Discusses America's involvement in Iraq, including the risks, triumphs, and repercussions, and offers alternatives to future dealings with Iraq and the War on Terrorism.

How and when do military innovations take place? Do they proceed differently during times of peace and times of war? In Winning the Next War, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation. He also discusses the changing relationship between the civilian innovator and the military bureaucrat. In peacetime, Rosen finds, innovation has been the product of analysis and the politics of military promotion, in a process that has slowly but successfully built military capabilities critical to American military success. In wartime, by contrast, innovation has been constrained by the fog of war and the urgency of combat needs. Rosen draws his principal evidence from U.S. military policy between 1905 and 1960, though he also discusses the British army's experience with the battle tank during World War I.

Keen investigates why conflicts are so prevalent and so intractable, even when one side has much greater military resources. He asks who benefits from wars-- whether economically, politically, or psychologically-- and argues that in order to bring them successfully to an end we need to understand the complex vested interests on all sides.

In war, do mass and materiel matter most? Will states with the largest, best equipped, information-technology-rich militaries invariably win? The prevailing answer today among both scholars and policymakers is yes. But this is to overlook force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which materiel is actually used. In a landmark reconception of battle and war, this book provides a systematic account of how force employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes. Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is central to modern war, becoming increasingly important since 1900 as the key to surviving ever more lethal weaponry. Technological change produces opposite effects depending on how forces are employed; to focus only on materiel is thus to risk major error--with serious consequences for both policy and scholarship. In clear, fluent prose, Biddle provides a systematic account of force employment's role and shows how this account holds up under rigorous, multimethod testing. The results challenge a wide variety of standard views, from current expectations for a revolution in military affairs to mainstream scholarship in international relations and orthodox interpretations of modern military history. Military Power will have a resounding impact on both scholarship in the field and on policy debates over the future of warfare, the size of the military, and the makeup of the defense budget.

A collection of military history essays examining the philosophical side of war and the meaning of “victory.” What does it mean to win a war? How does this differ from a simple military victory? How have different cultures and societies answered these questions through history, and how can we apply these lessons? When considering how a war might be “won,” there are three big ideas that underpin how success can be measured: ownership, intervention for effect, and fighting for ideas. These three main themes also contain a series of sub-themes: internal and external, short-term and long-term, military success versus political success, and tactical outcomes versus campaign effects versus strategic success. This book examines the constituent parts of what may comprise “victory” or “winning” in war and then travels, chronologically, through a wide variety of historical case studies, further exploring these philosophical components and weaving them into a factual discussion. The authors of each chapter will explore the three big ideas within the context of their individual case studies, offering pointers as to where, within that framework, their case study may sit. The message of this book is not just an academic exploration for its own sake, but a vital aspect (both morally and practically) of the political and military business of the application of force. In short, know in advance how you wish to end before you start. “Comprising sixteen excellent and thought-provoking essays by eighteen noted military historians and former warriors, the book comprehensively examines the realities of war and the wide-ranging concepts of victory. At the same time, it offers a very good general history of warfare.” —Baird Maritime “[This book] can provide useful insights to anyone; students and subject matter experts alike can find something to gain from this book. Most importantly, its emphasis on contemporary warfare can provide consequential information for our current military and civilian leadership, if they are willing to hear it.” —Air & Space Power Journal

What are the independent variables that determine success in war? Drawing on 40 years of studying and teaching war, political scientist Christian P. Potholm presents a 'template of Mars,' seven variables that have served as predictors of military success over time and across cultures. In Winning at War, Potholm explains these variables_technology, sustained ruthlessness, discipline, receptivity to innovation, protection of military capital from civilians and rulers, will, and the belief that there will always be another war_and provides case studies of their implementation, from ancient battles to today.