Analyzes the deflation theories of Thorstein Veblen, Irving Fisher, Joseph A Schumpeter, and Hyman Minsky. In so doing, this work develops a paradigm for understanding the phenomenon of deflation. It also provides a re-examination of the literature and theories of deflation.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

Following the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression, Fisher developed a theory of economic crises called "debt-deflation," which rejected general equilibrium theory and attributed crises to the bursting of a credit bubble. According to the debt deflation theory, a sequence of effects of the debt bubble bursting occurs: 1. Debt liquidation and distress selling. 2. Contraction of the money supply as bank loans are paid off. 3. A fall in the level of asset prices. 4. A still greater fall in the net worth of businesses, precipitating bankruptcies. 5. A fall in profits. 6. A reduction in output, in trade and in employment. 7. Pessimism and loss of confidence. 8. Hoarding of money. 9. A fall in nominal interest rates and a rise in deflation adjusted interest rates. This theory was ignored in favor of Keynesian economics, partly due to the damage to Fisher's reputation from his overly optimistic attitude prior to the crash, but has experienced a revival of mainstream interest since the 1980s, particularly since the Late-2000s recession, and is now a main theory with which he is popularly associated.

High public debt often produces the drama of default and restructuring. But debt is also reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers via negative or belowmarket real interest rates. After WWII, capital controls and regulatory restrictions created a captive audience for government debt, limiting tax-base erosion. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debt when accompanied by inflation. For the advanced economies, real interest rates were negative 1⁄2 of the time during 1945–1980. Average annual interest expense savings for a 12—country sample range from about 1 to 5 percent of GDP for the full 1945–1980 period. We suggest that, once again, financial repression may be part of the toolkit deployed to cope with the most recent surge in public debt in advanced economies.

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