In the election to the House of Representatives in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) almost tripled the number of its lower house members by winning 308 seats. It subsequently formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party. The new ruling party promised to completely overhaul policymaking mechanisms that had been shaped over the past decades. Yet, the Japanese people quickly felt disappointed with the DPJ’s ‘policymaking engineering’. Examining the evolution of the decision-making process in Japan under the DPJ administration between the years 2009-2012, this book offers a multidimensional explanation for the reasons for the DPJ’s failure in producing effective policymaking mechanisms. Implementing conceptual tools borrowed from historical institutionalism, the author explains why the Democrats displayed inflexibility in introducing selected elements of the Westminster system, incoherence in regard to many aspects of the decision-making reform, and unwillingness to take advantage of all of the institutional resources at their disposal. The book argues that the examination of the DPJ’s origins and interactions with other parties is crucial in understanding its misconceptions regarding the institutional model, policy vision, and institutional tools required for a durable change in policymaking patterns. Illustrating its argument with a range of case studies, this book explains why, ultimately, the DPJ’s concept of a politician-led government resulted in failure. It will also be helpful in understanding the prerequisites for the success of institutional reforms in general. As such it will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese studies, Political science, Asian studies.

This book evaluates the impact of the 2001 central government reforms on effective foreign policy making in Japan. It puts a special focus on the evolution of the domestic institutional factors and decision-making processes behind Japan’s foreign policy, while also analyzing the development of Japan’s external relations with various other countries, such as the US, China and North Korea. Adhering to the neoclassical realist approach, the authors show that, thanks to a more independent Kantei-based form of diplomacy, Japan’s prime ministers were able to strategically respond to international developments, and to pursue their own diplomatic endeavors more boldly. At the same time, they demonstrate that the effectiveness of this proactive posture was still heavily dependent on the decision-makers’ ability to form cohesive coalitions and select suitable institutional tools, which enabled them to influence domestic and international affairs.

In the election to the House of Representatives in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) almost tripled the number of its lower house members by winning 308 seats. It subsequently formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People�s New Party. The new ruling party promised to completely overhaul policymaking mechanisms that had been shaped over the past decades. Yet, the Japanese people quickly felt disappointed with the DPJ�s �policymaking engineering�. Examining the evolution of the decision-making process in Japan under the DPJ administration between the years 2009-2012, this book offers a multidimensional explanation for the reasons for the DPJ�s failure in producing effective policymaking mechanisms. Implementing conceptual tools borrowed from historical institutionalism, the author explains why the Democrats displayed inflexibility in introducing selected elements of the Westminster system, incoherence in regard to many aspects of the decision-making reform, and unwillingness to take advantage of all of the institutional resources at their disposal. The book argues that the examination of the DPJ�s origins and interactions with other parties is crucial in understanding its misconceptions regarding the institutional model, policy vision, and institutional tools required for a durable change in policymaking patterns. Illustrating its argument with a range of case studies, this book explains why, ultimately, the DPJ�s concept of a politician-led government resulted in failure. It will also be helpful in understanding the prerequisites for the success of institutional reforms in general. As such it will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese studies, Political science, Asian studies.

This book deals with the public policy-making process in contemporary Japan testifying a new dictum: 'The various phases of the policy process cause politics'. The analytical focus is threefold: encompassing the policy-making process on the national level; elections and the policy-making process; and the regional policy and decision-making. These analyses offer a number of original and comparative data on Japanese politics. This book also tries to interpret the basic pattern of Japanese politics, which contributes to a clear understanding of the dynamic aspects of the political process and political economy after the Second World War.

In the election to the House of Representatives in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) almost tripled the number of its lower house members by winning 308 seats. It subsequently formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People's New Party. The new ruling party promised to completely overhaul policymaking mechanisms that had been shaped over the past decades. Yet, the Japanese people quickly felt disappointed with the DPJ's 'policymaking engineering'. Examining the evolution of the decision-making process in Japan under the DPJ administration between the years 2009-2012, this book offers a multidimensional explanation for the reasons for the DPJ's failure in producing effective policymaking mechanisms. Implementing conceptual tools borrowed from historical institutionalism, the author explains why the Democrats displayed inflexibility in introducing selected elements of the Westminster system, incoherence in regard to many aspects of the decision-making reform, and unwillingness to take advantage of all of the institutional resources at their disposal. The book argues that the examination of the DPJ's origins and interactions with other parties is crucial in understanding its misconceptions regarding the institutional model, policy vision, and institutional tools required for a durable change in policymaking patterns. Illustrating its argument with a range of case studies, this book explains why, ultimately, the DPJ's concept of a politician-led government resulted in failure. It will also be helpful in understanding the prerequisites for the success of institutional reforms in general. As such it will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese studies, Political science, Asian studies.

Explores the politics and economics of the Abe government and evaluates major policies, such as Abenomics policy reforms.