The wealth derived from natural resources can have a tremendous impact on the economics and politics of producing countries. In the last quarter century, we have seen the surprising and sobering consequences of this wealth, producing what is now known as the "resource curse." Countries with large endowments of natural resources, such as oil and gas, often do worse than their poorer neighbors. Their resource wealth frequently leads to lower growth rates, greater volatility, more corruption, and, in extreme cases, devastating civil wars. In this volume, leading economists, lawyers, and political scientists address the fundamental channels generated by this wealth and examine the major decisions a country must make when faced with an abundance of a natural resource. They identify such problems as asymmetric bargaining power, limited access to information, the failure to engage in long-term planning, weak institutional structures, and missing mechanisms of accountability. They also provide a series of solutions, including recommendations for contracting with oil companies and allocating revenue; guidelines for negotiators; models for optimal auctions; and strategies to strengthen state-society linkages and public accountability. The contributors show that solutions to the resource curse do exist; yet, institutional innovations are necessary to align the incentives of key domestic and international actors, and this requires fundamental political changes and much greater levels of transparency than currently exist. It is becoming increasingly clear that past policies have not provided the benefits they promised. Escaping the Resource Curse lays out a path for radically improving the management of the world's natural resources.

A variety of perspectives from leading economists provides fresh insight into how Arab countries may best exploit their oil revenues.

The wealth derived from natural resources can have a tremendous impact on the economics and politics of producing countries. In the last quarter century, we have seen the surprising and sobering consequences of this wealth, producing what is now known as the "resource curse." Countries with large endowments of natural resources, such as oil and gas, often do worse than their poorer neighbors. Their resource wealth frequently leads to lower growth rates, greater volatility, more corruption, and, in extreme cases, devastating civil wars. In this volume, leading economists, lawyers, and political scientists address the fundamental channels generated by this wealth and examine the major decisions a country must make when faced with an abundance of a natural resource. They identify such problems as asymmetric bargaining power, limited access to information, the failure to engage in long-term planning, weak institutional structures, and missing mechanisms of accountability. They also provide a series of solutions, including recommendations for contracting with oil companies and allocating revenue; guidelines for negotiators; models for optimal auctions; and strategies to strengthen state-society linkages and public accountability. The contributors show that solutions to the resource curse do exist; yet, institutional innovations are necessary to align the incentives of key domestic and international actors, and this requires fundamental political changes and much greater levels of transparency than currently exist. It is becoming increasingly clear that past policies have not provided the benefits they promised. Escaping the Resource Curse lays out a path for radically improving the management of the world's natural resources.

Modernization theory : does economic development cause democratization? / Jose Antonio Cheibub and James Raymond Vreeland -- Dependency theory / James Mahoney and Diana Rodriguez-Franco -- Structuralism / Elliott Green -- Political development / Robert H. Bates -- The Washington Consensus and the new political economy of economic reform / Kevin Morrison -- Penury traps and prosperity tales : why some countries escape poverty while others do not / M. Steven Fish -- Culture, politics and development / Michael Woolcock -- Religion, politics and economic development : synergies and disconnects / Katherine Marshall -- Does inequality harm economic development and democracy? : accounting for missing values, noncomparable observations, and endogeneity / Christian Houle -- Ethnicity and development / Nic Cheeseman -- Civil conflict and development / Håvard Hegre -- The politics of the resource curse : a review / Michael L. Ross -- Taxation and development / Mick Moore -- How do governments build capabilities to do great things? : ten cases, two competing explanations, one large research agenda / Matt Andrews -- Leadership and the politics of development / Adrian Leftwich and Heather Lyne De Ver -- Colonialism and development in africa / Leander Heldring and James A. Robinson -- Investment and debt / Layna Mosley -- The role of the state in harnessing trade-and-investment for development purposes / Theodore H. Moran -- International financial institutions and market liberalization in the developing world / Stephen C. Nelson -- Foreign aid and democratization in developing countries / Danielle Resnick -- Organizing for prosperity : collective action, political parties, and the political economy of development / Philip Keefer -- Missing links in the institutional chain / Anirudh Krishna -- The comparative politics of service delivery in developing countries / Evan S. Lieberman -- Party systems and the politics of development / Allen Hicken -- Populism and political representation / Kenneth M. Roberts -- Africa's political economy in the contemporary era / Peter M. Lewis -- The politics of development in Latin America and East Asia / James W. McGuire -- Development and underdevelopment in the Middle East and North Africa / Melani Cammett -- Rethinking the institutional foundations of china's hypergrowth : official incentives, institutional constraints, and local developmentalism / Fubing Su, Ran Tao, and Dali L. Yang -- The politics of growth in South Korea : miracle, crisis, and the new market economy / Stephan Haggard and Myung-Koo Kang

Oil to Cash explores one option to help countries with new oil revenue avoid the so-called resource curse: just give the money directly to citizens. A universal, transparent, and regular cash transfer would not only provide a concrete benefit to regular people, but would also create powerful incentives for citizens to hold their government accountable. Oil to Cash details how and where this idea could work and how policymakers can learn from the experiences with cash transfers in places like Mexico, Mongolia, and Alaska.

Botswana is typical of the countries that are endowed with abundant natural resources. Although it is commonly accepted that resource-rich economies tend to fail in accelerating growth, Botswana has experienced the most remarkable economic performance in the region. Using the latest cross-country data, this study empirically readdresses the question of whether resource abundance can contribute to growth. It finds that governance determines the extent to which the growth effects of resource wealth can materialize. In developing countries in particular, the quality of regulation, such as the predictability of changes of regulations, and anticorruption policies, such as transparency and accountability in the public sector, are most important for effective natural resource management and growth.