This book considers the triggers that may cause China to use economic coercion in bilateral state disputes. The literature reviewed shows that economic statecraft and coercion is a viable policy tool for shaping an opposing state's behavior and the degree to which a state holds an asymmetrical economic advantage influences its ability to wield this tool. China's rising power has made the study and understanding of the conditions under which China will utilize economic coercion an imperative as more states become vulnerable to it. China has already revealed that it is willing to shape state behavior through economic "carrots" and "sticks." As demonstrated by the case studies explored in this book, China uses economic coercion to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty and its understanding of the status quo. Where it holds an economically asymmetrical advantage, China has targeted specific sectors for coercion as a way to signal resolve. As Chinese economic power continues to rise relative to regional neighbors and the U.S., the feasibility of using economic coercion also increases, making the future employment of economic coercion likely wherever China perceives a threat to its interests that is cannot be solved with its increasing military might.

This monograph analyzes the political impact of the rapidly growing economic relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan and evaluates the prospects for Beijing to exploit that expanding economic relationship to employ economic coercion against Taiwan. It also identifies China's goals for applying economic pressure against Taiwan. To establish a framework for evaluating China's relative success or failure in using economic coercion against Taiwan, this work draws upon the conclusions of the large and empirically rich body of studies of economic diplomacy that have focused on economic coercion and trade sanctions. A large portion of this monograph is devoted to evaluating the cross-strait economic relationship and Taiwan's potential economic vulnerability to Chinese efforts to cut off or disrupt key aspects of that relationship. But this document also extensively analyzes the challenges that China has faced in its efforts to convert this raw, potential economic influence into effective political leverage.

"This study provides an original contribution to the literature of economic coercion, based on empirical analysis of signaling from China to the US from late 2012 to late 2022, President Xi Jinping’s first two terms. I argue that Xi has expressed more assertive economic coercion toward the US because he wants to build China’s reputation as a powerful state to both foreign and domestic audiences; these coercive actions, however, have been largely performative because of interdependence. I present a theory of reputation building and provide a 2x2 typology that helps us understand why China has changed how its economically coerces the US over this time period. One dimension is the means of coercion. Over this time period, China changed its means from informal methods that gave the government plausible deniability to formal acknowledgment by the Chinese Communist Party with a corresponding legal framework. The other dimension is the target; China changed from targeting non-state actors (US corporations) to states (US government entities and officials). State actors have a lower likelihood of bending toward China’s will and represent stronger resolve from China by attempting to coerce them. These two dimensions combine to explain high, medium, or low reputation-seeking actions from China. Through comparative qualitative analysis of 52 events, I found that early in Xi’s tenure, China displays low reputation-seeking actions based on coercing firms via informal means. By the end of the studied time period, China displays high reputation-seeking behavior by constructing a legal framework of sanctions and signaling these sanctions to the US. These moves are frequently in reaction to similar moves from the US, however, and are without much bite because of possible blowback, leaving economic coercion as largely a performance to domestic and international audiences."--Abstract.

In Chinese Economic Statecraft, William J. Norris introduces an innovative theory that pinpoints how states employ economic tools of national power to pursue their strategic objectives. Norris shows what Chinese economic statecraft is, how it works, and why it is more or less effective. Norris provides an accessible tool kit to help us better understand important economic developments in the People’s Republic of China. He links domestic Chinese political economy with the international ramifications of China’s economic power as a tool for realizing China’s strategic foreign policy interests. He presents a novel approach to studying economic statecraft that calls attention to the central challenge of how the state is (or is not) able to control and direct the behavior of economic actors. Norris identifies key causes of Chinese state control through tightly structured, substate and crossnational comparisons of business-government relations. These cases range across three important arenas of China’s grand strategy that prominently feature a strategic role for economics: China’s efforts to secure access to vital raw materials located abroad, Mainland relations toward Taiwan, and China’s sovereign wealth funds. Norris spent more than two years conducting field research in China and Taiwan during which he interviewed current and former government officials, academics, bankers, journalists, advisors, lawyers, and businesspeople. The ideas in this book are applicable beyond China and help us to understand how states exercise international economic power in the twenty-first century.

Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China demonstrates how structural and domestic variables influence how East Asian states adjust their strategy in light of the rise of China, including how China manages its own emerging role as a regional great power. The contributors note that the shifting regional balance of power has fueled escalating tensions in East Asia and suggest that adjustment challenges are exacerbated by the politics of policymaking. International and domestic pressures on policymaking are reflected in maritime territorial disputes and in the broader range of regional security issues created by the rise of China.Adjusting to power shifts and managing a new regional order in the face of inevitable domestic pressure, including nationalism, is a challenging process. Both the United States and China have had to adjust to China's expanded capabilities. China has sought an expanded influence in maritime East Asia; the United States has responded by consolidating its alliances and expanding its naval presence in East Asia. The region's smaller countries have also adjusted to the rise of China. They have sought greater cooperation with China, even as they try to sustain cooperation with the United States. As China continues to rise and challenge the regional security order, the contributors consider whether the region is destined to experience increased conflict and confrontation.ContributorsIan Bowers, Norwegian Defence University College and Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies Daniel W. Drezner, Tufts University, Brookings Institution, and Washington Post Taylor M. Fravel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, Norwegian Defence University College and Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies Chung-in Moon, Yonsei University and Chairman, Presidential Committee on Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative, Republic of Korea James Reilly, University of Sydney Robert S. Ross, Boston College and Harvard University Randall L. Schweller, The Ohio State University ystein Tunsjø, Norwegian Defence University College and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies Wang Dong, Peking University

To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China’s grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.

This book aims to study China's economic statecraft in the contemporary era in a comprehensive manner. It attempts to explore China's approaches to using its economic, trade, investment, and financial power for the pursuit of its political, security, and strategic interests at the regional and global levels. The volume addresses three major issue areas in particular. The first issue pertains to how Beijing has used its economic clout to protect what it perceives as its "core interests" in its external relations. Three cases are included: the Taiwan issue, human rights, and territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The second major area of inquiry focuses on how China has employed its economic power in its key bilateral relations, including relations with Japan, North Korea, the United States, and other states in the East Asian region. The third issue concerns China's economic statecraft in the global context. It addresses the impacts of China's economic power and policy on the transformation of the global financial structure, developments in Africa, the international intellectual property rights regime, and China's food security relations with the outside world.