This text analyzes the dramatic shifts in Chinese Communist Party economic policy during the mid to late 1950s which eventually resulted in 30 to 45 million deaths through starvation as a result of the failed policies of the Great Leap Forward. Teiwes examines both the substance and the process of economic policy-making in that period, explaining how the rational policies of opposing rash advance in 1956-57 gave way to the fanciful policies of the Great Leap, and assessing responsibility for the failure to adjust adequately those policies even as signs of disaster began to reach higher level decision makers. In telling this story, Teiwes focuses on key participants in the process throughout both "rational" and "utopian" phases - Mao, other top leaders, central economic bureaucracies and local party leaders. The analysis rejects both of the existing influential explanations in the field, the long dominant power politics approach focusing on alleged clashes within the top leadership, and David Bachman's recent institutional interpretation of the origins of the Great Leap. Instead, this study presents a detailed picture of an exceptionally Mao-dominated process, where no other actor challenged his position, where the boldest step any actor took was to try and influence his preferences, and where the system in effect became paralyzed while Mao kept changing signals as disaster unfolded.

Winner of the Samuel Johnson Prize An unprecedented, groundbreaking history of China's Great Famine that recasts the era of Mao Zedong and the history of the People's Republic of China. "Between 1958 and 1962, China descended into hell. Mao Zedong threw his country into a frenzy with the Great Leap Forward, an attempt to catch up to and overtake Britain in less than 15 years The experiment ended in the greatest catastrophe the country had ever known, destroying tens of millions of lives." So opens Frank Dikötter's riveting, magnificently detailed chronicle of an era in Chinese history much speculated about but never before fully documented because access to Communist Party archives has long been restricted to all but the most trusted historians. A new archive law has opened up thousands of central and provincial documents that "fundamentally change the way one can study the Maoist era." Dikötter makes clear, as nobody has before, that far from being the program that would lift the country among the world's superpowers and prove the power of Communism, as Mao imagined, the Great Leap Forward transformed the country in the other direction. It became the site not only of "one of the most deadly mass killings of human history,"--at least 45 million people were worked, starved, or beaten to death--but also of "the greatest demolition of real estate in human history," as up to one-third of all housing was turned into rubble). The experiment was a catastrophe for the natural world as well, as the land was savaged in the maniacal pursuit of steel and other industrial accomplishments. In a powerful mesghing of exhaustive research in Chinese archives and narrative drive, Dikötter for the first time links up what happened in the corridors of power-the vicious backstabbing and bullying tactics that took place among party leaders-with the everyday experiences of ordinary people, giving voice to the dead and disenfranchised. His magisterial account recasts the history of the People's Republic of China.

This text analyzes the dramatic shifts in Chinese Communist Party economic policy during the mid to late 1950s which eventually resulted in 30 to 45 million deaths through starvation as a result of the failed policies of the Great Leap Forward. Teiwes examines both the substance and the process of economic policy-making in that period, explaining how the rational policies of opposing rash advance in 1956-57 gave way to the fanciful policies of the Great Leap, and assessing responsibility for the failure to adjust adequately those policies even as signs of disaster began to reach higher level decision makers. In telling this story, Teiwes focuses on key participants in the process throughout both "rational" and "utopian" phases - Mao, other top leaders, central economic bureaucracies and local party leaders. The analysis rejects both of the existing influential explanations in the field, the long dominant power politics approach focusing on alleged clashes within the top leadership, and David Bachman's recent institutional interpretation of the origins of the Great Leap. Instead, this study presents a detailed picture of an exceptionally Mao-dominated process, where no other actor challenged his position, where the boldest step any actor took was to try and influence his preferences, and where the system in effect became paralyzed while Mao kept changing signals as disaster unfolded.

This text analyzes the dramatic shifts in Chinese Communist Party economic policy during the mid to late 1950s which eventually resulted in 30 to 45 million deaths through starvation as a result of the failed policies of the Great Leap Forward. Teiwes examines both the substance and the process of economic policy-making in that period, explaining how the rational policies of opposing rash advance in 1956-57 gave way to the fanciful policies of the Great Leap, and assessing responsibility for the failure to adjust adequately those policies even as signs of disaster began to reach higher level decision makers. In telling this story, Teiwes focuses on key participants in the process throughout both "rational" and "utopian" phases - Mao, other top leaders, central economic bureaucracies and local party leaders. The analysis rejects both of the existing influential explanations in the field, the long dominant power politics approach focusing on alleged clashes within the top leadership, and David Bachman's recent institutional interpretation of the origins of the Great Leap. Instead, this study presents a detailed picture of an exceptionally Mao-dominated process, where no other actor challenged his position, where the boldest step any actor took was to try and influence his preferences, and where the system in effect became paralyzed while Mao kept changing signals as disaster unfolded.

In this timely book about the current state of research and practice of emergency management in China, the authors take as their basic premises that we now live in a risk society and that our collective ability to deal with disasters and their aftermath is more important than ever. Set within a multi-disciplinary framework that places risk, disaster and crisis, the three phases of emergency management, on an analytical continuum, and drawing on empirical data obtained through surveys, observations, and interviews, the study not only provides a thorough overview of recent progress in our theoretical understanding of the subject but also offers insights on how scientifically informed policies can improve the way emergency management is done in China.

This book provides a brief overview of China's "One Belt One Road" Initiative (OBOR), now officially re-labeled the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). Looking back from the vantage point of 2019 to 2013, when OBOR was first announced as China's new international infrastructure and trade initiative, OBOR/BRI has proven to be nothing less than an eye-catching program to assist developing countries in need of financing for sorely-needed infrastructure to achieve their economic development goals. Today, more than 70 countries and organizations are involved in the OBOR/BRI enterprise. Each one of these appears to have its own interesting story to tell related to China's support for its infrastructure projects including but not limited to pipelines, high-speed and other rail lines, communications networks, roads, deep-water and air ports, energy grids and inland transport and cargo hubs. China supplies developing countries with the access to loans, construction materials and workers. OBOR/BRI is sold by China as a win-win(-win) situation in which China and the loan recipient benefit economically (with the third win representing peace). The already rapid growth rate of China's OBOR received an unanticipated major boost when Donald Trump was elected US President in November 2016 and took office in mid-January 2017. Trump's campaign rhetoric and ensuing policies exposed his support for American isolationism as reflected in his campaign slogan "America First." Since his inauguration, the US has aggressively, intentionally, and incrementally embarked on abandoning its global leadership position and commitments, which it had held since the end of WWII. China through its OBOR has since taken advantage of the geopolitical vacuum created by America's self-imposed abdication not only from its global leadership status but from long-standing regional alliances and trade agreements as well. Although each region, country or project mentioned in this book merits its own book-length, in-depth attention, here we highlight OBOR's geographic and functional stealth-like expansion around the globe on land, sea and in space. An extensive reference list is provided to enable readers to pursue various OBOR/BRI-related topics of interest. The potential biases of various observers notwithstanding, there are challenging issues raised about the long-term sustainability of the OBOR/BRI. As the OBOR/BRI matures, questions about its economic viability are increasingly being raised. The issues raised by these questions and concerns should identify lessons that need to be learned both by China (governments, banks and companies) and by prospective OBOR/BRI partners. Fears of debt-trap diplomacy are but one example. Most recently, articles are appearing that question whether such an ambitious global infrastructure development initiative is really viable in the long run. While China can control its actions and what it chooses to invest in to meet a wide range of its objectives, there are intervening factors over which it has little to no control. China's ability to provide loans to developing economies can be reduced by happenings in the global economy, whether a trade war with the US, a downturn in its economy, or an economic inability of people around the globe to buy its goods and services. One Belt One Road: China's Long March to 2049 is the first book to explore both the scope and detail of this transformation of the global balance of power, as seen through the lens of OBOR/BRI.

"Bradley is sharp and rueful, and a voice for a more seasoned, constructive vision of our international relations with East Asia." --Christian Science Monitor James Bradley introduces us to the prominent Americans--including FDR's grandfather, Warren Delano--who in the 1800s made their fortunes in the China opium trade. Meanwhile, American missionaries sought a myth: noble Chinese peasants eager to Westernize. The media propagated this mirage, and FDR believed that supporting Chiang Kai-shek would make China America's best friend in Asia. But Chiang was on his way out and when Mao Zedong instead came to power, Americans were shocked, wondering how we had "lost China." From the 1850s to the origins of the Vietnam War, Bradley reveals how American misconceptions about China have distorted our policies and led to the avoidable deaths of millions. The China Mirage dynamically explores the troubled history that still defines U.S.-Chinese relations today.