Recent years have seen a renaissance of interest in the relationship between natural law and natural rights. During this time, the concept of natural rights has served as a conceptual lightning rod, either strengthening or severing the bond between traditional natural law and contemporary human rights. Does the concept of natural rights have the natural law as its foundation or are the two ideas, as Leo Strauss argued, profoundly incompatible? With The Foundations of Natural Morality, S. Adam Seagrave addresses this controversy, offering an entirely new account of natural morality that compellingly unites the concepts of natural law and natural rights. Seagrave agrees with Strauss that the idea of natural rights is distinctly modern and does not derive from traditional natural law. Despite their historical distinctness, however, he argues that the two ideas are profoundly compatible and that the thought of John Locke and Thomas Aquinas provides the key to reconciling the two sides of this long-standing debate. In doing so, he lays out a coherent concept of natural morality that brings together thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes and Locke, revealing the insights contained within these disparate accounts as well as their incompleteness when considered in isolation. Finally, he turns to an examination of contemporary issues, including health care, same-sex marriage, and the death penalty, showing how this new account of morality can open up a more fruitful debate.

Morality based on natural law has a long tradition, and has proven to be quite resilient in the face of numerous attacks and challenges over the years. Those challenges are no less serious today, which leads one to ask if natural law is still a viable foundation for ethics. Craig Boyd provides a contemporary defense of natural law theory against modern challenges from the arenas of science, religion, culture, and philosophy. In his analysis, he defends many of the classical elements of natural law, but also takes into account the contributions of scientific discoveries about human nature. He concludes that natural law is a necessary but not sufficient basis for ethics that must be accompanied by a theory of virtue.

Author Alberto M. Piedra lucidly illustrates the notion of 'natural law' through the examination of economic, social, political, and cultural issues. In this work Piedra draws on classical and Christian sources as well as his personal experience as an economist, diplomat, and lecturer on world politics to address philosophical views in a constructive and morally guided exegesis of natural law and economics. This innovative book shows the value of appeals to a governing, natural law and attendant principles such as the common good, subsidiarity, hierarchy, spiritual welfare, the reciprocity of freedom and authority, and the cultivation of personal moral and intellectual virtue. Natural Law will appeal to scholars, professionals, and others interested in the cultivation of personal moral and intellectual virtue.

A systematic analysis considers the objectivity of ethics, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist worldview and its role in a person's rational lifespan.

A concise and accessible introduction to natural law ethics, this book introduces readers to the mainstream tradition of Western moral philosophy. Building on philosophers from Plato through Aquinas to John Finnis, Alfonso Gómez-Lobo links morality to the protection of basic human goods--life, family, friendship, work and play, the experience of beauty, knowledge, and integrity--elements essential to a flourishing, happy human life. Gómez-Lobo begins with a discussion of Plato's Crito as an introduction to the practice of moral philosophy, showing that it requires that its participants treat each other as equals and offer rational arguments to persuade each other. He then puts forth a general principle for practical rationality: one should pursue what is good and avoid what is bad. The human goods form the basis for moral norms that provide a standard by which actions can be evaluated: do they support or harm the human goods? He argues that moral norms should be understood as a system of rules whose rationale is the protection and enhancement of human goods. A moral norm that does not enjoin the preservation or enhancement of a specific good is unjustifiable. Shifting to a case study approach, Gómez-Lobo applies these principles to a discussion of abortion and euthanasia. The book ends with a brief treatment of rival positions, including utilitarianism and libertarianism, and of conscience as our ultimate moral guide. Written as an introductory text for students of ethics and natural law, Morality and the Human Goods makes arguments consistent with Catholic teaching but is not based on theological considerations. The work falls squarely within the field of philosophical ethics and will be of interest to readers of any background.

A distinguished international team of philosophers offer responses to the work of Bernard Williams, followed by the author's reply.

Few philosophers attempt to establish that there is an evaluative and moral realm. They make these major assumptions without argument. This plays into the hands of moral nihilists and certain other moral skeptics. A major obstacle that prevents philosophers from developing such arguments is the long-standing view that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is,” that is, one cannot begin with purely descriptive non-evaluative propositions and deduce an evaluative or moral proposition. In this book, Edmund Wall develops arguments for evaluative and moral principles. His deductive reasoning begins with certain purely descriptive and non-evaluative propositions concerning human nature, establishing a basic moral principle of human life and a basic moral principle of knowledge. By providing such deductive arguments for basic moral principles, Wall makes considerable progress in establishing a sure foundation for morality. He further develops his case by responding to a plethora of anticipated objections against his two arguments, and by delineating the advantages of his own moral approach over a number of influential moral theories and competing accounts of moral reasoning.