This book explains cooperative and confrontational regional orders in the post-Cold War era. Applying a push-and-pull framework to the evolution of regional orders, the book’s theoretical section compares regional dynamics and studies the transformation and authority of governing arrangements among key regional actors who manage security and institutional cooperation. This presents a novel approach to comparing non-Western regional orders, and helps forge a better integration between International Relations disciplinary approaches and area studies. The empirical section analyzes Central Eurasia and South America within the period 1989-2017, using case studies and interviews with decision-makers, practitioners and experts. The volume demonstrates that soft engagement strategies from extra-regional great powers and internationalist domestic coalitions framed in a stable democratic polity are forces for peaceful interaction, while hard engagement strategies from great external powers plus nationalist coalitions within democratic backsliding in key regional powers present negative outlooks for regional cooperation. This book will be of much interest to students of regional security, comparative politics, area studies and International Relations.

Renegotiating the Nuclear Order offers a sociological approach to the nuclear order, and order defined by nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. The focus is on the need to renegotiate the nuclear order, given the conflict between deterrence and disarmament and the unbalanced distribution of rights and responsibilities between the nuclear and nonnuclear states. The study applies the concepts, a relevant social group, and a technological frame developed in the sociology of technology on the current competition between the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons. The negotiations of the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran form the empirical background. The policy challenges identified in the sociotechnical analysis are threefold. Firstly, there is the need to guarantee the credibility of the nuclear diplomacy in the gap between the “military” and the “peaceful”. Secondly, during the past 50 years the rights of the non-nuclear states have been undermined, while the nuclear-weapon states have ignored their disarmament obligations. There is a need to renegotiate a new balance. Thirdly, the relationship between the two treaties has to be clarified. The proposal is to clearly separate the two into a comprehensive treaty on non-proliferation and to a verifiable treaty on prohibiting nuclear weapons. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, arms control and disarmament, sociology, STS (Science-Technology-Society) studies, and International Relations.

Since World War II, the United States has played a crucial role in shaping Northeast Asian politics and economics. However, as this authoritative book shows, the Cold War's demise, September 11, and America's major strategic realignments have unleashed seismic changes in the region. China's rise, Japan's quest for a normal state, and the North Korean nuclear quagmire are also potential flashpoints. Collective memories of past aggression as well as resurgent nationalism further complicate regional dynamics. But hopeful signs abound, as deepening economic interdependence, expanding social and cultural exchanges, and the proliferation of informal economic, social, and cultural networks have improved the chances for a peaceful evolution to a liberal and stable region. Contributions by: Vinod K. Aggarwal, Paul Bacon, Avery Goldstein, G. John Ikenberry, Takashi Inoguchi, Ki-Jung Kim, Myongsob Kim, Woosang Kim, Yongho Kim, Min Gyo Koo, Michael Mastanduno, Chung-in Moon, Katharine H. S. Moon, Seung-won Suh, and William C. Wohlforth

Great power competition is the watermark of the current global scenario. In this regard, the maritime and naval dimension have a particular relevance on the struggle for regional and global hegemony. This book has the potential to engage with multiple audiences, since develops an analytic approach to understand naval great power competition in the maritime spaces of the Global South. It is set within a neoclassical realism approach, while engaging literature from international relations, international security, and studies on the Indo-Pacific and the South Atlantic security dynamics. The book offers a unique conceptual framework to understand how great powers select their maritime strategies, presents a series of regional and global maritime strategies by the United States, China, Russia and India, while assess their impact in the Southern Oceans, focusing in the Indo-Pacific realm and the South Atlantic.

This edited volume examines the political and security issues influencing and shaping the developing maritime order in the Indo Pacific. If focuses specifically on the impact of China’s maritime expansion upon the policies and strategies of the regional states as well as the major players. The chapters examine the interaction of these players, paying particular attention to Japan, as the originator of the Indo Pacific idea and promoter of security cooperation and regionalism. It also covers the responses of the ASEAN claimants, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines as well as Indonesia, alongside the key players, India, the US and also the EU.

This edited book complements and follows up on the book, Thompson and Volgy et al, Regions, Power and Conflict: Constrained Capabilities, Hierarchy, and Rivalry. It is predicated in part on the paucity of published material available on comparing regional international politics. Monadic, dyadic, and systemic approaches all have their uses and have been exploited extensively. The same cannot be said about comparative regional analysis. The premise is that a great deal of international politics takes place within regional parameters. Most states simply lack the capability or interest in devoting many resources to extra-regional affairs. Yet each region is distinctive. In some, military coups remain common while they have died out as a form of political practice in others. A few have been highly conflictual and then become more pacific, while others persist in their conflict intensity. Some have powerful neighbors with intervention tendencies, while others are surrounded by relatively weak states. Some are rich; others are poor. The point is that regions, all with proper names, have attributes that can be harnessed through comparison to explain why regional behavior differs greatly across the planet. The aim is to replace the proper names with the leading variables that appear to drive behavior. For instance, to shrug and say “that’s the Middle East for you” does not take us very far. Replacing the Middle East label with conceptualization about how a set of small, weak, autocratic states behave subject to high penetration by major powers might take us farther than shrugging off regional identity. We have good reasons to think that comparative regional analysis can deliver an explanatory value-added product just as much as alternative “levels of analysis” can. Ultimately, we might desire to integrate separate levels of analysis, rather than segregating them. But in the short term, we need to encourage comparative regional analysis because it is the least developed perspective. Why that might be the case can be debated, but it stems in part from our disciplinary tendencies for some analysts to specialize in regional behavior largely in a descriptive vein while others prefer to focus on explaining universal behavior. Comparative regional behavior tends to be squeezed out by regional scholars who suspect generalization about behavior and universal scholars who suspect particular contexts such as regions. Comparative regional analysis requires analysts who are willing to explore generalization but acknowledge regional contexts more explicitly than is customary. At the same time, more general substitutes for those regional labels must be introduced if explanatory headway is to be achieved.