While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.

Widely recognized as one of the most important theorists of warfare, important strands of Carl von Clausewitz's thinking on the subject are not widely known. In 'Clausewitz on Small War', Christopher Daase and James W. Davis begin to address this unfortunate state of affairs. In this volume they have assembled and translated Clausewitz's most important texts devoted to the analysis of asymetric, unconventional, guerrilla, and small-unit warfare, including Clausewitz's "Lectures on Small War", held at the Prussian War College in 1810 and 1811.

This is a philosophical treatise on war written by an Oxford grad who served in Afghanistan.

Soldier and intellectual Carl von Clausewitz first entered combat at the tender age of thirteen. He later rose to the rank of Major General, married into the Prussian nobility and wrote a book which was to become one of the most influential works on military strategy ever published. On War is one of the first books on modern military strategy. Writing mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, von Clausewitz never lived to see it published. He had a theory that it was the integration of political, societal and economic issues that was the most important factor in deciding the outcome of a war. This new theory made On War one of the most important texts on strategy ever written. On War has been translated into practically every major language and remains a source of inspiration for modern strategic thinkers. In this fascinating new interpretation, Andrew Holmes illustrates how von Clausewitz's ideas can be applied to contemporary business. Readers will discover:* Why business, like war, is neither an art nor a science;* How to 'fortify' their business;* The importance of a strong commander;* The secrets of being ruthless;* Why they should bypass their smart phones and open up the lines of communication.By re-interpreting von Clausewitz's original theories, Holmes demonstrates that On War is not just about the battlefield. This clear, concise and waffle-free book shows how you can treat life like a military operation and steer your troops in the right direction in the world of business. Andrew Holmes' Carl von Clausewitz's On War illustrates the timeless nature of von Clausewitz's insights by bringing them to life with modern examples and business case studies. This brilliant interpretation of On War is an entertaining accompaniment to one of the most famous strategy books ever written.

"This paper will re-evaluate the validity of the central propositions in On War with respect to modern technological, economic, political, and social conditions. This reappraisal is carried out in order to answer whether or not Clausewitz's approach to the study of war has any relevance for the modern analyst of defence. Moreover, it is essential to bear in mind that any general theory of war must include not only the historical and current forms that war has taken on, but it must be able to adapt to change in the future. Thus, this study is largely deductive and speculative; however, because war is a practical activity, constant reference must always be made to reality ... In order to determine if Clausewitz's approach is still relevant, this paper will discuss the original theory, challenges to it, and the possibility of theoretical growth in response to the limitations"--Page 3

The volume considers Clausewitz's timeless On War against the background of actual armed conflict. With scholars from a range of disciplines and countries, it throws new light on a classic text and contemporary issues.