Financial crises are devastating in human and economic terms. To avoid the next one, it is important to understand the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the financial eras which preceded it. Gary Gorton has been studying financial crises since his 1983 PhD thesis, "Banking Panics."The Maze of Banking contains a collection of his academic papers on the subjects of banks, banking, and financial crises. The papers in this volume span almost 175 years of U.S. banking history, from pre-U.S. Civil War private bank notes issued during the U.S. Free Banking Era (1837-1863); followed by the U.S. National Banking Era (1863-1914) before there was a central bank; through loan sales, securitization, and the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Banking changed profoundly during these 175 years, yet it did not change in fundamental ways. The forms of money changed, resulting in associated changes in the information structure of the economy. Bank debt evolved as an instrument for storing value, smoothing consumption, and transactions, but its fundamental nature did not change. In all its forms, it is vulnerable to bank runs without government intervention. These papers provide the framework for understanding how the financial crisis of 2007-2008 developed and what can be done to promote a stabile banking industry and prevent future economic crises.

If you’ve got some money in the bank, chances are you’ve never seriously worried about not being able to withdraw it. But there was a time in the United States, an era that ended just over a hundred years ago, in which bank customers had to pay close attention to whether the banking system would remain solvent, knowing they might have to rush to retrieve their savings before the bank collapsed. During the National Banking Era (1863–1913), before the establishment of the Federal Reserve, widespread banking panics were indeed rather common. Yet these pre-Fed banking panics, as Gary B. Gorton and Ellis W. Tallman show, bear striking similarities to our recent financial crisis. In both cases, something happened to make depositors—whether individual customers or corporate investors—“act differently” and find reason to question the value of their bank debt. Fighting Financial Crises thus turns to the past for a fuller understanding of our uncertain present, investigating how panics during the National Banking Era played out and how they were eventually quelled and prevented. Gorton and Tallman open with a survey of the period’s “information environment,” tracing the development of national bank notes, checks, and clearing houses to show how the key to keeping order was to disseminate information very carefully. Identifying the most effective responses based on the framework of the National Banking Era, they then consider the Fed’s and the SEC’s reactions to the recent crisis, building an informative new perspective on how the modern economy works.

Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. Gary B. Gorton, a prominent expert on financial crises, argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. Misunderstanding Financial Crises offers a back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic events caused by a perfect storm of unconnected factors. Instead, Gorton shows how financial crises are, indeed, inherent to our financial system. Economists, Gorton writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Comparing the so-called "Quiet Period" of 1934 to 2007, when there were no systemic crises, to the "Panic of 2007-2008," Gorton ties together key issues like bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, moral hazard, and too-big-too-fail--all to illustrate the true causes of financial collapse. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises since 1934 did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in part to the misunderstandings of economists, who assured regulators that all was well. Gorton also looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to think about markets and a description of the regulation necessary to address the future threat of financial disaster.

A corporate guide to crisis management in volatile financial markets Current financial crises in Argentina, Japan, and Turkey are being played out on the front pages of newspapers, and these are just the most recent financial crises that have rolled across the globe in the last decade and whose far-reaching impact hurts business around the world. Dangerous Markets: Managing in Financial Crises recognizes that no global corporation or financial institution can afford to ignore the potential of a financial storm and will help top management and financial professionals navigate through this often disastrous maze. While many books discuss financial crises and their ramifications, none has presented an action plan for managing these storms—until now. Dangerous Markets: Managing in Financial Crises presents a method that allows executives and financial professionals to recognize the warning signs of a financial crisis and act appropriately before the situation spirals out of control. Based on years of research and practice in cleaning up the mess, McKinsey consultants Barton, Newell, and Wilson reveal the warning signs of potential financial catastrophes and provide unique principles that can be followed to shape and manage a strategy for survival.