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This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1874 edition. Excerpt: ... and the columns came up afterwards. Further details will be found in a subsequent chapter on the supply of ammunition. Let us now examine the French accounts of the period of the battle described above. The 2nd and 3rd French Corps observed movements on the part of the Germans at an early hour. This was reported to Marshal Bazaine at 10 o'clock, and the orders to the 3rd and 4th Corps as to the defensive measures they were to take were repeated. The troops were to encamp in two lines, in as close order as possible, while the 6th Corps was to explore the road to Marange, north of Bronvaux, which leads towards the extreme right flank, and the 4th Corps to reconnoitre in the direction of Nerroy le Veneur.1 It was already recognised as possible that the Germans might extend their front so far as to threaten a serious attack on St. Privat. In this case the 6th Corps was to hold its ground there so as to enable the right wing to change its front in case of necessity, with a view to taking up a position in rear, which it was then in the act of reconnoitring. On the other hand the 4th French Corps was evidently surprised, and according to Montluisant's account the 6th Corps also, by the attack of the Ixth Army Corps. That writer says: --'On the i8th also the 6th Corps possessed no information as to the position of the enemy, and the staff was so far from suspecting the approach of the Prussians that it looked on the first information sent from St. Marie aux Chenes, suggesting the probability of an early attack from Batilly and St. Ail, as unworthy of credence.' 1 Both these villages lay in the rear of the French position, and the fact suggests a fear on the part of the Marshal that it was threatened by the Germans. According to Frossard the fire...

"The battle of Metz in the autumn of 1944 was the last time in the history of modern warfare when supposedly out-dated fortresses, built nearly a half century earlier, were able to play a decisive role. Impervious to heavy artillery and air bombardment, they enabled a weak and die-hard German force to resist, and, for o time, stop powerful American forces who had sliced across France. It was also a battle of 'might-have-beens.'"--Book Jacket.

General George Patton's most controversial campaign was the series of battles in autumn 1944 battles along the German frontier which centered on the fortified city of Metz. In part, the problem was logistics. As was the case with the rest of the Allied forces in the European Theatre, supplies were limited until the port of Antwerp could finally be cleared. Also problematic was the weather. The autumn of 1944 was one of the wettest on record, and hardly conducive to the type of mechanized warfare for which Patton was so famous. However at the heart of the problem was the accretion of sophisticated fortifications. Metz had been fortified since ancient times, heavily rebuilt by France in the post-Napoleonic period, modernized by Germany in 1870–1914, and modernized by France during the Maginot effort in 1935–40. The Germans hoped to hold Metz with a thin screen of second-rate troops, counting on the impregnable fortifications. This book covers the entire campaign from beginning to end, offering an unbiased assessment of the success and failures of both the Allied and Axis efforts.