This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40% of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Org. (JIEDDO) was created to lead and coordinate all DoD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. The auditor is recommending that JIEDDO: (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DoD; (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives; and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. Illustrations.

Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts

Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was created to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to JIEDDO. In addition, other DOD components, including the military services, have devoted at least $1.5 billion to the counter-IED effort--which does not include $22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. This testimony is based on a report that GAO is issuing today as well as preliminary observations from ongoing work that GAO plans to report in early 2010. In the report being issued today, GAO is recommending that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DOD, (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives, and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted actions to be taken.

Prior to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Org. (JIEDDO) establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for coordinating DoD¿s counter-improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. JIEDDO was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing R&D, throughout DoD. This report assesses the extent to which: 1) capability gaps were initially identified in DoD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO; 2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts; 3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services; and 4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. Illus.

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the DoD¿s need to develop and field new capabilities more quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006, Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised explosive devices alone. There have been funding, organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DoD's processes for meeting warfighters' urgent needs. This report determined: (1) the extent to which DoD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes; and (2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall responsiveness of DoD's urgent needs processes. This review conducted 23 case studies. Illustrations.

Prior to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for coordinating the Department of Defense's (DOD) counter improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. JIEDDO was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD. This report, which is one in a series of congressionally mandated GAO reports related to JIEDDO's management and operations, assesses the extent to which 1) capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, 2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, 3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and 4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and met with DOD and service officials.

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, DoD established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tech'y., and counterimprovised explosive devices systems. This review determined: (1) what DoD entities exist for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DoD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) has DoD evaluated the potential for consolidations. Illus. This is a print on demand report.