In uneasy partnership at the helm of the modern state stand elected party politicians and professional bureaucrats. This book is the first comprehensive comparison of these two powerful elites. In seven countries--the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands--researchers questioned 700 bureaucrats and 6OO politicians in an effort to understand how their aims, attitudes, and ambitions differ within cultural settings. One of the authors' most significant findings is that the worlds of these two elites overlap much more in the United States than in Europe. But throughout the West bureaucrats and politicians each wear special blinders and each have special virtues. In a well-ordered polity, the authors conclude, politicians articulate society's dreams and bureaucrats bring them gingerly to earth.

Adminstrative reform in most western democracies over the past couple of decades has been characterized by bringing in market-based concepts of public-service delivery. This book looks critically at administrative reform in a comparative perspective. The contributors - experts on administrative reform - assess its scope and objectives, and also the ways in which these reforms have impacted on the traditional roles of elective office and civil servants. This book will be an invaluable resource for students and academics in Politics and Public Administration, as well as for civil servants and experts on administrative reform.

Much insightful scholarship has been devoted to the elaboration of the nature and functions of elites in modern societies. The theories and paradigms which have emerged have evoked both strong support as well as considerable criticism. Testing this conception of the role of elites is a primary goal of the analysis presented here. We investigate in great detail in these three democratic systems the level of elites' concern for their problems, their sense of responsibility (and power) to act, their relations with community groups and the public, and their values. And throughout the analysis we keep in mind the question of "effective action." This study both builds on and diverges from the early comparative research on local elites.

Although a powerful, independent bureaucracy poses a threat to democracy, it is indispensable to its proper functioning. This book provides an overview of the complex relationship between bureaucracy and the politics of democracy and is essential reading for students of sociology, political science and public administration. It is designed to guide students through the maze of classical and modern theories on the topic, to give them basic information on the historical developments in this area and the present them with case histories of the actual relationship between bureaucrats and politicians in democratic societies.

Although everyone agrees on the need to make government work better, few understand public bureaucracy sufficiently well to offer useful suggestions, either theoretical or practical. In fact, some consider bureaucratic efficiency incompatible with democratic government. Douglas Yates places the often competing aims of efficiency and democracy in historical perspective and then presents a unique and systematic theory of the politics of bureaucracy, which he illustrates with examples from recent history and from empirical research. He argues that the United States operates under a system of "bureaucratic democracy," in which governmental decisions increasingly are made in bureaucratic settings, out of the public eye. He describes the rational, selfinterested bureaucrat as a "minimaxer," who inches forward inconspicuously, gradually accumulating larger budgets and greater power, in an atmosphere of segmented pluralism, of conflict and competition, of silent politics. To make the policy process more competitive, democratic, and open, Yates calls for strategic debate among policymakers and bureaucrats and insists that bureaucrats should give a public accounting of their significant decisions rather than bury them in incremental changes. He offers concrete proposals, applicable to federal, state, and local governments, for simplifying the now-chaotic bureaucratic policymaking system and at the same time bolstering representation and openness. This is a book for all political scientists, policymakers, government officials, and concerned citizens. It may well become a classic statement on the workings of public bureaucracy.

Most people think of governmental bureaucracy as a dull subject. Yet for thirty years the American federal executive has been awash in political controversy. From George Wallace's attacks on "pointy headed bureaucrats," to Richard Nixon's "responsiveness program," to the efforts of Al Gore and Bill Clinton to "reinvent government," the people who administer the American state have stood uncomfortably in the spotlight, caught in a web of politics. This book covers the turmoil and controversy swirling around the bureaucracy since 1970, when the Nixon administration tried to tighten its control over the executive branch. Drawing on interviews conducted over the past three decades, Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman cast light on the complex relationship between top civil servants and political leaders and debunk much of the received wisdom about the deterioration and unresponsiveness of the federal civil service. The authors focus on three major themes:the "quiet crisis" of American administration, a hypothesized decline in the quality and morale of federal executives; the "noisy crisis," which refers to the large question of bureaucrats' responsiveness to political authority; and the movement to "reinvent" American government. Aberbach and Rockman examine the sources and validity of these themes and consider changes that might make the federal government's administration work better. They find that the quality and morale of federal executives have held up remarkably well in the face of intense criticism, and that the bureaucracy has responded to changes in presidential administrations. Pointing out that bureaucrats are convenient targets in contemporary political battles, the authors contend that complexity, contradiction, and bloated or inefficient programs are primarily the product of elected politicians, not bureaucrats.The evidence suggests that American federal executives will carry out the political will if they are given adequate support and realistic

"The author treats the classic problem of achieving democratic control over powerful bureaucracies very successfully both by treating familiar material in a new and important way and by presenting new empirical evidence on the problem. . . . This is the most sophisticated and systematic work on the subject. . . . exceedingly well written--succinct, direct, and even graceful."--Dale Rogers Marshall, University of California, Davis "The author treats the classic problem of achieving democratic control over powerful bureaucracies very successfully both by treating familiar material in a new and important way and by presenting new empirical evidence on the problem. . . . This is the most sophisticated and systematic work on the subject. . . . exceedingly well written--succinct, direct, and even graceful."--Dale Rogers Marshall, University of California, Davis