The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in 1921 and was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme compression and brilliance, it immediately convinced many of its readers and captured the imagination of all. Its chief influence, at first, was on the Logical Positivists of the 1920s and 1930s, but many other philosophers were stimulated by its philosophy of language, finding attractive, even if ultimately unsatisfactory, its view that propositions were pictures of reality. Perhaps most of all, its own author, after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, was fascinated by its vision of an inexpressible, crystalline world of logical relationships. C.K. Ogden's translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has a unique provenance. As revealed in Letters of C.K. Ogden (1973) and in correspondence in The Times Literary Supplement, Wittgenstein, Ramsey and Moore all worked with Ogden on the translation, which had Wittgenstein's complete approval. The very name Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was of Ogden's devising; and there is very strong feeling among philosophers that, among the differing translations of this work, Ogden's is the definitive text - and Wittgenstein's version of the English equivalent of his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was first published in German in 1921, then translated and published into English in 1922 by C. K. Ogden, with help from F. P. Ramsey, and supervised by Wittgenstein. Tractatus revolves around seven basic propositions and begins to branch off from these propositions to illustrate the relations between words and objects. From this, Wittgenstein applies his connections into the philosophy of language and symbolism to show how the problems of philosophy arise from misuses of language. To Wittgenstein, "Philosophy is not a theory, but an activity." As it is an activity, philosophy must undergo the process of dissolving misuses of logic. Proclaiming philosophy is a matter of logic instead of metaphysics, too, ethics and aesthetics become inexpressible in the form of the spoken propositional logic. From this grounding of philosophy needing to undergo a subversive process of logic, Wittgenstein traverses many subjects from physics and death, the mystical and metaphysical, to the pictorial to imaginary. Even as the only book he published in his lifetime, it stands as one of the most important texts of the 20th century.

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only book-length philosophical work by the Austrian philosopher Wittgenstein that was published during his lifetime. The project had a broad goal: to identify the relationship between language and reality.

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in the areas of logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. Described by his mentor and colleague Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating," Wittgenstein is considered by many to be the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. Instrumental in inspiring two of the century's principal philosophical movements, logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy, he is considered one of the most important figures in analytic philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and Philosophical Investigations (1953) among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations." Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought. Wittgenstein's thought is usually divided between his "early" period, exemplified by the Tractatus, the only philosophy book he published in his lifetime, and his "later" period, best articulated in the Investigations. The early Wittgenstein was concerned with the relationship between propositions and the world, and saw the aim of philosophy as an attempt to describe that relationship and correct misconceptions about language. The later Wittgenstein was stridently anti-systematic in his approach and emphasized philosophy as a kind of "therapy," and rejected many of the conclusions of the Tractatus. The later Wittgenstein provided a detailed account of the many possible uses of ordinary language, calling language a series of interchangeable "language games" in which the meanings of words are derived not from any inherent logical structure, but from their public usage (the so-called "meaning is use" argument); thus there can be no private language.

Recent years have seen a great revival of interest in Wittgenstein's early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The Enchantment of Words is a study of that book, offering novel readings of all its major themes and shedding light on issues in metaphysics, ethics and the philosophies of mind, language, and logic. McManus argues that Wittgenstein's aim in this deeply puzzling work is to show that the 'intelligibility of thought' and the 'meaningfulness of language', which logical truths would delimit and metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language would explain, are issues constituted by confusions. What is exposed is a mirage of a kind of self-consciousness, a misperception of the ways in which we happen to think, talk and act as reasons why we ought to think, talk and act as we do. The root of that misperception is our confusedly endowing words with a life of their own: we 'enchant', and are 'enchanted by', words, colluding in a confusion that transposes on to them, and the world which we then see them as 'fitting', responsibilities that are actually ours to bear. Such words promise to spare us the trouble, not only of thinking, but of living. In presenting this view, McManus offers readings of all of the major themes of the Tractatus, including its discussion of logical truth, objects, names, inference, subjectivity, solipsism and the ineffable; McManus offers novel explanations of what is at stake in Wittgenstein's comparison of propositions with pictures, of why Wittgenstein declared the point of the Tractatus to be ethical, of how a bookwhich infamously declares itself to be nonsensical can both clarify our thoughts and require of us that we exercise our capacity to reason in reading it, and of how Wittgenstein later came to re-evaluate the achievement of the Tractatus.

Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme brilliance, it captured the imagination of a generation of philosophers. For Wittgenstein, logic was something we use to conquer a reality which is in itself both elusive and unobtainable. He famously summarized the book in the following words: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly; and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.' David Pears and Brian McGuinness received the highest praise for their meticulous translation. The work is prefaced by Bertrand Russell's original introduction to the first English edition.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s brief Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) is one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century, yet it offers little orientation for the reader. The first-time reader is left wondering what it could be about, and the scholar is left with little guidance for interpretation. In Tractatus in Context, James C. Klagge presents the vital background necessary for appreciating Wittgenstein’s gnomic masterpiece. Tractatus in Context contains the early reactions to the Tractatus, including the initial reviews written in 1922-1924. And while we can’t talk with Wittgenstein, we can do the next best thing—hear what he had to say about the Tractatus. Klagge thus presents what Wittgenstein thought about germane issues leading up to his writing the book, in discussions and correspondence with others about his ideas, and what he had to say about the Tractatus after it was written—in letters, lectures and conversations. It offers, you might say, Wittgenstein’s own commentary on the book. Key Features: Illuminates what is at stake in the Tractatus, by providing the views of others that engaged Wittgenstein as he was writing it. Includes Wittgenstein’s earlier thoughts on ideas in the book as recorded in his notebooks, letters, and conversations as well as his later, retrospective comments on those ideas. Draws on new or little-known sources, such as Wittgenstein’s coded notebooks, Hermine’s notes, Frege’s letters, Hänsel’s diary, Ramsey’s notes, and Skinner’s dictations. Draws connections between the background context and specific passages in the Tractatus, using a proposition-by-proposition commentary.