Several recent papers argue that corporate income taxes should not be used by small, open economies. With capital mobility, the burden of the tax falls on fixed factors (e.g., labor), and the tax system is more efficient if labor is taxed directly. However, corporate taxes not only exist but rates are roughly comparable with the top personal tax rates. Past models also forecast that multinationals should not invest in countries with low corporate tax rates, since the surtax they owe when profits are repatriated puts them at a competitive disadvantage. Yet such foreign direct investment is substantial. We suggest that the resolution of these puzzles may be found in the role of income shifting, both domestic (between the personal and corporate tax bases) and cross-border (through transfer pricing). Countries need cash-flow corporate taxes as a backstop to labor taxes to discourage individuals from converting their labor income into otherwise untaxed corporate income. We explore how these taxes can best be modified to deal as well with cross-border shifting.

Several recent papers argue that corporate income taxes should not be used by small, open economies. With capital mobility, the burden of the tax falls on fixed factors (e.g., labor), and the tax system is more efficient if labor is taxed directly. However, corporate taxes not only exist but rates are roughly comparable with the top personal tax rates. Past models also forecast that multinationals should not invest in countries with low corporate tax rates, since the surtax they owe when profits are repatriated puts them at a competitive disadvantage. Yet such foreign direct investment is substantial. We suggest that the resolution of these puzzles may be found in the role of income shifting, both domestic (between the personal and corporate tax bases) and cross-border (through transfer pricing). Countries need cash-flow corporate taxes as a backstop to labor taxes to discourage individuals from converting their labor income into otherwise untaxed corporate income. We explore how these taxes can best be modified to deal as well with cross-border shifting.

National tax authorities individually determine multinational ?rms’ country-speci?c tax liabilities by applying one or more sanctioned transfer pricing methodologies. These methodologies are founded on basic assumptions about market structure and ?rm behavior that are rarely empirically valid. Moreover, for the most part, the transfer pricing methodologies now in vogue were developed before the Internet became a dominant factor in the world economy, and hedge and private equity funds transformed ?nancial and commodities markets. For these reasons, multinational ?rms are unable to accurately anticipate their tax liabilities in individual countries, and remain at risk of double taxation. Uncertainties in corporate tax liability are extremely costly, both for individual corporations and from an economy-wide perspective. Firms pay exorbitant fees to have tax attorneys, accountants and economists prepare the documentation required by tax authorities to substantiate their intercompany pricing practices and defend their tax positions on audit. Corporate tax liabilities are also potentially much higher than they would be under a more transparent and predictable transfer pricing regime (due to the potential for double taxation and penalties), and investors’ returns are reduced accordingly. The FASB’s Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (released on July 13, 2006), has motivated multinational ?rms to increase their reserves substantially (in many cases at the insistence of their au- tors), reducing the total funds available for productive investment. 1 The current transfer pricing regimes are embodied in the OECD Guidelines, individual OECD member countries’ interpretations thereof, the U. S.

The tax rules of the United States and other countries have intended and unintended effects on the operations of multinational corporations, influencing everything from the formation and allocation of capital to competitive strategies. The growing importance of international business has led economists to reconsider whether current systems of taxing international income are viable in a world of significant capital market integration and global commercial competition. In an attempt to quantify the effect of tax policy on international investment choices, this volume presents in-depth analyses of the interaction of international tax rules and the investment decisions of multinational enterprises. Ten papers assess the role played by multinational firms and their investment in the U.S. economy and the design of international tax rules for multinational investment; analyze channels through which international tax rules affect the costs of international business activities; and examine ways in which international tax rules affect financing decisions of multinational firms. As a group, the papers demonstrate that international tax rules have significant effects on firms' investment and other financing decisions.

This book analyzes the disparities both between federal statutes and regulations, and regulations and administrative practices, in two highly controversial areas of corporate tax policy: intra-company transfer pricing and intangible asset valuations. It addresses issues that can mean hundreds of millions of dollars to individual corporations, and a significant fraction of the federal government's revenue base. Tax practitioners and consultants who are understandably frustrated in their efforts to divine the IRS's reasoning in transfer pricing and valuation issues will find the book very useful. It will also find an audience among elected representatives, other public officials, and tax lobbyists in the process of evaluating existing corporate tax policy or formulating alternative tax policies. In addition, the book is a useful reference for academics studying international taxation, public finance, and treaty compliance.

The paper updates, modifies, and extends research by Grubert (2003) to investigate income shifting from intercompany transfer pricing. The analysis is based on theoretical and regression models developed in Grubert (2003). The models are modified slightly to capture the effects of "real" intercompany tangible, intangible, and services transactions (as opposed to interest 'income stripping' through intercompany or interbranch debt), and extended to incorporate data relating to cost sharing arrangements. Although some caution is required in interpreting the transfer pricing implications from the regression results, the empirical analysis generally supports concerns about potential non-arm's length income shifting under current transfer pricing rules.