Capitalism has become 'financialized'. Since the 1970s, the swelling of financial markets and asset price bubbles has occurred alongside weaker underlying economic growth. Yet financialization was not a spontaneous market development - it was deeply political. States fuelled this process through policies of financial liberalization, and the British state lies at the heart of the story. Britain's radical financial liberalizations in the 1970s and 1980s were instrumental in creating a financialized global economic order in which the City of London emerged as a central hub. But why did the British state propel financialization? The conventional wisdom points to the lobbying power of financial elites and the strength of neoliberal ideology. However, Governing Financialization offers an alternative explanation through an in-depth exploration of declassified state archives. By examining key financial liberalizations in the 1970s and 1980s - including the notorious 'Big Bang' - this book argues that these policies were not part of an intentional scheme to create a new finance-led economic model. Instead, they were designed to address immediate governing dilemmas related to the grinding 'stagflation' crisis and its aftershocks. In this era, British governments found themselves trapped between global competitive pressures to enforce painful domestic adjustment and national political pressures to maintain existing living standards. Financial liberalization was pursued in a trial-and-error manner to navigate this dilemma. By unleashing financial markets, the state hoped to either postpone the worst effects of the crisis, or enact tough economic restructuring in an arm's-length fashion. Financialization was an accidental outcome, not an intentional result.

The international financial community blamed the Asian crisis of 1997–1998 on deep failures of domestic financial governance. To avoid similar crises in the future, this community adopted and promoted a set of international "best practice" standards of financial governance. The G7 asked specialized public and private sector bodies to set international standards, and tasked the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank with their global dissemination. Non-Western countries were thereby encouraged to emulate Western practices in banking and securities supervision, corporate governance, financial disclosure, and policy transparency. In Governing Finance, Andrew Walter explains why Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand—key targets and test cases of this international standards project—were placed under intense pressure to transform their domestic financial governance. Walter finds that the depth of the economic crisis, and more enduring aspects of Asian capitalism, such as family ownership of firms, made substantive compliance with international standards very costly for the private sector and politically difficult for governments to achieve. In spite of international compliance pressure, the result was varying degrees of cosmetic or "mock" compliance. In a book containing lessons for any agency or country attempting to implement lasting change in financial governance, Walter emphasizes the limits of global regulatory convergence in the absence of support from domestic politicians, institutions, and firms.

Since the 1970s, the swelling of financial markets and asset price bubbles has occurred alongside weaker underlying economic growth. Yet financialization was not a spontaneous market development - it was deeply political. States fuelled this process through policies of financial liberalization, and the British state lies at the heart of the story. Britain's radical financial liberalizations in the 1970s and 1980s were instrumental in creating a financialized global economic order in which the City of London emerged as a central hub. But why did the British state propel financialization? The conventional wisdom points to the lobbying power of financial elites and the strength of neoliberal ideology. However, 'Governing Financialization' offers an alternative explanation through an in-depth exploration of declassified state archives.

This volume provides a wide-ranging discussion of both the potential and the problems arising from the application of multi-level governance literature to the monetary and financial domain.

Financialising City Statecraft and Infrastructure addresses the struggles of national and local states to fund, finance and govern urban infrastructure. It develops fresh thinking on financialisation and city statecraft to explain the socially and spatially uneven mixing of managerial, entrepreneurial and financialised city governance in austerity and limited decentralisation across England. As urban infrastructure fixes for the London global city-region risk undermining national ‘rebalancing’ efforts in the UK, city statecraft in the rest of the country is having uneasily to combine speculation, risk-taking and prospective venturing with co-ordination, planning and regulation.

How does international financial integration affect development in newly industrializing countries? Sylvia Maxfield offers a challenging interpretation of the Mexican political economy in light of this complex question. In an increasingly internationalized world, she argues, capital-controlling economic policies can have benefits that, especially for the newly industrializing Latin American countries addressed here, outweigh the efficiency costs of government intervention.

How do regulatory structures evolve in EU financial governance? Incorporating insights from a variety of disciplines, Governing Finance in Europe provides a comprehensive framework to investigate the dynamics leading to centralisation, decentralisation and fragmentation in EU financial regulation. Offering a comprehensive and generalizable theoretical account of regulatory centralisation, this book combines theoretical approaches from political science, law, sociology and economics to trace centralisation in EU financial governance. Contributors build on a rich political science and legal literature and offer empirical analyses of major EU legislative packages in financial regulation, including the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) and Capital Markets Union (CMU). This book systematically identifies and examines the forces and counter-forces on regulatory centralisation. It also offers conjectures as to who benefits from the regulation and how decision-makers are held politically and legally accountable. Featuring contributions from internationally renowned scholars, this book is key reading for academics working in finance and financial policies, particularly those investigating European politics, regulation and regional integration. It will also be of interest to practitioners and policymakers, as chapters provide unique insights into the real-world implications of financial regulation.