The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, covers the period when the United States intervened in the east African country of Somalia to arrest famine in the midst of an ongoing civil war. Ultimately hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but unintended involvement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of forty-two members of the armed forces, resulting in the impression of chaos and disaster. Richard W. Stewart in his essay analyzes how a mission that had accomplished so much had ended in such circumstances. Stewart concludes that the military and diplomatic peace operation was doomed to failure because there was no peace to keep: The factions were not exhausted from the fighting and were not yet willing to stop killing each other or anyone caught in the middle. The dedication and sacrifices made by soldiers in that war-torn country provide a lesson in heroism that remains compelling today.

CMH Pub 70-81-1. Prepared to honor the 10th anniversary of Operation Restore Hope. Places the events of the firefight of 3-4 October 1993 into the wider context of the United States humanitarian, political, and military operation to rescue a people and a state from anarchy and chaos.

This study examines the American military's experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. That original focus can be found in the following pages, but the authors address other, broader issues as well, to include planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand.

This monograph explores the problem of mission creep. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. has struggled to find its place in the new world order. As a result US military forces have increasingly found themselves involved in various operations other than traditional warfare. Often the political aims of these operations are difficult to identify and translate into military operational objectives and end states. Worse yet, the political aims themselves are prone to rapidly shift and evolve from those originally intended, leaving the military commander the difficult task of catching up with policy or even guessing at the political objectives. This uncertain environment sets the conditions for the delinkage between the political goal and military operations which may result in disaster. The monograph examines US operations in Somalia to provide the data for the analysis in order to determine the factors which contribute to mission creep. Examining US-Somalia policy from 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) to Oct. 1993 (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) this monograph analyses the evolution of national policy objectives and the military and political operations undertaken to achieve those objectives. An analysis of operational and tactical objectives and end states as well as military methods determines the factors which contributed to the failed US involvement in UNOSOM II. In addition, the monograph identifies the Somali geo-political, historical, cultural, and economic factors which influenced US operations. This monograph concludes that contradictory and uncoordinated national strategy and political policy resulted in poor operational planning and execution. There were also significant factors at the operational level which contributed to the failed US intervention.

"My Clan Against the World": US and Coalition Operations in Somalia, 1992-94 represents another in a series of military case studies published by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The impetus for this project came from the commanding general, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, who directed CSI to examine the American military's experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu.