Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1660--1783) was one of the most influential books on military strategy in the first half of the 20th century. A core text in the naval war colleges of the United States, Britain, and Japan, Mahan's book shaped doctrine for the conduct of war at sea. Adams uses Mahan's ideas to discuss the great Pacific sea battles of World War II and to consider how well they withstood the test of actual combat. Reexamining the conduct of war in the Pacific from a single analytic viewpoint leads to some surprising conclusions about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, the recapture of the Philippines, and the submarine war. Naval historians and armchair strategists alike will find much food for thought in these engrossing pages.

"Although this book portrays the course of an imaginary war between the United States and Japan, it has not been written to support the view that such a conflict is either close at hand or inevitable. No doubt there are elements of danger in the immigration controversy, while further causes of friction may attend the growth of American commercial enterprise in the Far East."--Preface.

A description of a hypothetical naval war between Japan and the United States that influenced the actual naval strategies of both countries during World War II

This gripping blow-by-blow account of a war between the United States and Japan, originally published in 1925, predicted actual events. Writing 16 years before the japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Bywater, the world's leading naval authority in the period between the two world wars, prophesied a Japanese surprise attack on the U.S. in the Pacific, while simultaneously invading the Phillippines and Guam.

This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies. Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans. A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.

Most books gloss over submarines at Midway and, if they are mentioned at all, conclude they failed miserably and had little impact on the outcome of the battle. It is undeniable that carrier aviation and intelligence saved the day, but the role of the submarine was an important one in defense of an anticipated amphibious assault. Midway Submerged is a comprehensive examination of a little-known aspect of this pivotal naval battle, explaining how Nimitz used his submarines at Midway, and the Japanese misused theirs based on a flawed tactical plan. Based on in-depth archival research not only into the battle itself, but also submarine design and construction, and tactical and operational doctrine for both the United States and Japan, it brings a whole new dimension to the discussion of the battle of Midway. It examines the intended role of the submarine in the plans and doctrine of both navies, and what the submarines were expected to accomplish for both fleets during the battle, before assessing the actual accomplishments, successes, and failures of the submarine forces on both sides. Of particular importance, the book offers an analysis of how well these vessels fulfilled the expectations placed on them by their respective naval planners, concluding that submarines played a more important role in the outcome than has been previously understood.

Marvin Pokrant argues that the currently recognized principles of war are flawed and proposes a set of nine new principles to guide military leaders.