This book reviews recent progress in the theory of oligopoly and market leadership and provides new results on the theory of Stackelberg competition and Nash competition with strategic investment under endogenous entry. These theories are applied to models of competition in quantities, prices and to patent races. The results are used to propose a new approach to competition policy and issues of the abuse of dominance.

A proposal for moving from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy, reviewing theory and evidence on economic incentives for innovation. Competition policy and antitrust enforcement have traditionally focused on prices rather than innovation. Economic theory shows the ways that price competition benefits consumers, and courts, antitrust agencies, and economists have developed tools for the quantitative evaluation of price impacts. Antitrust law does not preclude interventions to encourage innovation, but over time the interpretation of the laws has raised obstacles to enforcement policies for innovation. In this book, economist Richard Gilbert proposes a shift from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy. Antitrust enforcement should be concerned with protecting incentives for innovation and preserving opportunities for dynamic, rather than static, competition. In a high-technology economy, Gilbert argues, innovation matters. Gilbert considers both theory and available empirical evidence on the relationships among market structure, firm behavior, and the production of new products and services. He reviews the distinctive features of the high-tech economy and why current analytical tools used by antitrust enforcers aren't up to the task of assessing innovation concerns. He considers, from the perspective of innovation competition, Kenneth Arrow's “replacement effect” and the Schumpeterian theory of market power and appropriation; discusses the effect of mergers on innovation and future price competition; and reviews the empirical literature on competition, mergers, and innovation. He describes examples of merger enforcement by US and European antitrust agencies; examines cases brought against Microsoft and Google; and discusses the risks and benefits of interoperability standards. Finally, he offers recommendations for competition policy. The open access edition of this book was made possible by generous funding from Arcadia – a charitable fund of Lisbet Rausing and Peter Baldwin.

Any legal regime must attempt to assess the trade-offs associated with rules that will affect incentives to innovate, allocative efficiency, competition, and freedom of economic actors to commercialize the fruits of their innovative labors. The essays in this book approach this critical set of problems from an economic perspective.

Scholars explore antitrust issues as these relate to dynamic industry competition and public policy.

This text explores in depth the fundamental principles of corporate insolvency law and the many conceptual and analytical problems posed by the legislation and offers both theoretical and practical solutions.

This cohesive collection brings together David J. Teece's most important work on the nexus of innovation and competition policy. He was one of the first to flag the importance of innovation issues to competition policy 25 years ago. He has also pioneered the application of economic and organizational principles to issues in the management of innovation. Throughout these essays, Professor Teece shows how technological advances, the advent of the Internet and other recent shifts in the global business landscape have placed businesses in a radically altered situation from even just a few decades ago. He clearly elucidates the need for both businesses and policymakers to adapt to this rapidly evolving landscape by embracing and fostering next-generation competition policies. Topics discussed include antitrust policy, technology strategies, competition policy, market power and intellectual property issues. Students and professors of business and management, innovation studies, intellectual property and competition lawyers will find this volume a critical asset to their work. Policymakers and regulators will also benefit immensely from this lucid and comprehensive collection.

. . . a must-read for anyone wanting to study tying in more detail. . . the book offers a very thorough analysis of tying, together with some recommended improvements to the way in which tying is currently assessed under the EU and the US antitrust rules. Common Market Law Review Schmidt s Competition Law, Innovation and Antitrust is a superb introduction to the subject of tying arrangements and other bundled sales in high technology markets, principally as they are treated under US antitrust law and EU competition law. Schmidt thoroughly assesses the economics of such arrangements, the benefits they confer and the potential harms they impose, and then gives a positive introduction to the law. This is a comprehensive treatment of its subject and an indispensible aid to the competition law scholar or practitioner. Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Iowa, College of Law, US This innovative book assesses the hotly debated topic of tying from three different perspectives: competition law, economics and intellectual property rights. It highlights the faults and benefits of the current approaches to tying under EC competition law and US antitrust law. In the light of modern economic thinking, the recent review of Article 82 EC, and Sherman Act, Section 2, the author identifies a more economic approach to tying that moves away from the per se illegality label that has so far impinged on tying case law. Hedvig Schmidt recognizes the significance that tying can play on innovation and product development, and thus suggests a new approach which carves out a safe haven for technological integrated products to ensure continuous stimulation of innovation. With comparative assessments and investigations, this book is a must-read for academics specializing in competition law and theory, as well as practitioners and policy-makers of competition law and intellectual property.