Irish Law Based on the 6th edition of Professor Imwinkelried's authoritative American text, Evidentiary Foundations, and amended for the Irish market, this title is a practical guide which explains how the various evidentiary doctrines are applied on a daily basis in the Irish courts. Combining discussion of law and practice, the authors outline a step-by-step approach to laying the necessary foundations for the introduction of items of evidence. Using hypothetical examples, the title illustrates how the substantive rules of evidence convert into concrete lines of questioning in the courtroom. This is the first book of its kind on the Irish market and will provide invaluable practical guidance for practitioners and students of the law of evidence.

"Evidentiary Foundations provides sample lines of questioning that demonstrate how to lay the foundation for admitting various kinds of evidence. It also includes a brief discussion of the underlying legal principles, based on modern common law and the applicable Federal Rules of Evidence"--

Fact-Finding Without Facts explores international criminal fact-finding - empirically, conceptually, and normatively. After reviewing thousands of pages of transcripts from various international criminal tribunals, the author reveals that international criminal trials are beset by numerous and severe fact-finding impediments that substantially impair the tribunals' ability to determine who did what to whom. These fact-finding impediments have heretofore received virtually no publicity, let alone scholarly treatment, and they are deeply troubling not only because they raise grave concerns about the accuracy of the judgments currently being issued but because they can be expected to similarly impair the next generation of international trials that will be held at the International Criminal Court. After setting forth her empirical findings, the author considers their conceptual and normative implications. The author concludes that international criminal tribunals purport a fact-finding competence that they do not possess and, as a consequence, base their judgments on a less precise, more amorphous method of fact-finding than they publicly acknowledge.

This book examines systematically the underlying theory of evidence in Anglo-American legal systems and identifies the defining characteristics of adjudicative fact-finding. Stein develops a detailed innovative theory which sets aside the traditional vision of evidence law as facilitating the discovery of the truth. Combining probability theory, epistemology, economic analysis, and moral philosophy; he argues instead that the fundamental purpose of evidence law is to apportion the risk oferror in conditions of uncertainty. Stein begins by identifying the domain of evidence law.He then describes the basic traits of adjudicative fact-finding and explores the epistemological foundations of the concept. This discussion identifies the problem of probabilistic deduction that accompanies generalizations to which fact-finders resort. This problem engenders paradoxes which Stein proposes to resolve by distinguishing between probability and weight. Stein advances the principle of maximal individualization that does not allow factfinders to make a finding against a person when the evidence they use is not susceptible to individualized testing.He argues that this principle has broad application, but may still be overridden by social utility. This analysis identifies allocation of the risk of error as requiring regulation by evidence law. Advocating a principled allocation of the risk of error, Stein denounces free proof for allowing individual judges to apportion this risk asthey deem fit.He criticizes the UK's recent shift to a discretionary regime on similar grounds. Stein develops three fundamental principles for allocating the risk of error: the cost-efficiency principle which applies across the board; the equality principle which applies in civil litigation; and the equal best principle which applies in criminal trials. The cost-efficiency principle demands that fact-finders minimize the total cost of errors and error-avoidance.Under the equality principle,fact-finding procedures and decisions must not produce an unequal apportionment of the risk of error between the claimant and the defendant. This risk should be apportioned equally between the parties. The equal best principle sets forth two conditions for justifiably convicting and punishing a defendant. The state must do its best to protect the defendant from the risk of erroneous conviction and must not provide better protection to other individuals. Regulating both the admissibility of evidence and its sufficiency, these principles explain and justify many existing evidentiary rules. Alex Stein is Professor of Law at the Benjamin N.Cardozo School of Law,New York.

Authors Imwinkeleried, Wydick & Hogan take the abstract principles of evidence & organize them into concise statements & illustrate their uses with sample transcripts of the elements being applied in the courtroom.

Foundations is taking it back to basics.Foundations is about Accountability! Removing what you think is real and replacing it with what's true. It's hard to remove your blinders when you're standing in your own way. Are you responsible for your own miscues?