdotes and analysis of real situations with rigorous analytical modeling, each chapter analyzes one specific issue, first presenting findings in nontechnical terms accessible to policy practitioners and graduate students in management or public policy and then presenting a more mathematical analytical exposition for students and researchers specializing in the economics of electricity markets and for those who want to understand and apply the underlying models.

This book presents International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium commissioned papers. The papers systematically explore the conceptual and empirical dimensions of the new trade theory and try to determine the potential application to agricultural trade and trade policy analysis.

First published in 1998. This work contributes to the discussion of Knight by showing that uncertainty broadens the conception of economic welfare, and that a new cost analysis holds the key to unlocking the Knightian corpus. It develops Knight's suggestion that uncertainty-control costs can be reduced - arguing that the large firm enjoys economic rent from utilizing its dominant vantage point in the market. The author demonstrates that while Knight provides the intellectual stimulus which propelled Chamberlin's thesis of monopolistic competition, Chamberlin uses a very abstract form of uncertainty in his analysis.

This new approach to traditional price theory and to the analysis of imperfect competition represents a breakthrough in the development of a "new" microeconomic theory. Addresses issues in price theory, industrial organization, international trade and regional urban economics.

A theoretical analysis of international trade and industrial policy, developing and using new models of trade with imperfect competition. Modeling of imperfect competition within international trade has been difficult until recent breakthroughs in this area, which have provided a more realistic view of the world economy. The book builds on the advances provided by such tools as game theory and the theory of monopolistic competition. The first section covers broad and basic trade issues which arise under imperfect competition. Section two examines implications for trade policy covering issues such as strategic trade policy in static and dynamic settings. Section three deals with various structural issues, such as optimal choice of trade liberalizing policies, the formation of trade blocks, and open dualistic economy with externalities.

The history of policymaking has been dominated by two rival assumptions about markets. Those who have advocated Keynesian-type policies have generally based their arguments on the claim that markets are imperfectly competitive. On the other hand laissez faire advocates have argued the opposite by claiming that in fact free market policies will eliminate "market imperfections" and reinvigorate perfect competition. The goal of this book is to enter into this important debate by raising critical questions about the nature of market competition. Drawing on the insights of the classical political economists, Schumpeter, Hayek, the Oxford Economists’ Research Group (OERG) and others, the authors in this book challenge this perfect versus imperfect competition dichotomy in both theoretical and empirical terms. There are important differences between the theoretical perspectives of several authors in the broad alternative theoretical tradition defined by this book; nevertheless, a unifying theme throughout this volume is that competition is conceptualized as a dynamic disequilibrium process rather than the static equilibrium state of conventional theory. For almost all the others the growth of firm is consistent with a heightened degree of competitiveness, as both Marx and Schumpeter emphasized, and not a lowered one as in the conventional 'monopoly capital' view.