Since the terrorist attacks on the American homeland on September 11, 2001, fighting the menace has become the frontier issue on the U.S.’ national security agenda. In the case of the African Continent, the United States has, and continues to accord major attention to the West African sub-region. This book : Evaluates where we can place West Africa within the broader crucible of the U.S. war on terrorism Establishes the key elements of the U.S.’ counter-terrorism policy in West Africa? Examines the U.S. counter-terrorism strategies in West Africa, and evaluates if they are being pursued both at the bilateral and multilateral levels in the region Interrogates the relationship between stability in the sub-region and the waging of the U.S.’ war on terrorism. Specifically, the book examines the crises of underdevelopment—cultural, economic, environmental, political, security and social—in the sub-region, especially their impact on shaping the conditions that provide the taproots of terrorism. Clearly, addressing these multidimensional crises of underdevelopment is pivotal to the success of the U.S. war on terrorism in the sub-region. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of terrorism, homeland security, African Studies, conflict management, and political violence.

Abject poverty and official corruption make parts of Africa a very attractive destination for terrorist organizations. Opportunities have developed during the pre- and post-9/11 periods in Africa for the recruitment of terrorists, attainment of bases of operations and sources of funding for Al Qaeda or its affiliated terror groups. This comprehensive volume provides an extensive examination of major terrorist events in Africa. It highlights internal and external indices to illustrate why Africa is so ripe for terrorism, ostensibly in terms of recruitment as well as attainment and sources of funding due to the continent's continuing poverty and corruption. The volume will prove indispensable reading for anyone researching security issues, political sociology and African studies.

United States-Africa relations have experienced four major cycles. The first cycle was during the Cold War(1960-1990). During this period, the U.S. developed a one-sided relationship with various African states in which the latter served as "foot soldiers" for the U.S. in its competition with the Soviet Union for global domination. Among other things, the various client African states provided the U.S. with access to airfields, deep water ports and sites for the establishment of various intelligence gathering facilities. In addition, the U.S. used various groups like UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi in Angola to undermine and fight pro-Soviet regimes on the continent. The second cycle of the relationship covered the period 1991-1998. During this time, the U.S. scaled down its security activities in Africa. The major reason was that with the end of the Cold War Africa(with few exceptions like Egypt) was no longer a major front for the promotion of U.S. Security interests. The third cycle commenced in 1998 and ended in 2001. This period was characterized by the U.S.’ search for an approach to frame its security relations with Africa. In this vein, the U.S. undertook various military-security initiatives . The fourth cycle began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the American homeland. Since then, the U.S. has expanded the scope of its security relations with Africa, as reflected in the establishment of various initiatives and programs. At the core is the prosecution of the American "war on terror." Against this backdrop, this book examines some of the major dimensions of the U.S.’ security relations with Africa, including American security interests on the continent, the "war on terror," AFRICOM, and military cooperation. Using the book’s integrative theoretical framework, each of the chapters in the volume examines the various factors that shape the issue of focus.

This volume addresses the controversies of the global war on terror vis-à-vis Africa; and the way Africa is going to be negatively affected shall the war in point not be deconstructed so that the war on terror can be fought based on the consensus of all stakeholders for their collective interests.

In 2019, Islamic State lost its last remaining sliver of territory in Syria, and its Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed. These setbacks seemed to herald the Caliphate's death knell, and many now forecast its imminent demise. Yet its affiliates endure, particularly in Africa: nearly all of Islamic State's cells on the continent have reaffirmed their allegiance, attacks have continued in its name, many groups have been reinvigorated, and a new province has emerged. Why, in Africa, did the two major setbacks of 2019 have so little impact on support for Islamic State? The Islamic State in Africa suggests that this puzzle can be explained by the emergence and evolution of Islamic State's provinces in Africa, which it calls 'sovereign subordinates'. By examining the rise and development of eight Islamic State 'cells', the authors show how, having pledged allegiance to IS Central, cells evolved mostly autonomously, using the IS brand as a means for accrual of power, but, in practice, receiving relatively little if any direction or material support from central command. Given this pattern, IS Central's relative decline has had little impact on its African affiliates-who are likely to remain committed to the Caliphate's cause for the foreseeable future.

"Examines the state of governance in the countries of the greater Horn of Africa region--Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Yemen--and discusses strategies to combat the transnational threat of terrorism, including suggestions for more effective U.S. engagement in the region"--Provided by publisher.