On September 11, 2001, the United States of America was surprised by a deadly terrorist attack fueled by hatred for the United States that Americans could not understand. This book is written to help Americans understand how people in other parts of the world are impacted by a U. S. foreign policy that often seems arbitrary, self-serving, and inconsistent with the ideals of democracy. The author is past president of the Seychelles, neighbor to Diego Garcia, from which many of the airstrikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan were launched. His comments are informative and constructive for anyone interested in creating a better and more coherent U. S. foreign policy that will lead to a more peaceful world and prevent a recurrence of terrorist attacks on America.>

“A well-detailed account of the [World War II] raid, which badly stung the Royal Navy but which the Japanese failed to exploit to a strategic advantage” (Seapower). In early April 1942, a little-known episode of World War II took place. Said by Sir Winston Churchill to be “the most dangerous moment of the war,” the Japanese made their only major offensive westwards into the Indian Ocean. As historian Sir Arthur Bryant said, “A Japanese naval victory in April 1942 would have given Japan total control of the Indian Ocean, isolated the Middle East and brought down the Churchill government.” Having crippled the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese turned their sights on the British Eastern Fleet based at Ceylon. Occupation of Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, would not only provide the Japanese a springboard into India but also control of the essential convoy routes to Europe and the Western Desert. And aside from the British Eastern Fleet, the Indian Ocean lay undefended. In April 1942, a Japanese fleet led by six aircraft carriers, four battleships, and thirty other ships sailed into the Bay of Bengal. In the ferocious battles that followed, the British lost a carrier, two heavy cruisers, and many other ships; however, the Japanese eventually turned back, never to sail against India again. John Clancy, whose father survived the sinking of HMS Cornwall during the battle, “masterfully combines the strategic overview, the tactical decision making and many personal experiences to bring this episode of the war to life” (WWII Today). “Absolutely enthralling.” —Books Monthly “Well researched . . . a balanced view of men acting under the stress of war during a critical time.” —WWII History

The history of the Indian Ocean provides a snapshot of many of the key issues in world history.

By examining Mauritius and the Indian Ocean, this unique synthesis of imperial and naval/military history, reveals the depths of colonial involvement in the Second World War and the role of colonies in British strategic planning from the eighteenth century. In the century of total war, the British Empire was fully mobilized. The Mauritian home front became regimented, troops were recruited for service overseas, the Eastern fleet guarded the Indian Ocean, and Mauritius became a base for SOE operations and intelligence-gathering for Bletchley.

The Indian Ocean, with its critical routes for global commerce, is a potentially volatile location for geopolitical strife. Even as the region’s role in the international economy and as a highway to conflict zones increases, the US has failed to advance a coherent strategy for protecting its interests in the Indian Ocean or for managing complex diplomatic relationships across the region. The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy presents a range of viewpoints about whether and how the US should alter its diplomatic and military strategies for this region. Contributors examine US interests in the Indian Ocean, assess the relative critical importance or imperiled nature of these interests, and propose solutions for American strategy ranging from minimal change to maximum engagement. The book concludes with a comparative assessment of these options and a discussion of their implications for US policymakers. This volume’s perspectives and analysis of the Indian Ocean region will be valued by scholars and students of US foreign policy, South Asia, and security studies as well as by diplomats, military officers, and other practitioners.