The Korean peninsula, divided for more than fifty years, is stuck in a time warp. Millions of troops face one another along the Demilitarized Zone separating communist North Korea and capitalist South Korea. In the early 1990s and again in 2002-2003, the United States and its allies have gone to the brink of war with North Korea. Misinterpretations and misunderstandings are fueling the crisis. "There is no country of comparable significance concerning which so many people are ignorant," American anthropologist Cornelius Osgood said of Korea some time ago. This ignorance may soon have fatal consequences. North Korea, South Korea is a short, accessible book about the history and political complexites of the Korean peninsula, one that explores practical alternatives to the current US policy: alternatives that build on the remarkable and historic path of reconciliation that North and South embarked on in the 1990s and that point the way to eventual reunification.

This Task Force report comprehensively reviews the situation on the peninsula as well as the options for U.S. policy. It provides a valuable ranking of U.S. interests, and calls for a firm commitment from the Obama administration to seek denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, backed by a combination of sanctions, incentives, and sustained political pressure, in addition to increased efforts to contain proliferation. It notes that China's participation in this effort is vital. Indeed, the report makes clear that any hope of North Korea's dismantling its nuclear program rests on China's willingness to take a strong stance. For denuclearization to proceed, China must acknowledge that the long-term hazard of a nuclear Korea is more perilous to it and the region than the short-term risk of instability. The report also recognizes that robust relations between Washington and its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, must underpin any efforts to deal with the North Korean problem. It looks as well at regime change and scenarios that could lead to reunification of the peninsula. At the same time that the Task Force emphasizes the danger and urgency of North Korea's behavior, it recognizes and applauds the beneficial U.S. relationship with South Korea, which has proved to be a valuable economic and strategic partner. In this vein, the Task Force advocates continued close coordination with Seoul and urges prompt congressional passage of the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement.

The Korean peninsula, divided for more than fifty years, is stuck in a time warp. Millions of troops face one another along the Demilitarized Zone separating communist North Korea and capitalist South Korea. In the early 1990s and again in 2002-2003, the United States and its allies have gone to the brink of war with North Korea. Misinterpretations and misunderstandings are fueling the crisis. "There is no country of comparable significance concerning which so many people are ignorant," American anthropologist Cornelius Osgood said of Korea some time ago. This ignorance may soon have fatal consequences. North Korea, South Korea is a short, accessible book about the history and political complexites of the Korean peninsula, one that explores practical alternatives to the current US policy: alternatives that build on the remarkable and historic path of reconciliation that North and South embarked on in the 1990s and that point the way to eventual reunification.

After World War II, the escalating tensions of the Cold War shaped the international system. Fearing the Worst explains how the Korean War fundamentally changed postwar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union into a militarized confrontation that would last decades. Samuel F. Wells Jr. examines how military and political events interacted to escalate the conflict. Decisions made by the Truman administration in the first six months of the Korean War drove both superpowers to intensify their defense buildup. American leaders feared the worst-case scenario—that Stalin was prepared to start World War III—and raced to build up strategic arms, resulting in a struggle they did not seek out or intend. Their decisions stemmed from incomplete interpretations of Soviet and Chinese goals, especially the belief that China was a Kremlin puppet. Yet Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung all had their own agendas, about which the United States lacked reliable intelligence. Drawing on newly available documents and memoirs—including previously restricted archives in Russia, China, and North Korea—Wells analyzes the key decision points that changed the course of the war. He also provides vivid profiles of the central actors as well as important but lesser known figures. Bringing together studies of military policy and diplomacy with the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in each of the principal nations, Fearing the Worst offers a new account of the Korean War and its lasting legacy.

This book is intended to elucidate United States policy during the Korean War and to describe the strategies and command methods by which that policy was carried out. The major decisions that determined the United States course in Korea and continued to influence the nation's responses to Communist aggression during the two decades that followed were taken during the first twelve months of the Korean fighting. Although the war continued for another two years, no significant change was made in the policy developed between President Truman's decision to intervene in June 1950 and the beginning of Armistice negotiations at Kaesong in July 1951. This book concentrates on that initial period.