This study is a philosophical critique of the foundations of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. As such, it also takes cognizance of his claim that psychoanalysis has the credentials of a natural science. It shows that the reasoning on which Freud rested the major hypotheses of his edifice was fundamentally flawed, even if the probity of the clinical observations he adduced were not in question. Moreover, far from deserving to be taken at face value, clinical data from the psychoanalytic treatment setting are themselves epistemically quite suspect.

Offers a systematic analysis of Freud's theories, examines the effectiveness of the retrospective clinical methods used in psychoanalysis, and discusses free association, dreams, and personality.

Offers a systematic analysis of Freud's theories, examines the effectiveness of the retrospective clinical methods used in psychoanalysis, and discusses free association, dreams, and personality.

The normal approach to the study of the foundations of psychoanalysis is to focus on Sigmund Freud's classical texts. In this book, however, the author approaches the issue from the perspective of the foundations of behavioural sciences in general. He studies the nature of psychological terms and explanations, and the relation between neuroscience and psychology. Due to the wide perspective, the author is able to create a fresh view to the stubborn debate concerning the scientific status of psychoanalysis. The author shows that both advocates and critics of psychoanalysis have a tendency to misconstrue the nature of psychoanalytic theorizing, and thus have had unrealistic expectations of psychoanalytic explanations. The book tries to differentiate between those aspects of psychoanalysis which should be considered scientific, and those aspects of psychotherapies in general which should not come into the scientific category. This books will be found to be a valuable contribution to the field of psychoanalytic studies.

Schelling, Freud, and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychoanalysis provides a long-overdue dialogue between two seminal thinkers, Schelling and Freud. Through a sustained reading of the sublime, mythology, the uncanny, and freedom, this book provokes the reader to retrieve and revive the shared roots of philosophy and psychoanalysis. Teresa Fenichel examines the philosophical basis for the concepts of the unconscious and for the nature of human freedom on which psychoanalysis rests. Drawing on the work of German philosopher F. W. J. Schelling, the author explores how his philosophical understanding of human actions, based as it was on the ideas of drives, informed and helped shape Freud’s work. Fenichel also stresses the philosophical weight of Freudian psychoanalysis, specifically in regards to the problem of freedom and argues that psychoanalysis complicates and reinforces Schelling’s basic idea: to know reality we must engage with the world empathetically and intimately. This book also serves as an introduction to Schelling’s thought, arguing that his metaphysics—particularly concerning the primacy of the unconscious and of fantasy—can be read as a therapeutic endeavor. Finally, the book offers a deep rethinking of the action and nature of sublimation through both Freud’s and Schelling’s texts. Fenichel suggests psychoanalytic therapy is self-interpretation—a recognition of our narratives as narratives, without for that reason taking them any less seriously. Schelling, Freud, and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychoanalysis will be of great interest to psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic psychotherapists as well as scholars of philosophy.

Metapsychology and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis redresses faults in Freud’s original conception to develop a coherent theoretical basis for psychodynamic theory. Simon Boag demonstrates that Freud’s much maligned ‘metapsychology’, once revised, can provide a foundation for evaluating and integrating the plethora of psychodynamic perspectives, by developing a philosophically-informed position that addresses the embodied, interconnected relationship between motivation, cognition and affects. The book centres upon the major concepts in psychoanalysis, including the notion of unconscious mental processes, wish-fulfilment, fantasy, and repression. Both philosophical considerations and empirical evidence are brought to bear upon these topics, and used to extract the valuable insights from major approaches. As a result, Boag’s revised general psychology, which stays true to Freud’s intention, addresses psychoanalytic pluralism and shows it is possible to develop a unified account, integrating the insights from attachment theory and object relational approaches and acknowledging the rightful role for neuropsychoanalysis. Metapsychology and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis will be of interest to psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, philosophers of mind and psychologists, as well as anyone concerned with neuropsychoanalysis or psychoanalysis and attachment theory.

In his Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, Adolf Grunbaum claimed that the arguments supporting psychoanalytic hypotheses are both logically invalid and unsound. They are invalid because they violate the cannons of inductive elimination, and unsound because the clinical data is contaminated by the suggestive influence of the analyst.In a spirited defence of psychoanalysis, the author asserts that Grunbaum's argument over suggestibility is not supported by textual evidence and gives her own formulation of Freud's argument to show how the problem of suggestibility can be dealt with. To counter the charge of the invalidity of the repression argument, the author addresses the two specific objections of Grunbaum: first, that repression can be a maintaining rather than an originating cause of neurotic symptoms, and, second, that by eliminating rival candidates it is possible to formulate a valid argument for repression aetiology. This book is a must-read for all those interested in the stature and reputation of psychoanalysis in the scientific world.