The appearance of ideologically motivated anti-communist insurgent groups in the Third World is an important new phenomenon that has received little serious attention. Analysis has focused on American attitudes, while the indigenous roots and motivations of such groups have remained largely unexplored. Michael Radu fills in the gap in The New Insurgencies, with case studies and contributions from Anthony Arnold, Paul Henze, Justus van de Kroef, and Jack Wheeler.As the authors show, more often than not, Third World anti-communist insurgencies express a general rejection of values and ideologies from outsiders. Many of these insurgencies reflect violent opposition to regimes installed by the Soviets during the 1970s, yet they only rarely articulate a struggle for liberal democracy. Nationalism, religion, or the preservation of traditional political and economic patterns are more often the true motivations. And while insurgents often apply military and occasionally political methods used by successful Marxist-Leninist insurgencies of this century, they tend to be rural based and close to the aspirations of the peasant masses rather than directed by the educated and urbanized elites.The New Insurgencies includes case studies of major anti-communist movements today, including those in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and Nicaragua. It shows that in each, the role of local powers such as South Africa, Thailand, and Pakistan rather than direct U.S. support has been critical to the insurgents' effectiveness. In part this may be because the old bipartisan Washington consensus based on anti-communism has evaporated; and Radu explores why this has occurred.Regardless of Washington's support, the new insurgencies are likely to persist. Their impact on U.S., Soviet, and world policy will be profound. The New Insurgencies combines extensive use of firsthand data, including personal knowledge of some of the major personalities involved, with extensive bibliogra

An analysis of insurgent warfare, looking at factors that contribute to insurgency.

A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.

Despite attracting headlines and hype, insurgents rarely win. Even when they claim territory and threaten governmental writ, they typically face a military backlash too powerful to withstand. States struggle with addressing the political roots of such movements, and their military efforts mostly just "mow the grass," yet, for the insurgent, the grass is nonetheless mowed-and the armed project must start over. This is the insurgent's dilemma: the difficulty of asserting oneself, of violently challenging authority, and of establishing sustainable power. In the face of this dilemma, some insurgents are learning new ways to ply their trade. With subversion, spin and disinformation claiming centre stage, insurgency is being reinvented, to exploit the vulnerabilities of our times and gain new strategic salience for tomorrow. As the most promising approaches are refined and repurposed, what we think of as counterinsurgency will also need to change. The Insurgent's Dilemma explores three particularly adaptive strategies and their implications for response. These emerging strategies target the state where it is weak and sap its power, sometimes without it noticing. There are options for response, but fresh thinking is urgently needed-about society, legitimacy and political violence itself.

The "War Stories" columnist for Slate presents the inside story of a small group of soldier-scholars who have significantly changed the ways the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars, drawing on interviews with top contributors to reveal the origins of revolutionary ideas and how they have overcome formidable internal resistance.

As a young British officer in the Gurkha regiment, John Mackinlay served in the rainforests of North Borneo and experienced firsthand the Maoist-style insurgencies of the 1960s. Years later, as a United Nations researcher, he witnessed the chaotic deployment of international forces to Africa, the Balkans, and South Asia, and the transformation of territorial, labor-intensive uprisings into the international insurgent networks we know today. After 9/11, Mackinlay turned his eye toward the Muslim communities of Europe and institutional efforts to prevent terrorism. In particular, he investigates military expeditions to Iraq and Afghanistan and their effect on the social cohesion of European populations that include Muslims from these regions. In a world divided between rich and poor, the surest way for the "bottom billion" to gain recognition, express outrage, or improve their circumstances is through insurgency. In this book, Mackinlay explains why leaders from the wealthiest and most powerful nations have failed to understand this phenomenon. Our current bin Laden era, Mckinlay argues, must be viewed as one stage in a series of developments swept up in the momentum of a global insurgency. The campaigns of the 1960s are directly linked to the global movements of tomorrow, yet in the past two decades, insurgent activity has given rise to a new practice that incorporates and exploits the "propaganda of the deed." This shift challenges our vertically-structured response to terror and places a greater emphasis on mastering the virtual, cyber-based dimensions of these campaigns. Mckinlay revisits the roots of global insurgencies, describes their nature and character, reveals the power of mass communications and grievance, and recommends how individual nations can counter these threats by focusing on domestic terrorism.

Through interviews and on-the-ground research, this book provides a new explanation of the nature of insurgent group behavior. Through case studies of the SPLA, FARC, and PKK, it offers an intimate understanding of modern day insurgent/terrorist groups and their tactics as well as an explanation of the changing behavior of insurgent groups toward the civilians they claim to represent.