This book follows the men of the 5th Corps and the Army of the Potomac through the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, with the army condemned to moving blindly through enemy territory without the benefit of cavalry scouting or screening. It considers the lost opportunities of June 1864, when Grant's masterly movement of the Army of the Potomac across the James to confront the enemy at Petersburg should have ended in victory and the fall of Richmond. Bungling and complacency doomed the attacks on Petersburg's fortifications, and instead of victory, the battered Federals faced a drawn-out siege, and another 10 months of war. Finally, the author considers what happened to a number of the prominent Federal participants in the Overland Campaign during the last year of the war and after. Many of those who lied and cheated their way to the top became government leaders and the authors of policy for years to come.

This book follows the men of the 5th Corps and the Army of the Potomac through the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, with the army condemned to moving blindly through enemy territory without the benefit of cavalry scouting or screening. It considers the lost opportunities of June 1864, when Grant's masterly movement of the Army of the Potomac across the James to confront the enemy at Petersburg should have ended in victory and the fall of Richmond. Bungling and complacency doomed the attacks on Petersburg's fortifications, and instead of victory, the battered Federals faced a drawn-out siege, and another 10 months of war. Finally, the author considers what happened to a number of the prominent Federal participants in the Overland Campaign during the last year of the war and after. Many of those who lied and cheated their way to the top became government leaders and the authors of policy for years to come.

The initial confrontation between Union general Ulysses S. Grant and Confederate general Robert E. Lee in Virginia during the Overland Campaign included the pivotal battles of Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor. Yet this crucial engagement has only recently received the same degree of scrutiny as other Civil War battles. In Lee's Army during the Overland Campaign, Alfred C. Young III makes a significant contribution to that study by providing for the first time accurate information regarding the Confederate side throughout the conflict. While the strength and casualties in Grant's army remain uncontested, historians know much less about Lee's army because of poor record keeping by the Confederates as well as an inordinate number of missing or lost battle reports. The complexity of the Overland Campaign, which consisted of several smaller engagements in addition to the three main clashes, led to considerable historic uncertainty regarding Lee's army. Significant doubts persist about the army's capability at the commencement of the drive, the amount of reinforcements received, and the total of casualties sustained during the entire campaign and at each of the major battles. The prevailing narrative depicts Confederates as outstripped nearly two to one and portrays Grant suffering losses at a rate nearly double that of Lee. Many Civil War scholars contend that the campaign proved a clear numerical victory for Lee but a tactical triumph for Grant. Young's decade of research, however, contests that notion with new statistical data. Through thorough analysis of information compiled from the National Archives and personal estates Young challenges common assumptions about the Overland Campaign, showing clearly that Lee's army stood far larger in strength and size and suffered much higher casualties than previously believed.

Contains more than 100 maps, diagrams and illustrations The Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864, is the tenth study in the Combat Studies Institute’s (CSI) Staff Ride Handbook series. This handbook analyzes Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s 1864 Overland Campaign from the crossing of the Rapidan River on 4 May to the initiation of the crossing of the James River on 15 June. Unlike many of CSI’s previous handbooks, this handbook focuses on the operational level of war. Even so, it provides a heavy dose of tactical analysis, thereby making this ride a superb tool for developing Army leaders at almost all levels. Designed to be completed in three days, this staff ride is flexible enough to allow units to conduct a one-day or two-day ride that will still enable soldiers to gain a full range of insights offered by the study of this important campaign. In developing their plan for conducting an Overland Campaign staff ride, unit commanders are encouraged to consider analyzing the wide range of military problems associated with warfighting that this study offers. This campaign provides a host of issues to be examined, to include logistics, intelligence, psychological operations, use of reconnaissance (or lack thereof), deception, leadership, engineering, campaign planning, soldier initiative, and many other areas relevant to the modern military professional. Each of these issues, and others also analyzed herein, are as germane to us today as they were 150 years ago.

Washington Roebling is well known as the man who supervised construction of the Brooklyn Bridge. His path to overseeing that monumental task began during the Civil War. In addition to his brave, dramatic actions at Gettysburg, his Civil War service was remarkable: artilleryman, bridge builder, scout, balloonist, mapmaker, engineer, and staff officer. His story reveals much about Gettysburg but also about Civil War intelligence and engineering and the politics and infighting within the Army of the Potomac’s high command. Roebling’s service—leadership, engineering, decision-making, and managing personalities and politics—prepared him well for overseeing the Brooklyn Bridge.

This book follows the 2nd Maine Cavalry from their muster in the late winter of 1863 through their action against Confederate forces in Louisiana, Florida and Alabama. While giving the details of the many scouting expeditions, raids and battles in which the regiment participated, it also includes the more personal stories of several of the young soldiers involved. In addition, a complete regimental roster gives details of enlistment, illness, death from various causes, promotions, demotions, etc.

The Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864, is the tenth study in the Combat Studies Institute's (CSI) Staff Ride Handbook series. This handbook, prepared by Dr. Curtis S. King, Dr. William Glenn Robertson, and LTC Steven E. Clay, analyzes Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant?s 1864 Overland Campaign from the crossing of the Rapidan River on 4 May to the initiation of the crossing of the James River on 15 June. Unlike many of CSI's previous handbooks, this handbook focuses on the operational level of war. Even so, it provides a heavy dose of tactical analysis, thereby making this ride a superb tool for developing Army leaders at almost all levels. Designed to be completed in three days, this staff ride is flexible enough to allow units to conduct a one-day or two-day ride that will still enable soldiers to gain a full range of insights offered by the study of this important campaign. In developing their plan for conducting an Overland Campaign staff ride, unit commanders are encouraged to consider analyzing the wide range of military problems associated with warfighting that this study offers. This campaign provides a host of issues to be examined, to include logistics, intelligence, psychological operations, use of reconnaissance (or lack thereof), deception, leadership, engineering, campaign planning, soldier initiative, and many other areas relevant to the modern military professional. Each of these issues, and others also analyzed herein, are as germane to us today as they were 150 years ago. Modern military professionals, for whom this handbook was written, will find a great deal to ponder and analyze when studying this campaign. CSI--The Past is Prologue!