Some legal rules are not laid down by a legislator but grow instead from informal social practices. In contract law, for example, the customs of merchants are used by courts to interpret the provisions of business contracts; in tort law, customs of best practice are used by courts to define professional responsibility. Nowhere are customary rules of law more prominent than in international law. The customs defining the obligations of each State to other States and, to some extent, to its own citizens, are often treated as legally binding. However, unlike natural law and positive law, customary law has received very little scholarly analysis. To remedy this neglect, a distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers has been assembled to assess the nature and significance of customary law. The book offers fresh insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law.

Some legal rules are not laid down by a legislator but grow instead from informal social practices. In contract law, for example, the customs of merchants are used by courts to interpret the provisions of business contracts; in tort law, customs of best practice are used by courts to define professional responsibility. Nowhere are customary rules of law more prominent than in international law. The customs defining the obligations of each State to other States and, to some extent, to its own citizens, are often treated as legally binding. However, unlike natural law and positive law, customary law has received very little scholarly analysis. To remedy this neglect, a distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers has been assembled to assess the nature and significance of customary law. The book offers fresh insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law.

A group of philosophers, historians and lawyers assess the nature and significance of customary law.

Common law rules predominate in some areas of law, such as torts and contracts, and are extremely important in other areas, such as corporations. Nevertheless, it has been unclear what principles courts use—or should use—in establishing common law rules. In this lucid book, Melvin Eisenberg develops the principles that govern this process.

This book promotes discussion and understanding of customary law and explores its continued relevance in sub-Saharan Africa. It considers the characteristics of customary law and efforts to ascertain and codify customary law, and how this body of law differs in content, form and status from legislation and common law.

This book examines the evolution of customary international law (CIL) as a source of international law. Using the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a key case study, the book explores the importance of CIL in the development of international criminal law and focuses on the ways in which international criminal tribunals can be said to change the ways in which CIL is formed and identified. In doing so, the book surveys the process and substance of CIL, as well as the problematic distinction between the elements of state practice and opinio juris. By applying an inclusive positivist approach, Noora Arajärvi analyses the methodologies of identification of CIL in selected cases of the ICTY, and their normative foundations. Through examination of the case-law and the reasoning of courts and tribunals, Arajärvi demonstrates to what extent the court's chosen method of identification of CIL affects the process of custom formation and the resulting system of norms in general. The book will be of great value to researchers and scholars of international law, international relations, and practitioners with interests in customary international law.