For the last thirty years Somalia has experienced violence and upheaval. Today, the international effort to help Somalis build a federal state and achieve stability is challenged by deep-rooted grievances, local conflicts and a powerful insurgency led by Al-Shabaab. Consisting of forty-four chapters by conflict resolution specialists and the world's leading experts on Somalia, this volume constitutes a unique compendium of insights into the insurgency and its impact. War and Peace in Somalia explores the legacies of past violence, especially impunity, illegitimacy and exclusion, and the need for national reconciliation. Drawing on decades of experience and months of field research, the contributors throw light on diverse forms of local conflict, its interrelated causes, and what can be done about it. They share original research on the role of women, men and youth in the conflict, and present new insight into Al-Shabaab--particularly the group's multi-dimensional strategy, the motivations of its fighters, their foreign links, and the prospects for engagement. This ground-breaking volume illuminates the war in Somalia, and sets out what can and should be done to bring it to an end. For policymakers and researchers covering Somalia, East Africa, extremism or conflict resolution, this is a must-read.

Fighting for Peace in Somalia provides the first comprehensive analysis of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), an operation deployed in 2007 to stabilize the country and defend its fledgling government from one of the world's deadliest militant organizations, Harakat al-Shabaab. The book's two parts provide a history of the mission from its genesis in an earlier, failed regional initiative in 2005 up to mid-2017, as well as an analysis of the mission's six most challenges, namely, logistics, security sector reform, civilian protection, strategic communications, stabilization, and developing a successful exit strategy. These issues are all central to the broader debates about how to design effective peace operations in Africa and beyond. AMISOM was remarkable in several respects: it would become the African Union's (AU) largest peace operation by a considerable margin deploying over 22,000 soldiers; it became the longest running mission under AU command and control, outlasting the nearest contender by over seven years; it also became the AU's most expensive operation, at its peak costing approximately US$1 billion per year; and, sadly, AMISOM became the AU's deadliest mission. Although often referred to as a peacekeeping operation, AMISOM's troops were given a range of daunting tasks that went well beyond the realm of peacekeeping, including VIP protection, war-fighting, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and state-building as well as supporting electoral processes and facilitating humanitarian assistance. Tana Forum Annual Book Launch 2019 Winner.

For all of the doubts raised about the effectiveness of international aid in advancing peace and development, there are few examples of developing countries that are even relatively untouched by it. Sarah G. Phillips's When There Was No Aid offers us one such example. Using evidence from Somaliland's experience of peace-building, When There Was No Aid challenges two of the most engrained presumptions about violence and poverty in the global South. First, that intervention by actors in the global North is self-evidently useful in ending them, and second that the quality of a country's governance institutions (whether formal or informal) necessarily determines the level of peace and civil order that the country experiences. Phillips explores how popular discourses about war, peace, and international intervention structure the conditions of possibility to such a degree that even the inability of institutions to provide reliable security can stabilize a prolonged period of peace. She argues that Somaliland's post-conflict peace is grounded less in the constraining power of its institutions than in a powerful discourse about the country's structural, temporal, and physical proximity to war. Through its sensitivity to the ease with which peace gives way to war, Phillips argues, this discourse has indirectly harnessed an apparent propensity to war as a source of order.

Explores the experiences of women in Somalia and how they have survived the trauma of war.

This paper aims at identifying practical ways in which NGOs might contribute to the peacemaking process in Somalia and Somaliland. It covers the Somali Civil War up to October 1993. The author believes that Somalia has become a testing ground for the UN, the U.S. and NGOs, a theatre in which many ideas pertinent to a possible future world order are being worked out. He believes the heart of the challenge is how humanitarian agencies learn to respond to the results of armed conflict in complex and protracted emergencies. A wide range of suggestions is offered to NGOs. They need to recognise that peacemaking is a long term process and should consider sponsoring research into the causes and impact of the Somali conflict. UN efforts have failed because they represented external intervention rather than a Somali initiative, so NGOs may need to get involved on a political level. They could assist by promoting "peacemaking" rather than "peace enforcement", for example, by advocating an enquiry into human rights abuses by UN personnel and by Somali warlords. Peacemaking needs to address the underlying causes of conflict- in Somalia land ownership and land use is a significant source of conflict and this is another area where NGOs could usefully focus resources. Finally, the author considers that peacemaking and development can usefully be seen as similar processes, both of which benefit from a participatory approach. Thus NGOs have an important role to play in promoting local initiatives.

"This book explores how popular discourses about war, peace, and international intervention structure the conditions of possibility to such a degree that even the inability of institutions to provide reliable security can stabilize a prolonged period of peace. It argues that Somaliland's post-conflict peace is grounded less in the constraining power of its institutions than in a powerful discourse about the country's structural, temporal, and physical proximity to war"--