An analytical investigation into Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s decision-making process during every stage of World War II. When Winston Churchill accepted the position of Prime Minister in May 1940, he insisted in also becoming Minister of Defence. This, though, meant that he alone would be responsible for the success or failure of Britain’s war effort. It also meant that he would be faced with many monumental challenges and utterly crucial decisions upon which the fate of Britain and the free world rested. With the limited resources available to the UK, Churchill had to pinpoint where his country’s priorities lay. He had to respond to the collapse of France, decide if Britain should adopt a defensive or offensive strategy, choose if Egypt and the war in North Africa should take precedence over Singapore and the UK’s empire in the East, determine how much support to give the Soviet Union, and how much power to give the United States in controlling the direction of the war. In this insightful investigation into Churchill’s conduct during the Second World War, Allen Packwood, BA, MPhil (Cantab), FRHistS, the Director of the Churchill Archives Centre, enables the reader to share the agonies and uncertainties faced by Churchill at each crucial stage of the war. How Churchill responded to each challenge is analyzed in great detail and the conclusions Packwood draws are as uncompromising as those made by Britain’s wartime leader as he negotiated his country through its darkest days.

This is the story of the great coalition formed by the United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia to combat the Axis in World War II. Mr. Feis traces the ideas and purposes that governed each member of this alliance, and the gradual separation between the West and Russia as victory over Germany was achieved. While adding new information and new interpretation, Mr. Feis comprehends this "one war and three wills" as a whole, relating diplomacy and strategy to each other against the background of circumstance. The acts and characteristics of the dominating figures—Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin—emerge in new historical perspective as the story tells what they did and why. The narrative begins early in 1941 as the coalition is emerging and ends after the collapse of Germany in 1945. Among the dements arc: the early grasping of the Soviet government for territorial claims; the continuous discussion over strategy; the dramatic difficulties with the Soviet authorities over control of Italy, Poland, and Rumania; the variations in the plans for Germany, including dismemberment; the Casablanca, Moscow, Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta conferences; the spreading disquiet over Soviet intentions in Europe and the Far East. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Were World Wars I and II inevitable? Were they necessary wars? Or were they products of calamitous failures of judgment? In this monumental and provocative history, Patrick Buchanan makes the case that, if not for the blunders of British statesmen– Winston Churchill first among them–the horrors of two world wars and the Holocaust might have been avoided and the British Empire might never have collapsed into ruins. Half a century of murderous oppression of scores of millions under the iron boot of Communist tyranny might never have happened, and Europe’s central role in world affairs might have been sustained for many generations. Among the British and Churchillian errors were: • The secret decision of a tiny cabal in the inner Cabinet in 1906 to take Britain straight to war against Germany, should she invade France • The vengeful Treaty of Versailles that mutilated Germany, leaving her bitter, betrayed, and receptive to the appeal of Adolf Hitler • Britain’s capitulation, at Churchill’s urging, to American pressure to sever the Anglo-Japanese alliance, insulting and isolating Japan, pushing her onto the path of militarism and conquest • The greatest mistake in British history: the unsolicited war guarantee to Poland of March 1939, ensuring the Second World War Certain to create controversy and spirited argument, Churchill, Hitler, and “the Unnecessary War” is a grand and bold insight into the historic failures of judgment that ended centuries of European rule and guaranteed a future no one who lived in that vanished world could ever have envisioned.

"First published in Great Britain by Macmillan"--Title page verso.

This historical reassessment of the World War II British bombing campaign notes that though in 1940 Churchill declared that he was waging “a military and not a civilian war” to destroy “military objectives” and not “women and children,” within eighteen months both types of targets would be struck by Bomber Command. The author searches for the reasons in “three contiguous realms” of strategic influence: moral (and legal), political, and military. The study concludes that although for much of the war “area bombing” of cities was a “tragic necessity” meeting the ‘reasonable man’s’ standard of what was decently allowable given the blunt weapons the Allies had” and the evils they faced, nonetheless Allied leaders could have and should have abandoned indiscriminate bombing in the last phases of the conflict, when more precise means were at hand and “Nazi power had been overmatched.”

`An enjoyable book.' - R.A.C. Parker, International Affairs 'a thoughtful and thought-provoking reexamination that sheds new insight on this unique relationship.' - E.P. Muller, Choice 'an absorbing story.' - Foreign Affairs 'a detailed insight into the special relationship between the figureheads of two major allies...looks at why what began as a cordial friendship ended as a rather sour association between two tired and ailing leaders.' - History Today The wartime relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt was a partnership between two men totally different in personality, who clashed on important issues of allied strategy as well as most crucial issues of European and world policy. For this reason, allied strategy lurched from a largely British-sponsored master plan, in the early days of the alliance, to an American-sponsored strategic plan later in the war. For this reason also, Britain and the United States were frequently at odds over policy towards Russia, France and China, and never really achieved a coordinated policy in these vital matters. This book traces the course of the partnership and the reasons why it began as a cordial friendship and ended as a rather sour association between two tired and ailing leaders.