Hurley criticizes the standard view of consciousness, which conceives perception as input from world to mind and action as output from mind to world, with the serious business of thought in between. She considers how the interdependence of perceptual experience and agency at the personal level may emerge from the subpersonal level.

Scholars from many different disciplines examine consciousness through the lens of intellectual approaches and cultures ranging from cosmology research and cell biophysics laboratories to pre-Columbian Mesoamerica and Tibetan Tantric Buddhism in a volume that extends consciousness studies beyond the limits of current neuroscience research. The "hard problem" of today's consciousness studies is subjective experience: understanding why some brain processing is accompanied by an experienced inner life. Recent scientific advances offer insights for understanding the physiological and chemical phenomenology of consciousness. But by leaving aside the internal experiential nature of consciousness in favor of mapping neural activity, such science leaves many questions unanswered. In Ontology of Consciousness, scholars from a range of disciplines—from neurophysiology to parapsychology, from mathematics to anthropology and indigenous non-Western modes of thought—go beyond these limits of current neuroscience research to explore insights offered by other intellectual approaches to consciousness. These scholars focus their attention on such philosophical approaches to consciousness as Tibetan Tantric Buddhism, North American Indian insights, pre-Columbian Mesoamerican civilization, and the Byzantine Empire. Some draw on artifacts and ethnographic data to make their point. Others translate cultural concepts of consciousness into modern scientific language using models and mathematical mappings. Many consider individual experiences of sentience and existence, as seen in African communalism, Hindi psychology, Zen Buddhism, Indian vibhuti phenomena, existentialism, philosophical realism, and modern psychiatry. Some reveal current views and conundrums in neurobiology to comprehend sentient intellection. Contributors Karim Akerma, Matthijs Cornelissen, Antoine Courban, Mario Crocco, Christian de Quincey, Thomas B. Fowler, Erlendur Haraldsson, David. J. Hufford, Pavel B. Ivanov, Heinz Kimmerle, Stanley Krippner, Armand J. Labbé, James Maffie, Hubert Markl, Graham Parkes, Michael Polemis, E Richard Sorenson, Mircea Steriade, Thomas Szasz, Mariela Szirko, Robert A.F. Thurman, Edith L.B. Turner, Julia Watkin, Helmut Wautischer

Featuring the thoughts of Julia Butterfly Hill, Deena Metzger, Joanna Macy, John Mack, and others, this inspiring dialogue between environmental and spiritual activists centers on the seven attributes of consciousness that they have employed in their activism.

The papers included in the volume look at how language awareness affects the outcomes of foreign and second language acquisition in advanced learners. The book focuses on questions such as how much linguistic knowledge is open to the learner’s conscious experience, what should and should not be considered the knowledge of language, how language awareness can be enhanced in the classroom, and, most crucially, what effects language awareness has on attained proficiency. Some papers in the volume also address methodological challenges of researching language awareness, such as the difficulty of defining and measuring awareness with sufficient precision.

"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noë. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noë argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought—that perception is a kind of thoughtful activity. Touch, not vision, should be our model for perception. Perception is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity of the body as a whole. We enact our perceptual experience. To perceive, according to this enactive approach to perception, is not merely to have sensations; it is to have sensations that we understand. In Action in Perception, Noë investigates the forms this understanding can take. He begins by arguing, on both phenomenological and empirical grounds, that the content of perception is not like the content of a picture; the world is not given to consciousness all at once but is gained gradually by active inquiry and exploration. Noë then argues that perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession and exercise of practical bodily knowledge, and examines, among other topics, the problems posed by spatial content and the experience of color. He considers the perspectival aspect of the representational content of experience and assesses the place of thought and understanding in experience. Finally, he explores the implications of the enactive approach for our understanding of the neuroscience of perception.

What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? This book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the relationship between perception and action, with a focus on the debate about the dual visual systems hypothesis, against action oriented theories of perception.

This book makes a comparative analysis of working-class consciousness in Britain, France, Italy and the United States and seeks to answer the question of whether the working class today is a potentially revolutionary force in the West. In France and Italy class conflict and working-class consciousness have reached a higher level of intensity than in Britain or the United States. Both Marxist and functionalist explanations for this are discussed, special attention being paid to the recent French Marxism of Althusser, Mallet and Touraine. Class consciousness is examined as a dynamic process by analyzing the "explosion of consciousness" which often seems to occur in turbulent strike situations. The author concludes that class conflict is more complex than either group of theorists suggest. Working-class consciousness and the relationship between labor and capital are found to be dualistic and fundamentally unstable. Revolutionary potential is greatest in situations of uneven economic and social development when the capital-labor contradiction may be reinforced by other social conflicts. This means that the Marxist claim that the working-class carries in itself the power to be a class for itself must be rejected.