In the aftermath of the euphoria brought on by our military victory in the Persian Gulf War, is the realization that we still have much to learn. The Persian Gulf War appears to have validated the quality of U.S. doctrine, leadership and military prowess. It showcased the technical superiority of our equipment, and confirmed under fire the courage and competence of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Yet, even in an overwhelming victory there are painfully hard lessons to be learned, or in the case of fratricide, relearned. Perhaps no other aspect of our failures strike the military psyche harder than fratricide. This study will suggest that we do not have to accept the fratricide statistics of the past, however factual, as inevitable of future U.S. conflicts. It will propose that the facts of fratricide should be gathered not as a casualty prediction planning tool, but as a focus to design training and operational procedures, which in conjunction with advanced technology will work towards the significant reduction if not the elimination of fratricide from attack helicopter fires.

Today’s Army faces an environment much different from that which it prepared for in the Cold War. Massed armor battles on the plains of Europe, for which the Army was trained and equipped, have become much less likely while involvement in smaller and more limited conflict has become more probable. Future conflict is more likely to resemble Grenada, Panama, or Somalia than Desert Storm. As world demographics shift from rural to urban areas, the cities will increasingly become areas of potential conflict. They cannot be avoided as a likely battlefield, and have already played a prominent part in Army combat operations in the last decade. If the Army is to keep pace in this changing environment it must look to the cities when developing doctrine, technology, and force structure. The close battlefield of Mogadishu or Panama City is much different from the premier training areas of the National Training Center or Hohenfels. Yet aviators have been presented the dilemma of training for the latter environment and being deployed to the former. For most aviators facing urban combat, it is a matter of learning as they fight. To avoid the high casualties and collateral damage likely in an urban fight against a determined opponent, however. Army aviation must train and prepare before they fight. Attack helicopters are inextricably woven into the fabric of combined arms operations. But for the Army to operate effectively as a combined arms team in an urban environment, both aviators and the ground units they support must understand the capabilities and limitations attack helicopters bring to the battle. This paper presents an historical perspective of how attack helicopters have already been used in this environment. It also discusses the factors that make city fighting unique, and the advantages and disadvantages for attack helicopter employment in an urban environment, as well as implications for future urban conflicts.

On Feb. 7, 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, a Bradley and an M113 were destroyed by 2 Hellfire missiles fired from an Apache helicopter. Two U.S. soldiers were killed, and 6 others were wounded in the incident. This report provides a detailed discussion of the incident, including related events and factors that contributed to it, and an analysis of the U.S. Army's investigation of the incident. It addresses: whether equipment failure caused the incident, the Apaches' performance, and whether the name of the Apache gunner was improperly released to the press.

Den amerikanske hærs første officielle historiske beretning om operationerne i den anden Irakiske Krig, "Operation Iraqi Freedom", (OIF). Fra forberedelserne, mobiliseringen, forlægningen af enhederne til indsættelsen af disse i kampene ved Talil og As Samawah, An Najaf og de afsluttende kampe ved Bagdad. Foruden en detaljeret gennemgang af de enkelte kampenheder(Order of Battle), beskrives og analyseres udviklingen i anvendte våben og doktriner fra den første til den anden Golf Krig.