The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
Title | The Many Faces of Strategic Voting PDF eBook |
Author | John H Aldrich |
Publisher | University of Michigan Press |
Total Pages | 253 |
Release | 2019-02-28 |
Genre | Political Science |
ISBN | 0472901125 |
Voters do not always choose their preferred candidate on election day. Often they cast their ballots to prevent a particular outcome, as when their own preferred candidate has no hope of winning and they want to prevent another, undesirable candidate’s victory; or, they vote to promote a single-party majority in parliamentary systems, when their own candidate is from a party that has no hope of winning. In their thought-provoking book The Many Faces of Strategic Voting, Laura B. Stephenson, John H. Aldrich, and André Blais first provide a conceptual framework for understanding why people vote strategically, and what the differences are between sincere and strategic voting behaviors. Expert contributors then explore the many facets of strategic voting through case studies in Great Britain, Spain, Canada, Japan, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and the European Union.
Making Votes Count
Title | Making Votes Count PDF eBook |
Author | Gary W. Cox |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | 362 |
Release | 1997-03-28 |
Genre | Political Science |
ISBN | 9780521585279 |
Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
How to Rig an Election
Title | How to Rig an Election PDF eBook |
Author | Nic Cheeseman |
Publisher | Yale University Press |
Total Pages | 343 |
Release | 2024-07-23 |
Genre | Political Science |
ISBN | 0300280831 |
An engrossing analysis of the pseudo-democratic methods employed by despots around the world to retain control Contrary to what is commonly believed, authoritarian leaders who agree to hold elections are generally able to remain in power longer than autocrats who refuse to allow the populace to vote. In this engaging and provocative book, Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas expose the limitations of national elections as a means of promoting democratization, and reveal the six essential strategies that dictators use to undermine the electoral process in order to guarantee victory for themselves. Based on their firsthand experiences as election watchers and their hundreds of interviews with presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, election officials, and conspirators, Cheeseman and Klaas document instances of election rigging from Argentina to Zimbabwe, including notable examples from Brazil, India, Nigeria, Russia, and the United States—touching on the 2016 election. This eye-opening study offers a sobering overview of corrupted professional politics, while providing fertile intellectual ground for the development of new solutions for protecting democracy from authoritarian subversion.
Comparing Democracies
Title | Comparing Democracies PDF eBook |
Author | Lawrence LeDuc |
Publisher | SAGE Publications, Incorporated |
Total Pages | 448 |
Release | 1996-08-29 |
Genre | Political Science |
ISBN |
11. Leaders - Ian McAllister
The Political Logic of Poverty Relief
Title | The Political Logic of Poverty Relief PDF eBook |
Author | Alberto Diaz-Cayeros |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | 259 |
Release | 2016-02-26 |
Genre | Political Science |
ISBN | 1107140285 |
The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places electoral politics and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation. The authors develop a theory with applications to Mexico about how elections shape social programs aimed at aiding the poor. They also assess whether voters reward politicians for targeted poverty alleviation programs.
Strategic Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems
Title | Strategic Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems PDF eBook |
Author | Thomas Gschwend |
Publisher | |
Total Pages | 292 |
Release | 2001 |
Genre | Party affiliation |
ISBN |
Strategic Voting
Title | Strategic Voting PDF eBook |
Author | Reshef Liu |
Publisher | Springer Nature |
Total Pages | 149 |
Release | 2022-05-31 |
Genre | Computers |
ISBN | 3031015797 |
Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome. In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics, and computer science. The book has two parts. The first part asks "are there voting rules that are truthful?" in the sense that all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point, we survey both extensions of the theorem and various conditions under which truthful voting is made possible (such as restricted preference domains). We also explore the connections with other problems of mechanism design such as locating a facility that serves multiple users. In the second part, we ask "what would be the outcome when voters do vote strategically?" rather than trying to prevent such behavior. We overview various game-theoretic models and equilibrium concepts from the literature, demonstrate how they apply to voting games, and discuss their implications on social welfare. We conclude with a brief survey of empirical and experimental findings that could play a key role in future development of game theoretic voting models.